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ABSTRACT 
 
Adverse events are a common occurrence in health care. While much attention 
has been paid to the impact of adverse events on patients and families, little is known 
about the experiences of health care providers as “second victims.” This study examines 
the experiences of second victims, using the example of one Canadian health region that 
had experienced a large-scale event that continues to shape how adverse events are 
understood and managed in that context. The methodology used is critical ethnography. 
The researcher uses her knowledge as an insider to health care organizational culture to 
explore the embodied and everyday experiences of health care providers. The study 
makes explicit the connections between culture and power to scrutinize the normative 
assumptions, values and beliefs that shape, and are shaped by, the experience of adverse 
events.  
Staff feel powerless to speak up about adverse events; and by resisting the 
oppression that they fear will result if they were to speak out, they perpetuate the 
relations of power. Staff blame a constructed monolithic health care organization for the 
oppression, a story of responsibility and blame that is reinforced by the public via the 
media. Power is hidden and implicit in the system. Key findings are: (1) Health care 
providers involved in adverse events need to be given the opportunity to talk about their 
experience; (2) The best way to provide support is to recognize that support is needed 
quickly; and (3) In order for an organization to appropriately support the second victims 
of adverse events and their subsequent patients, a systems approach -- with attention to 
organizational culture in its relation to power -- is required.  
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The specific organizational features that shaped the experiences of health care 
providers in this study are not unique to the organization that was the site of the study. 
This study illustrates the magnitude of the trauma and the expanse of the possible 
experiences and helps us to understand more fully the second victim perspective and how 
a health care organization can mitigate the trauma to second victims.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Locating the Health Care Provider within an Adverse Event 
1.1 Introduction  
The experience of being involved in an adverse event may leave the health care 
provider traumatized as a second victim. This study examines the second victim 
experience of health care providers from front-line staff to organizational leaders. The 
result is concrete direction about how a health care organization can better support health 
care providers to reduce the impact of adverse events on second victims and patients in 
the long term, and how to reform adverse event management. A critical ethnographic 
approach was used to examine adverse event experiences from the perspective of health 
care providers.  
Adverse events are common in health care and can have a significant effect on 
health care providers. Health care providers frequently feel “personally responsible for 
the unexpected patient outcomes and feel as though they have failed their patients, 
second-guessing their clinical skills and knowledge base” (Scott et al., 2010, p. 233). 
After an adverse event, health care providers – and by that I am referring to all people 
involved in the provision of health care from front-line staff to organizational leaders -- 
are often left to find support through their own resources, leaving the health care provider 
unsupported. As this study will show, this may in turn change behaviour and pose risks 
for future patients. The experience of being involved in an adverse event has been 
relatively unexamined and remains poorly understood even by the health care providers 
who have had such experiences.  
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The scope of adverse event management is very broad, encompassing: the 
reporting system, the policies and guidelines that inform the activities, the investigative 
processes and the responses of individuals, colleagues and organizational leadership to 
the event. The last fifteen years have seen an exponential increase in research on and 
attention to medical error and patient1 safety in health care (Conway & Weingart, 2009). 
The health care system has become increasingly cognisant of ethical practice and 
concerned for acknowledging the unnecessary suffering of patients and families. Far less 
progress has been made toward respect and compassion for the health care workers 
(Conway & Weingart, 2009). Studies examining the type and frequency of adverse events 
have not considered the experience from the health care providers’ standpoint, nor how a 
health care provider is located within such an event and how adverse events are organized 
within a health care organization. 
This study is important because it makes visible the adverse event experience, in 
particular revealing how it is understood by health care providers. When an adverse event 
happens, there are a number of processes that are activated, and those involved may or 
may not have had contact with or be known to one another. It is only by having an 
understanding of the experience of adverse events from the health care providers’ 
standpoint that a health care organization can begin to put mechanisms in place to 
mitigate future effects on health care providers and the patients who receive care. 
This study employed critical ethnography as the methodology. Critical 
ethnography helps to situate what is observed in the field in the larger context, to see the 
                                                 
1 In this dissertation, the term patient is used to represent patients, clients and residents. 
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links “between everyday action or interaction and wider cultural formations” (Savage, 
2006, p. 385). “Critical ethnography explicates a political agenda and is not simply a 
description of the insider’s perspective” (McCabe & Holmes, 2014, p. 79). It attempts to 
uncover the hidden or taken-for-granted structures and relationships of power and control 
(Bransford, 2006; Grbich, 1999). “Healthcare organizations, like all organizations, are 
politically and historically constructed,” (Batch & Windsor, 2015, p. 872) and Eastern 
Health, where this study is situated, is no exception. Undertaking ethnography with a 
critical lens ensured a focus on what was (or is) but also on what could be (Batch & 
Windsor, 2015). The orientation toward change in critical ethnography, according to 
Foley and Valenzuela (2008), spans a continuum from political activity at one end to 
enlightening policy direction at the other. This research assumed the latter position. 
An adverse event can be a frightening experience for both the patient and the 
health care provider. For some health care providers, it can be an event that is never 
resolved. Some health care providers continue to feel punished by their colleagues and 
their employer long after the event. Before attempting to begin to examine the 
experiences of staff2 involved in adverse events within Eastern Health it is important to 
describe what constitutes an adverse event for the purposes of this study and to define the 
level of harm in relation to victimization that is being considered in this study.  
                                                 
2 For ease of reading the term ‘staff’ will be used at times in place of ‘staff members’, 
such that the term is used in a singular as well as plural sense throughout the 
dissertation. I am using staff and health care providers interchangeably and by health 
care providers I am referring to all people involved in health care delivery from front-
line staff to organizational leaders. 
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1.2 The Definition of Adverse Event 
Adverse events, including errors, have been acknowledged as a frequent 
occurrence in health care for at least the past decade (Levinson & Gallagher, 2007, p. 95), 
although occurrences have probably always existed. The Canadian Patient Safety Institute 
(CPSI) defines an adverse event as “an event that results in unintended harm to the 
patient, and is related to the care and/or services provided to the patient rather than to the 
patient’s underlying medical condition” (2012b, p. 1). An adverse event may or may not 
be directly connected with an error. “An error is defined as the failure of a planned action 
to be completed as intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve 
an aim (i.e., error of planning)” (Institute of Medicine, 1999, p. 28). Therefore an adverse 
event that results from the failure of a planned action or the use of a wrong plan would be 
considered an adverse event caused by an error. An adverse event attributable to error is 
considered a preventable adverse event, whereas in a non-preventable adverse event, no 
error is identifiable.  
It is important to acknowledge that an adverse event attributable to error is not 
necessarily attributable to a person, but may be the result of a system that created the 
opportunity for error, often referred to in this study as a systems issue or systemic 
problem. Systems issues and systemic problems will be discussed in more detail in 
Section 2.10 (“System and Human Factors”). It is important to begin the discussion of 
adverse events with a focus on the persons who are harmed by the adverse event and by 
defining the concept of victim and how victim is used within adverse event and patient 
safety management discourse.  
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1.3 Victims of an Adverse Event 
There are three distinct levels of harm identified in relation to an adverse event 
(Leuven Institute for Healthcare Research, 2016). First, the event begins with the 
individual who is affected, the patient. There has been an increasing focus in recent years 
on patient safety and the effect of adverse events on the individual patient and family, 
who are often referred to as the victim. The effect of the adverse event extends outward, 
beyond the individual first victim, to include health care providers who are involved in 
the event in some capacity and are potentially affected by the event. Those individuals are 
referred to in the literature as the second victims. The experience of being a second 
victim will vary depending on how close or distant the health care provider is to the 
adverse event. The third level of contact is the effect of the adverse event on the corporate 
or organizational body, referred to as the third victim. Some people who are not 
considered to be involved in the event, perhaps seen as observers and not typically 
identified as possible victims, may also be affected by the event. 
Adverse events share many of the same attributes as other forms of trauma, 
including the difficulty faced by the victims in sharing their stories since those stories 
bring the event back to conscious awareness (Wu & Steckelberg, 2012). As a result of 
this challenge, the force of an adverse event is often locked behind the silence and untold 
stories of its victims. This study examines the experiences of second victims. For the 
purposes of this inquiry, the category of second victims includes not only health care 
providers who have been directly involved in an adverse event, but those who have been 
negatively and seriously affected by an event because of indirect involvement or 
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involvement by association. The distinctions between direct, indirect and associated 
involvement will be described in more detail in Section 1.13 (“Research Questions”). 
1.4 Study Site  
The study was conducted within the Eastern Health region of Newfoundland and 
Labrador (NL). NL is the most easterly province of Canada, situated in the country’s 
Atlantic region. It incorporates the island of Newfoundland and mainland Labrador to the 
northwest, with a combined area of 405,212 square kilometres (Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2015). The province’s population in 2014 was estimated at 
526,000 with approximately 92% of the population living on the island of Newfoundland 
(Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2015). Eastern Health is the largest 
integrated health authority in Newfoundland and Labrador.  
Figure 1-1: Newfoundland and Labrador Health Regions, 2007.  Source: 
Statistics Canada            
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At the time of this writing, Eastern Health had approximately 13,500 employees 
and was serving a regional population of approximately 290,000. It offers the full 
continuum of health and community services and is the only health authority within NL 
providing tertiary care.  
The experience of the hugely significant adverse event known as ER/PR3 
inevitably shapes how Eastern Health staff experience adverse events in general. The 
purpose of the next section is to describe ER/PR. 
1.5 ER/PR 
At the entrance to the Health Science Centre in St. John’s, Newfoundland (NL) 
sits a monument, placed to honour the victims of a tragedy. Those who pass by or come 
to visit the monument think about the victims -- the patients and families -- who were 
affected by that tragedy. However, some health care providers who were involved in this 
tragedy and who must pass by perceive the monument in a very different way. The 
tragedy is referred to by staff in Eastern Health as ER/PR. ER/PR is an acronym that 
refers to estrogen receptor and progesterone receptor testing for breast cancer; but when 
staff use the term ER/PR they are referring to a period in the organization’s history, 
specifically the time from the identification of a problem with ER/PR testing in 2005 to 
the beginning of the Cameron Inquiry4 in 2008. 
ER/PR testing is performed by a process called immunohistochemistry (IHC), 
involving the application of labelled antibodies to a section of breast cancer tissue. The 
                                                 
3 ER/PR - Estrogen Receptor Progesterone Receptor testing. 
4 The Cameron Inquiry was a Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor Testing 
established in June 2007 with Justice Margaret Cameron appointed to lead it. 
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slides are subsequently examined under a microscope to assess whether there are 
hormone receptors which take up these antibodies (Rayson & Barnes, 2008). The 
determination of a potentially hormonally-sensitive tumour is based on the presence of 
one or both of these hormone receptors, referred to as markers. The evaluation of these 
ER/PR markers is critical for therapeutic decision-making and plays an essential role in 
determining whether a breast cancer patient would benefit from anti-hormonal therapy 
(Mathews, Newbury, & Housser, 2011; Rayson & Barnes, 2008). “Patients with 
clinically positive results may be offered Tamoxifen or an aromatase inhibitor” (Mathews 
et al., 2011, p. 175). 
In the Spring of 2005, a breast cancer patient (PD) whose cancer had spread to her 
liver and spine, having exhausted all her treatment options, travelled with her husband to 
New York for a holiday. In the context of that trip, her husband, a physician himself, by 
happen-stance met a physician from Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (MS-
KCC), in an elevator (Cameron, 2009a). The physician from MS-KCC was attending a 
conference on cancer treatment in the same hotel. PD’s husband enquired about the 
possibility of any new or experimental treatment that his wife might participate in and 
returned to St. John’s with a plan to have his wife’s oncologist contact MS-KCC to 
inquire about the possibilities (Cameron, 2009b). It was in the context of the contact 
made with a breast oncologist at MS-KCC, in April 2005, that PD’s diagnosis in relation 
to her ER/PR results was described as “very rare” and a recommendation was made to 
repeat the ER/PR testing (Cameron, 2009b, p. 2). It was determined from retesting that 
both the estrogen and progesterone receptor status changed to positive, and anti-hormonal 
treatment that was originally rejected as a treatment option was now indicated, although 
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unfortunately PD’s illness was too far advanced and she succumbed to her illness in the 
summer of 2005 (Cameron, 2009b). 
As a result of the outcome of PD’s sample retest, an informal internal 
investigation was conducted to retest a number of other patients’ samples whose original 
results were also negative for ER/PR (Mathews et al., 2011). In May 2005, Eastern 
Health began a more formal internal investigation into ER/PR receptor tests after a 
number of breast cancer patients’ test results changed from clinically negative to positive 
on retest (Cameron, 2009b). In the summer of 2005, a decision was made to retest all 
breast cancer samples for patients who were tested between 1997 and 2005 and whose 
initial ER/PR status was clinically negative (Mathews et al., 2011). Samples were sent for 
retesting to a reference laboratory in Toronto, although Eastern Health encountered 
difficulties identifying all the patients who should have been retested since “there was no 
single data source that captured this information” (Mathews et al., 2011, p. 175). The 
retesting of ER/PR samples occurred over the course of a year and resulted in a high rate 
of result changes from negative to positive. The new result meant that some women 
would have been offered different treatment options if the new result had been reported 
originally.  
Patients who were initially retested as part of the internal investigation and whose 
results had changed were contacted and followed up by a physician, usually their 
oncologist (Cameron, 2009b). Eastern Health decided to wait to inform the patients in the 
larger group until their retest results were received, which resulted in a delay in informing 
some patients, since the retesting in some cases took several months (Mathews et al., 
2011). There was also a decision made by Eastern Health against making a public 
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announcement about the concerns with the test (Mathews et al., 2011). A plan to 
communicate with patients had not yet been decided when a local newspaper broke the 
story in October 2005 (Cameron, 2009b). Eastern Health then began to contact patients in 
a more comprehensive fashion by using the staff resources of the Quality and Risk 
Management program.  
The messaging by Eastern Health, related to the cause of the testing problems and 
the numbers of patients impacted, proved problematic for the organization. In October of 
2005 and again in December of 2006 Eastern Health suggested that the cause of the 
problems was a change in equipment which increased the sensitivity of the test 
(Cameron, 2009b). However, both internal and external reviews found serious problems 
in the preparation and preservation of tissues, the preparation of slides, the staining of 
tissues, as well as a lack of quality control and quality assurance protocols (Mathews et 
al., 2011). In December of 2006, Eastern Health identified the number of patients whose 
treatment had changed as a result of the retesting, indicating an error rate of 12 percent. 
However, in May 2007, in the context of a class action lawsuit5 (discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 4), a different report of the total number of patients whose results had changed 
suggested an error rate of 42 percent. This information led to questions about whether all 
patients had been contacted, with Eastern Health reporting that all patients had been 
contacted and media reports contradicting those assurances (Mathews et al., 2011). The 
provincial government began to question Eastern Health’s handling of the ER/PR 
retesting and as a result established a Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor 
                                                 
5 Verna Doucette v. Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority, 2010. 
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Testing6, in June 2007, with Justice Margaret Cameron appointed to lead it. The period 
referred to as ER/PR is the period from the discovery of the changed results in 2005 to 
the beginning of the public hearings in the Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor 
Testing (The Cameron Inquiry) in March 2008. 
Although adverse events are an expected reality in health care organizations 
across the country, this event seemed different. It became the focus of local media 
attention for many months, even garnering the attention of national media.  
1.6 Researcher within Eastern Health 
It is important to note that I do not have any personal experience of ER/PR or the 
Cameron Inquiry. I joined the organization as an employee in 2009, a few months after 
the Cameron Inquiry report had been released. I joined the QRM program staff more than 
2 years later, in 2011. During my first 2 years with Eastern Health I was only peripherally 
aware of the circumstances of ER/PR and the Cameron Inquiry, since the Public Health 
Program where I was employed as a manager had no direct connections with the ER/PR 
events. Staff in Public Health occasionally mentioned the Cameron Inquiry as an 
organizational point of interest, but I had not read the report and there were no specific 
changes in the program I was managing (Communicable Disease Control and 
Immunization) based on the recommendations of the Cameron Inquiry report. When I 
began my position as Quality Clinical Safety Leader, in QRM, in the Fall of 2011, I was 
working directly with people in a program that had been intimately involved in the events 
of ER/PR and the Cameron Inquiry, and directly affected by the development of new 
                                                 
6 The Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor Testing, known as The Cameron 
Inquiry. 
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policy that resulted from the Cameron Inquiry Report (see Section 4.7.3) and by the 
realignment of program functions based on the recommendations of the Cameron Inquiry 
Report and the Task Force on Adverse Health Events Report (see Section 4.3.2). I was 
also directly involved with the management of the Client Safety Reporting System (see 
Section 4.2.5), working with staff to provide orientation to the reporting system and 
encouraging reporting, completing Quality Case Reviews (see Section 4.2.7) and Root 
Cause Analysis Concise Investigations (see Section 4.2.6), and supporting program 
management in disclosure and adverse event management. 
1.7 Examining the Experience of Adverse Events 
 This study aimed to examine the experiences of health care providers who were 
second victims of adverse events within Eastern Health, the largest regional health 
authority in Canada’s most easterly province of Newfoundland and Labrador. That 
particular health region had experienced a significant adverse event (referred to as ER/PR 
and described in detail in Section 1.5) that involved many staff and patients and received 
nation-wide media attention. The event had resulted in an Inquiry and, subsequently, 
many policy and procedural changes within the organization, beginning about a decade 
prior to this research and ongoing at the time this research was initiated. This study 
begins with an examination of the experiences reported by staff in the context of ER/PR 
and continues with the experiences of adverse events in the years that followed. An 
examination or critique of the ER/PR event would make an interesting project but that 
was not the focus of this study. The intent of this study was not to analyse any particular 
event; instead, this study examines the system in which such events take place. The intent 
was to “unpack” and scrutinize the ways things are done, what things are said, who 
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interacts with whom, where power dynamics are, and how power is exercised, resisted, 
ignored, or dismissed by various players, with a focus on those health care providers – 
both staff and management -- who have been second victims of adverse events within 
Eastern Health.  
This study is very complex from an organizational as well as emotional 
perspective. The experiences of participants and the stories that were shared within the 
context of this study were heartfelt and heart-breaking at times. This study was made 
even more complex by the reality that it was very difficult to accurately portray such 
sensitive and hurtful content. As well, it was made complex because the story continues -
- these experiences are not in the past; the experiences are ongoing. Many who continue 
to work in Eastern Health suffer in very tangible ways from adverse events that happened 
in the past.  
Prior to conducting this research, I had already been well aware of the pain of the 
second victims of adverse events, through my role as Quality Clinical Safety Leader in 
Quality and Risk Management (QRM) for Eastern Health (a role that concluded just as 
data collection was beginning). Subsequently, as I listened to and examined, over many 
months, the stories shared in this study, I was increasingly personally transformed by the 
pain of the second victims who shared their experiences with me. At the conclusion of 
this research, I now position myself as a second victim. This is in part by virtue of my 
previous work in the QRM program investigating adverse events and in part as a result of 
my experiences entering into participants’ pain as a critical ethnographer.   
In this dissertation, some events have been altered slightly and, at times, genders 
of participants have been changed to preserve the confidentiality of participants and to 
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make events less recognizable. I have tried to do this in a way that maintains the integrity 
of each participant’s intent.  
1.8 Variances in the Experiences of Adverse Events 
Observations within my QRM role caused me to reflect on an earlier experience I 
had, working elsewhere, regarding a family’s loss. That reflection led me to this research 
inquiry. While working in QRM and observing the experience of both front line staff and 
QRM staff trying to cope in the aftermath of adverse events, and observing the responses 
of patients and families, I began to reflect on a story that seemed to tell a different tale, 
for both staff and patients. In 1998 I relocated to the province of British Columbia. 
Shortly after arriving in BC I met a family who had recently lost a child, a daughter, as a 
result of a medical error. At that time I had not identified medical errors or circumstances 
of medical error to be a particular interest of mine, so I just listened to their story. As the 
story unfolded there were a number of details that were shared with me and have 
remained important to me within the context of my observations in QRM and 
subsequently during this research.  
The daughter was 7 years old when she had an isolated relapse of lymphoblastic 
leukaemia of her bone marrow, approximately 2 years after her initial treatment for 
central nervous system-negative acute lymphoblastic leukaemia. The chemotherapy 
treatments for the relapse were provided at the BC Children’s Hospital in a treatment 
room similar to an operating theatre, with the oncologist and nurses present while the 
parents waited in a waiting area. During the course of a chemotherapy treatment, the 
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oncologist, in error, gave an intrathecal7 injection of Vincristine, a drug whose route of 
administration is intravenous, that resulted in the child’s death. The error was recognized 
immediately and several medical interventions were attempted to prevent her impending 
demise, but unfortunately those efforts failed. As soon as this mistake occurred, the 
physician -- being aware of the fatal effect that the medication given by this delivery 
method would have -- approached the parents to explain what had happened. The mother 
explained to me, in 1998, that when the physician recognized his error he immediately 
came out to speak to her and her husband: he described his error, took responsibility for 
the error, expressed his remorse, and encouraged them to come into the treatment room 
and spend as much time as possible with their daughter before what, he believed, would 
be a rapid death. In fact the girl did not die immediately, but succumbed to death on day 
13 following the incident. The family received a further official apology from the 
president of BC Children’s Hospital immediately following the death, accepting 
responsibility for the error and the harm done (Ombudsman of British Columbia, 1997). 
The circumstances of this event were published, in the peer reviewed Journal of 
Paediatric Haematology/Oncology in 1998, due to a commitment by the physicians 
involved to prevent future errors of this type (Fernandez, Esua, Hamilton, Fitzsimmons & 
Pritchard, 1998).8   
                                                 
7 Intrathecal refers to an injection into the spinal canal, more specifically into the sub-
arachnoid space so that it reaches the Cerebral Spinal Fluid rather than into the blood 
stream. 
8 An identical error that had not been shared with the wider health care community, 5 
years earlier, had resulted in the death of a four-year-old girl. In April of 1992, in 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Vincristine had been given intrathecally resulting in the child’s 
death, the same error described at BC Children’s Hospital. The 1997 death is 
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My reflections in relation to my study relate to the relationship between the BC 
parents and physician that resulted following the events of 1997, and how the physician 
was able to move forward in his professional life. The parents described the physician as 
someone they admired and respected for the way he responded and interacted with them 
on the day of the error. Years later, as I observed the experiences of staff, physicians, 
patients and families in the context of my QRM work in Eastern Health, I began to 
compare and contrast their experiences with the story I had heard years before. I 
wondered what it was about the events of the 1997 BC death that had allowed the parents 
to respond in a supportive way toward the physician. Their response was in contrast to 
the events I was observing, where the health care providers, patients and patients’ 
families tended to appear adversarial and the health care providers appeared to be 
traumatized and fearful of acknowledging an adverse event -- whether or not there was 
error involved. Staff who were involved in adverse events within Eastern Health were 
being traumatized and there did not appear to be any opportunity for them to become 
champions for patient safety.   
Fear of litigation seemed to play a part in the responses I was observing in Eastern 
Health. The parents in BC had described their feelings toward the physician involved in 
their daughter’s care as being concerned about him and having no ill feelings. This 
response seemed to be related to the way he had taken responsibility for his role in their 
daughter’s death. The mother verbalized that she and her husband had no desire to seek 
                                                 
representative of the result when repeatable errors in health care are not shared openly 
(Baker & Norton, 2001). The importance of this observation to this study, is the 
potential for harm that is created when incidents occur and staff do not feel safe to share 
their experience. 
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financial compensation from the physician or the hospital. Their only interest was in 
contributing to an Inquiry that would ensure that no other person would have to die as a 
result of this same kind of error, a completely preventable adverse event. This case went 
to Inquiry and articles have been written that implore system change to prevent future 
errors of this type (Fernandez et al., 1998; Noble & Donaldson, 2010). The physician and 
this family have been proactive in efforts of patient-safety in relation to paediatric 
chemotherapy.  
When patients and families are aware of an adverse event -- in particular a 
preventable adverse event -- they will commonly, from my observations in QRM, request 
information and perhaps an explanation or apology from the direct care decision-maker. 
In many cases, following the processing of their immediate grief response, they will 
express a desire to know what is being done to prevent this from happening to someone 
else. In most cases they are not interested in pursuing a legal process unless they begin to 
sense that their questions are not being answered or not being treated as important, or 
they encounter people who are trying to block their access to a reasonable process. My 
observations are supported by the literature (The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 2012; Tsimtsiou, Kirana, Hatzimouratidis, & Hatzichristou, 2014).  
When Eastern Health organizes a meeting with patients and their families for the 
purpose of explaining what happened or answering the patient's or family's questions, the 
patient and the family will be attending to details about who is present and who is 
providing information. Are they hearing an explanation directly from the person who was 
making the decisions that resulted in the event? Are they hearing an apology, if that is 
18 
 
what they deem to be appropriate? Are they being told how the system failed or how the 
system is being changed to prevent this from happening to someone else?  
In my observations of physicians, nurses, pharmacy and laboratory staff through 
my role in QRM, I had noticed that when significant events happened that negatively 
impacted a patient, staff did not immediately -- or perhaps ever -- freely talk to the patient 
or family about what had happened. When a formal apology was offered it tended to be 
delivered by a member of the organizational leadership team.    
1.9 The Importance of the Study Emerges from a Disturbing Disjuncture 
The two contrasting observations described above, combined with what I was 
hearing anecdotally from my co-workers about the ongoing experiences of trauma to 
health care providers from the ER/PR event,9 laid the foundation for the study. While 
both ER/PR and Cameron had occurred before I began my employment at Eastern 
Health, I had also personally witnessed health care providers commenting on the trauma 
that they continued to experience. For example, I heard many staff, across various 
programs and disciplines, reporting discomfort with being identified as an Eastern Health 
employee at the time of the Cameron Inquiry and even subsequently. 
Before beginning my employment in QRM I had worked as a nurse for over 30 
years. I had observed many dynamics within the culture of medicine and the context of 
health service delivery related to communication, support, system functioning and 
management oversight. I had been aware of many adverse events; but my knowledge was 
                                                 
9 The ER/PR event will be referred to again in the discussion of the Cameron Inquiry in 
Section 4.7.3.  ER/PR and Cameron both occurred before I began my employment at 
Eastern Health.  
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never as poignant as when I began my employment in the Quality and Risk Management 
(QRM) department and began to function within the role of a Quality Clinical Safety 
Leader. The Quality Clinical Safety Leader role within the health authority is specifically 
identified as having responsibility to advocate for patient safety including, in part, to 
assess and investigate the circumstances and possible causes of adverse events or 
unexpected patient outcomes. Within the event investigation, the Quality Clinical Safety 
Leader is meant to function in a neutral role, simply examining the facts and identifying, 
with the patient, the patient’s family, staff and program leadership, ways that the health 
care system may have allowed the opportunity for the event or outcome to occur.  
My observations of the staff’s non-use of the Client Safety Reporting System 
(CSRS) or, perhaps more accurately, the reluctance or fear of reporting that staff 
described -- seemed to be linked in some tangible way to the Cameron Inquiry and to an 
organizational culture that was increasingly being described by some staff as blaming or 
punitive. At the same time that the organization was continuing to enhance the resources 
of the QRM department, there was an increasing national movement toward patient safety 
and disclosure of adverse events. It became clear that to fully understand the experience 
of staff in adverse events and to begin to make a difference in that experience as a Quality 
Clinical Safety Leader, it would be necessary to examine not only their experience but 
also the texts, behaviors, and expectations of the work environment and organizational 
culture within which adverse events were occurring.  
 My interest in this study was solidified when I discovered a discrepancy between 
what I was being told was the organizational approach to adverse event management, and 
staff accounts and experiences of being involved in adverse events. I observed that some 
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employees who were involved directly, indirectly, or even at a distance in adverse events 
and outcomes were exhibiting significant traumatic responses. I also began to hear 
anecdotal reports that staff who had reported adverse events were being penalized or 
disciplined in some way. Staff who reported being indirectly involved or not involved but 
who had knowledge of events, described fear and anxiety related to future adverse events 
in terms of possible discipline. At the same time that I began noticing the lived 
experience of staff in adverse events, I was beginning to examine the policies in the 
context of my position in QRM, and I realized two important aspects of policies related to 
adverse events. First, the policy addressing adverse event management described an 
organization that intended to “support the spirit of a just culture” (Eastern Health, 2011a, 
p. 2). Second, the policies apparently did not attend to staff experiences of trauma relating 
to an adverse event. 
 I also observed angst among the QRM staff as it related to the treatment of staff at 
the time of adverse events and during quality case review processes. Quality Clinical 
Safety Leaders made ongoing attempts to advocate for staff and to create a non-punitive 
environment, including participation in policy development. There was a desire on the 
part of the QRM staff to create policy specifically related to a just culture (see Section 
2.11) that was indicative of their desire to acknowledge the harm that was coming to staff 
involved in events often outside staff’s control. In addition, QRM staff were concerned 
for the welfare of staff as a result of a health care culture that was perceived to be 
punitive. The observation of this disjuncture between the expected organizational 
approach to adverse event management as described in organizational policy (see Section 
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4.2.4) and the staff’s experiences led me to recognize the importance of doing this 
research.   
1.10 The Personification of the Organization 
In many cases it was difficult for staff to describe their event without vilifying 
Eastern Health. The personification of Eastern Health as a villain runs deeply through 
participant accounts. As much as participants may refer to “Eastern Health” (the 
organization and organizational leadership) in negative terms, there is of course no one 
person named “Eastern Health” who is responsible for the pain experienced. Managers 
and directors10 have also been identified as second victims as a result of being involved in 
managing or directing staff at the time of adverse events, and some of those managers 
and directors are key informants that I have interviewed within this study and who have 
contributed to the collective understanding of what it is to be a second victim. I wish to 
emphasise in this introductory chapter that it was a challenge in this writing to be true to 
participants’ words while not inadvertently perpetuating the negative personification of 
Eastern Health. I hope that I achieved this objective. 
1.11 Research Phases 
This research involved five principal phases. First, a review of the literature was 
conducted to understand the history of the concept of the second victim (defined in 
Section 1.3), focusing on how the concept came to be recognized and understood and on 
the evolution of the discourse of risk management and patient safety. In addition, the 
                                                 
10 The title of Director is used in Eastern Health for members of the management team 
who have managers reporting to them and who report at the Executive level to positions 
entitled “Vice President”. 
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literature review examined forms of organizational support, the concept of organizational 
“culture” and health care culture in particular, and the key concepts of power and silence. 
Second, informant interviews were conducted with 35 health care providers representing 
a full spectrum of disciplinary perspective and varying years of work experience. 
Examination of the interview data constituted the third phase and was ongoing 
throughout the data collection period and into the analysis and writing phase. A fourth 
phase involved a further review of the literature to explore system and human factors (as 
opposed to an emphasis on individual responsibility) and the concept of just culture, 
specifically in relation to the context shaping the experiences of health care providers 
involved in adverse events. And finally, in the fifth phase, texts that informants had 
identified as framing their experience were examined.  
1.12 Objectives 
The objectives of this research were: 
1) To examine the experiences of health care providers involved directly11, 
indirectly12 or by association13 with an adverse event; specifically, how an adverse 
event is managed and understood, with attention to the mechanisms of power that 
shape individual experiences.  
                                                 
11 By “directly involved” I mean health care providers who were responsible for the 
direct clinical and care decisions related to the patient's outcome. 
12 By “indirectly involved” I mean health care providers who were present at the time of 
the occurrence, aware of the clinical and care decisions, but not responsible for the 
clinical and care decisions related to the patient's outcome. 
13 By “involved by association” I mean health care providers who were not present at the 
time of the occurrence and not aware of the clinical and care decisions related to the 
patient's outcome. This included health care providers who were considered associated 
with the adverse event by someone else or who identified with the adverse event 
themselves. 
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2) To examine whether and how the organizational culture of the health care 
organization shapes the experiences of adverse events; and to identify how 
organizational strategies and supports figure in to the experience of adverse events 
by health care providers (HCPs).  
3) To examine whether, from the perspective of HCPs, the way adverse events are 
managed affects the ability to fully provide effective health care in the wake of 
being involved in an adverse event; that is, to elicit HCP opinions about whether 
there are resultant concerns related to quality and safety of patient care when 
health care is provided by a HCP who has been involved directly, indirectly or by 
association with an adverse event. 
1.13 Research Questions 
The research questions for this study included:  
What is the experience of HCPs who have been involved directly, indirectly or by 
association in an adverse event? How would a HCP describe their personal 
response in relation to the adverse event? What type of intervention, response or 
support by colleagues did the HCP experience in relation to the adverse event?  
What type of intervention/response by the health care organization did the HCP 
experience in relation to the adverse event?  
Specific questions included:  
What are the types of and pathways for communication between HCPs in the 
aftermath of an adverse event and implications for disclosure to patients and 
reports to the institution? What are the multiple ways that adverse event reporting 
and patient disclosure takes place or is silenced? Do HCPs believe that the quality 
24 
 
and safety of patient care is affected when care is provided by a HCP who has 
been involved in an adverse event? What type of intervention/response do HCPs 
believe would mitigate the effects of being involved in an adverse event?  
1.14 Potential Contributions of the Study 
 This research provides knowledge about how health care providers experience 
adverse events. In addition, this study provides information about how the experience of 
adverse events is shaped by and (re)shapes the organizational culture of reporting and 
disclosure. Moreover, this study provides important insight into whether adverse events 
have an effect on the quality and safety of patient care in the wake of a health care 
provider’s involvement in an adverse event. The outcome of these findings is the 
identification of effective strategies and supports to mitigate possible negative effects of 
adverse events on health care providers, on the organization itself, and on the patient 
population in general. 
 At a micro-level of inquiry, this is the first study to examine how responses to 
adverse events are experienced within a health care organization that has experienced a 
significant adverse event. While it is well known that there are adverse patient events of 
varying severity that occur within any health care setting, individual perspectives have, to 
now, only been anecdotally reported within Eastern Health and most other health care 
organizations. For Eastern Health, the Cameron Inquiry brought the reality of adverse 
patient events to the forefront for public examination, but the organization has not 
intentionally explored the experience of health care providers. The implications of the 
study may include new and challenging knowledge for the organization. The study will 
provide insight into the experience of health care employees, and has the potential to 
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contribute in very positive ways to organizational responses to adverse events that could 
clearly affect not only health care providers but the future quality of patient care.  
 More generally (that is, beyond Eastern Health), the findings of this study will 
inform individuals and health care organizations about the experience of health care 
providers who have been involved, directly, indirectly or by association, in an adverse 
patient event. The concept of second victim will be more fully understood and the role of 
organizational culture as it relates to the experience of second victims, as described here, 
will be available for consideration by health care organization leadership teams. The 
study will also inform the development of health care policy related to organizational 
response following adverse events. 
For the purpose of this study it is important to make a distinction between 
disclosure of adverse events to a patient or family, reporting for the purpose of adverse 
event management and participation in quality assurance activities. Disclosure refers to 
the provision of information to a patient and their family at the time of an adverse event. 
It was clear to me during my role in QRM that staff know the right thing to do in terms of 
disclosure to patients and families; staff express concern when disclosure does not 
happen either in a timely manner or in a thorough and transparent manner. Therefore, 
research on disclosure did not seem to be a necessary focus for my research. Reporting 
for the purpose of adverse event management refers to reporting to the organization 
through mechanisms like the client safety reporting system for the purpose of counting 
and classifying level of harm in an adverse event. Participation in quality assurance 
activities refers to efforts made to examine policy and procedures for the express purpose 
of improving practice and care for the purposes of patient safety improvement. This is not 
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a study of the ethics of whether or when disclosure should happen. This is not a study 
which examines whether reporting has occurred in an appropriate manner. This is a study 
that focuses on the experience of staff in adverse events and how that experience shapes 
their behaviour of disclosure, reporting and participation in quality assurance activities.       
1.15 The Chapters: An Overview  
I began by contextualizing this research with the story of the ER/PR testing errors, 
a significant laboratory medicine event that marked a pivotal point in the history of 
Eastern Health adverse event management. My interest in this study emerges from the 
story of a small child whose avoidable death speaks volumes about the experience of 
adverse events. The child’s family is introduced, and the struggle that health care 
providers have to overcome in the face of adverse events is described, a crucial 
observation in the decision to undertake this important study. This chapter has provided a 
description of the background and importance of this study. It provided definitions of key 
concepts which are foundational to understanding the adverse event experience and to 
positioning study participants within the experience. The disjuncture which disturbed the 
homeostasis of my understanding of the organization’s behaviour was also provided; that 
disjuncture began my path toward identifying the importance of this study. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature which is key to laying a foundation 
to begin this exploration. Peer reviewed sources are used to explore key concepts that 
provide the background and context for this study.  
Chapter 3 provides the context and method of the study. The researcher and the 
participants who work together to make the experience of adverse events visible are 
introduced. This chapter describes the Critical Ethnographic approach used. It attends to 
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the important details of the study methods, data collection and analysis procedures, rigor, 
ethics and human rights considerations and participant support.  
Chapter 4 provides an examination of the evolution of the discourse of risk 
management and patient safety, a backdrop to the substantial changes that were expected 
as a result of the Inquiry and task force reports. The description of the evolution of text 
within Eastern Health gives a sense of the stresses and strains that the organization faced 
as organizational leaders attempted to respond through policy development to two 
significant reports – the Cameron Report with its 60 recommendations and the Adverse 
Events Task Force Report with another 9 recommendations and a list of proposed 
legislative and governance changes. At the same time, staff within the health authority 
were having to balance these demands for change with the direction of provincial 
legislation, new national guidelines, and the discipline specific text from various 
professional organizations who all had a stake in the policy decisions within the health 
authority. This chapter sets the stage for understanding the complexity of the adverse 
event experience in an organization trying to undergo systemic change. 
 Chapter 5 begins with the experiences of staff who were present during the time 
of ER/PR, and travels through the many months of the investigation and Inquiry with 
several key informants from the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory and the Quality and 
Risk Management Program. Woven within their accounts of the experience are vignettes 
from other participants who shared the same experience or helped to define some of the 
details of this important recollection. The intimate details of the feelings and struggles of 
the staff of Eastern Health during a time of pain and endurance are shared. A memorial 
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honouring the patients and families of ER/PR will be described from the staff’s 
perspective.  
Chapter 6 moves onward through the months and years after the Inquiry and 
examines the ongoing experience of working in a wounded organization. Several 
individuals from different programs describe how adverse events are organized, and how 
they have experienced adverse events. Although this chapter is not one continuous story 
but rather a collection of reflections from a variety of participants, collectively it provides 
a comprehensive view of the organization and how additional adverse events are 
experienced as a reflection of a significant organizational event.   
Chapter 7 explores the key features of the adverse event experiences as described 
by the collective of second victims. Health care providers who have dropped out, 
survived and some who have thrived after an experience of harm provide insight into 
support and non-support, blame, powerlessness and a culture of silence.   
And finally, Chapter 8 considers the major findings of the study and 
acknowledges the importance of key recommendations for education, practice, research 
and policy to alter the experience of other health care providers who will undoubtedly 
face adverse events. The experience of the second victim is honoured in the challenge to 
health care organizations to consider positive change in light of the findings of this 
important and illuminating study.  
Health care is a complex environment with influences from many different 
stakeholders, from the patients who require care to the government that sets policy and 
requires accountability. This study brings forth the voices of health care providers – from 
front line staff to upper-level managers -- who have been harmed by adverse events. The 
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recommendations that emerge out of their stories will assist those with the power to 
change experiences of harm within health care to better support and respond to health 
care providers who are the second victims of adverse events. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 Review of the Literature 
This literature review critically and thematically explores the concept of second 
victim as it relates to the experience of adverse events in health care. It begins with a 
review of the concept of adverse events and reporting of adverse events. It moves on to 
examine the concept of second victim, including its associated contextual features --  
forms of support, organizational and health care culture, power, and voice and silence. 
Finally, it narrows in to examine health care culture in relation to the second victim 
including a discussion of system and human factors and just culture. These concepts are 
important when examining the experience of health care providers in adverse events,  
sometimes to understand the role of the concept in the experience and at other times to 
understand how the experience is described. For example, the role of voice and silence in 
the adverse event experience is instrumental in the experience of suffering described 
within the descriptions of ER/PR. Power and powerlessness within the health care 
environment is key to frame the experiences of health care providers who are grappling 
with the trauma of feeling blamed.  
The search strategy was to capture a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary cross-
section of research conducted on the adverse events in health care from 2009 - 2014. The 
search was limited to 5 years, as the intention was to describe the recent evolution of the 
discourse of risk management and patient safety rather than to conduct an exhaustive 
search. The search strategy utilized the following search variables: adverse event, adverse 
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patient event, medical error, adverse event outcomes, adverse events/errors and health 
care provider and second victim. In addition, a search was undertaken within 
Commissions of Inquiry14 and Legal Case15 directories to locate health care inquiries and 
legal landmark cases that set the context for the environment in which the study was 
being undertaken. Research on adverse events spans a number of disciplines, including 
medicine, nursing, psychology, business, and sociology. Therefore, it was important to 
include databases that would capture at least those disciplines. Sources that included 
international citations were also chosen, based on the knowledge that adverse events are a 
universal issue within healthcare and that the experiences of other countries would be 
informative. The databases chosen were: PubMed, Scopus, CINAHL and EMbase. A 
systematic review of the BMJ Quality and Safety in Health Care Journal was undertaken 
as many of the studies found through the search terms cited that particular journal. In 
addition, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (2015) and CPSI (2014) websites were 
explored as they include specific patient safety components and adverse event 
information.  
Review of the literature from the initial searches meant returning to the literature 
to obtain key studies that were frequently cited but fell outside the search criteria, 
primarily due to year of publication. It was noted that when “Canada” was added as a 
limit, the number of citations was very few. Studies included in this literature review 
                                                 
14 Commission of Inquiry directories used for the search included the National Archives 
of Canada – Index to Federal Royal Commissions, Government of NL Health 
publications and Royal Commissions of Ontario. 
15 Legal Case directories used for the search included Dominion Law Reports, CanLII – 
the Canadian Legal Information Institute and Lexum – Supreme Court of Canada. 
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focused on perceptions of adverse events as they relate to the health care provider 
experience. In addition, studies which examined the perception of adverse events to 
justify the development of support programs within health care organizations were 
included.  
The literature review is organized into five broad themes. First, I reviewed studies 
on adverse events, including frequency and reporting of adverse events in health care. 
Second, I examined research on the second victim concept and experience, including how 
the term was coined and forms of support for the second victim. Third, I turned to the 
medical sociology and anthropology literature to inform myself about the notion of 
organizational culture, and then focused on the culture of health care organizations more 
specifically. Fourth, I examined the concepts of power and voice and silence as key 
features of the experience of health care providers. Finally, the patient safety 
management literature was reviewed in order to more fully understand some recent and 
important facets of that discourse. In that review, I focused on system and human factors 
and the concept of just culture. Each of these literatures: adverse events, second victim, 
organizational culture, power, voice/silence together are a cluster of interrelated concepts 
that are central to informing an understanding of the second victim experience. 
2.1 Adverse Events 
The definition of an adverse event, according to Baker et al. (2004), is: an 
unintended injury or complication that is caused by health care management, rather than 
by the patient's underlying disease, and that leads to death, disability at the time of 
discharge, or a prolonged hospital stay. To understand the magnitude of the involvement 
of health care providers in adverse events and the breadth of the issue, particularly in the 
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Canadian context in which this study takes place, it was pertinent to appreciate the 
frequency of adverse events. Two important studies, one in the United States and one in 
Canada, provide some informative data in this regard. The Harvard Medical Practice 
Study examined more than 30,000 randomly selected discharges from 51 randomly 
selected hospitals in New York State in 1984 (Brennan et al., 1991; Leape et al., 1991). 
Based on that study, the Institute of Medicine reports that 
Adverse events, manifest by prolonged hospitalization or disability at the time of 
discharge or both, occurred in 3.7 percent of the hospitalizations. The proportion 
of adverse events attributable to errors (i.e. preventable adverse events) was 58 
percent and the proportion of adverse events due to negligence was 27.6 percent 
(1999, p. 30).  
 
Baker et al. (2004) examined adverse events in four Canadian hospitals in each of five 
provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia). This was the 
first Canadian study to provide a national estimate of the incidence of adverse events 
across a range of hospitals (teaching, large community and small community). The 
adverse event rate was reported as 7.5% of hospital admissions. “Among the patients with 
adverse events, events judged to be preventable occurred in 36.9% and death in 20.8%”  
(Baker et al., 2004, p. 1678). The overall interpretation of the rate of adverse events 
translates into 185,000 adverse events associated with 2.5 million annual hospital 
admissions in Canada, with close to 70,000 of those events being potentially preventable 
(Baker et al., 2004, p. 1678).  
 The Canadian Paediatric Adverse Events Study (CPAES) was the first National 
study of the epidemiology of adverse events in hospitalized children designed to 
determine and compare the types and preventability of adverse events in paediatric 
centres and large community hospitals (Matlow et al., 2013). The CPAES included 
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twenty-two hospitals in 7 provinces and based on the results it was determined that 9.2% 
of children hospitalized in Canada experience adverse events (Matlow et al., 2013). The 
type of hospital was a determining factor in the likelihood of experiencing an adverse 
event, with children in paedatric centres having significantly more adverse events at a 
rate of 11.2%, whereas children in community hospitals experienced adverse events at a 
rate of 3.3% (Matlow et al., 2013).  
 In a prospective cohort study Barker, Flynn, Pepper, Bates, and Mikeal (2002) 
utilized a random sample of 36 institutions to identify the prevalence of medication 
errors. Based on that study, Barker et al. report that  
Medication errors were frequent, occurring at a rate of nearly 1 of every 5 doses 
in the typical hospital and skilled nursing facility. The percentage of errors rated 
potentially harmful was 7%, or more than 40 per day per 300 inpatients, on the 
average” (2002, p. 1903). 
 
Based on these studies, it is clear that adverse event rates in Canada and the United States 
represent a significant issue in health care. It is reasonable to expect that for each adverse 
event there will be at least one, but presumably more, health care professionals involved 
to varying degrees.   
2.2 Reporting of Adverse Events 
Handler, Nace, Studenski, and Fridsma (2004) describe their findings of 
knowledge, attitudes and beliefs of medication error reporting in a single long-term care 
facility. Three methods were used to characterize the medication error reporting 
processes and perceptions about errors, including: observation and semi-structured 
interviews to identify basic reporting processes; review of medication error reports; and a 
survey of nursing facility staff about their knowledge, attitudes and beliefs concerning 
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medication errors. The authors used estimates provided by Barker et al. (2002), to 
determine a comparator to the data found in their study. Handler et al. (2004) reported 
that Barker et al. (2002) found that 20% of medications administered in long term care 
were associated with an error and that 7% were potentially harmful. Using these 
estimates, approximately 250 medication administration errors per day would be expected 
in the study facility, with approximately 18 being potentially harmful. The Handler et al. 
findings indicate a reporting rate of 0.16 medication errors per day, “a fraction of the 
errors that were likely to have occurred”  (2004, p. 194). A summary of the findings 
indicate “a low frequency of formal reporting, a narrow perspective on sources of error, 
and concerns about disciplinary action” (Handler et al., 2004, p. 195). 
A study by Mrayyan, Shishani, and Al-Faouri (2007) describes Jordanian nurses’ 
perceptions about medication errors, including their opinions about reporting rates. The 
findings indicate that the nurses believed that medication errors are under-reported, and 
that punitive actions are prevalent. “Using incident reports, only 42.1% of medication 
errors were reported to nurse managers” (Mrayyan et al., p. 665). Results indicated that 
the nurses failed to report medication errors because they were afraid of disciplinary 
action or job loss.  
Having considered adverse events and the reporting of adverse events, I will turn 
now to the concept of the second victim and to research on the experiences of second 
victims of adverse events.  
2.3 Second Victim 
A second victim is a health care provider who becomes victimized by 
experiencing trauma as a result of involvement in an unanticipated adverse patient event, 
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medical error and/or a patient-related injury (Scott et al., 2010). The term was first coined 
by Albert Wu in his original writing on the topic of medical error in 2000. The term has 
been used consistently since, to describe the concept of a health care provider involved in 
an adverse medical event. Several authors report that the effect of adverse events on the 
health care provider is not well recognized or acknowledged (Christensen, Levinson, & 
Dunn, 1992; Crigger & Meek, 2007; Edrees, Paine, Feroli, & Wu, 2011; Massachusetts 
Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors, 2006; Meurier, Vincent, & Parmar, 1997; 
Rassin, Kanti, & Silner, 2005; Scheirton, Mu, & Lohman, 2003; Smetzer, 2012; 
Waterman et al., 2007). Wu states that “virtually every practitioner” has this shared 
experience, the “sickening realization of making a bad mistake,” whereas “sadly, the kind 
of unconditional sympathy and support that are really needed are rarely forthcoming” 
(2000, p. 358). And further “while there is a norm of not criticizing, reassurance from 
colleagues is often grudging or qualified” (Wu, 2000, pp. 358-359). Wu and Steckelberg 
describe the response of the second victim as signs and symptoms of a disorder “similar 
to those in acute stress disorder” (2012, p. 267). Their analysis is based on a limited 
number of anecdotes, from which they formulated a description of the process of 
experiencing an adverse event.  
The impact of an adverse event on a second victim is often written about but less 
often studied. It is clear from the literature that many individuals and organizations within 
health care are recognizing the presence of a phenomenon which can have and reportedly 
does have significant impact on health care providers, and potentially on the recipients of 
health care (eg. Christensen, et al., 1992). Some writers contend that the adverse event is 
37 
 
well recognized within health care but the impact on the health care provider is not as 
well recognized or acknowledged (eg. Edrees et al., 2001).  
The Harvard consensus statement of 2006, drawing on interviews with managers 
and clinicians, examined manager and clinician communication with patients about errors 
and adverse events. Their findings were not based on accounts of actual experiences of 
adverse events, as the study was about the experience of communicating with patients. 
Nonetheless the statement reports that health care providers are “unrecognized ‘second 
victims’ in these events, and receive little understanding or support” and “following a 
serious adverse event caregivers often feel isolated and experience profound shame and 
guilt” (Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors, 2006, p. 17). In 
addition, the Harvard consensus statement reports that the absence of a support system 
“can have a longstanding and detrimental impact on a clinician’s ability to provide patient 
care following an adverse event” (Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical 
Errors, 2006, p. 17). Similarly, Smetzer (2012) states  
The healthcare industry as a whole has not widely communicated or implemented 
effective support mechanisms to address the deeply personal, social, spiritual, and 
professional crisis often experienced by the “second victims” of fatal errors. Too 
often, we remain silent and abandon the second victims of errors – our wounded 
healers – in their time of greatest need. Second victims suffer a medical 
emergency equivalent to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (p. 55). 
 
A small number of studies have directly examined the experiences of second 
victims. Christensen et al. (1992) reported that physicians experienced profound 
emotional distress that continued for prolonged periods following the occurrence of a 
mistake. Similarly, Newman (1996) reported on a study in which all study subjects who 
did not deny their mistakes also experienced some form of emotional distress. Waterman 
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et al. (2007) conducted a survey of 3,171 physicians that indicated physician distress was 
common, with physicians reporting increased anxiety about future errors, loss of 
confidence, sleeping difficulties, reduced job satisfaction and fear of harm to their 
reputation. Interestingly, one third of those physicians who were involved only in a “near 
miss” (Waterman et al., 2007, p. 472) also reported increased stress. Scott, describing a 
study of clinicians in the University of Missouri Health Care system, noted that many of 
their participants provided meticulously detailed accounts of events, including the exact 
date and event-specific details like the colour of clothing (Scott, 2011). She described one 
of the most striking findings being that “every second victim participating in the project 
described their respective unanticipated clinical event as a life-altering experience that 
left a lasting impression on them” (Scott, 2011, p. 2). 
Experiences of nurses as second victims have also been studied, though to a lesser 
extent. Meurier et al. (1997) examined nursing practice and found that the majority of 
participants described having experienced emotional distress in response to their errors, 
including anger (at themselves or others), feelings of inadequacy, fear of repercussion 
and guilt feelings. Nurses also reported loss of confidence and increased anxiety in their 
work. Similarly, Rassin et al. in a qualitative study of medication errors in relation to 
stress and PTSD16 symptoms among nurses, suggest that errors have “severe emotional 
effects: fear, guilt, shame, sometimes even mental pressure lasting for months, 
reminiscent of PTSD” (2005, p. 884). 
                                                 
16 Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a mental health condition that’s triggered by 
a terrifying event — either experiencing it or witnessing it. Symptoms may include 
flashbacks, nightmares and severe anxiety, as well as uncontrollable thoughts about the 
event (Mayo Clinic, 2016). 
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 Sirriyeh, Lawton, Gardner, and Armitage (2010) and Schwappach and Boluarte 
(2008) conducted systematic reviews to assess the effects of involvement in medical 
errors on healthcare professionals' psychological well-being. They found significant 
emotional distress (shame, guilt) immediately following an error, as well as psychological 
responses (self-doubt, perceptions of altered relationships) in all research they reviewed. 
They reported there was limited evidence related to how health professionals cope with 
having been involved in a medical error (Sirriyeh et al., 2010). The authors remark that it 
is not clear how responses to error vary across clinical settings and professional groups, 
although “nursing samples were consistent in … a feeling of personal responsibility for 
an error and the commitment to reporting such incidents regardless of an increase 
likelihood of being blamed” (Sirriyeh et al., 2010, p. 7). Schwappach and Boluarte report 
on intense emotional distress and increased risk of burn-out and depression associated 
with involvement in medical errors. In addition, the authors described the “reciprocal 
cycle of these symptoms and future suboptimal patient care and error” (Schwappach & 
Boluarte, 2008, p. 9). They report that there have been few studies that have examined 
physicians’ needs and experiences in relation to errors, such as factors and conditions that 
may impede or contribute to a constructive approach (Schwappach & Boluarte, 2008).  
It is evident from this literature that the experience of health care providers 
involved directly in adverse events is likely significant and yet remains relatively 
unexamined. The experiences of health care providers who are affected by adverse events 
indirectly or by association, for example by virtue of their employment, profession or, 
proximity to the location of the event, have not yet been examined. In addition, the 
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effects of adverse events on the organization itself are likely significant and have not 
been addressed.        
Several authors have presented explanations of the second victim response, and 
two of these have proposed descriptions of the second victim response that may be 
considered models to explain the progression of response. The two models include: 
Crigger and Meek’s four stages of self-reconciliation (2007) and Scott et al.’s natural 
history of recovery (2009). A model that specifically addresses recovery is Berlinger's 
forgiveness model (2011). Other authors equate the second victim response to the 
existing model of PTSD, including Edrees et al. (2011), Rassin et al. (2005), Smetzer 
(2012), and Wu and Steckelberg (2012). 
2.4 Forms of Support for the Second Victim 
Several studies examining adverse events and the experience of the second victim 
illuminate the importance of, and the forms of, support for the second victim. The general 
consensus throughout the literature, as Smetzer states, is that “the healthcare industry as a 
whole has not widely communicated or implemented effective support mechanisms” 
(2012, p. 55). The experience of health care providers is described in the literature as 
ranging from feeling supported to feeling abandoned. Silversides reported that one 
physician described that “support from patients and colleagues alleviated much of his 
stress,” whereas another physician described the experience of feeling abandoned: 
“except for one or 2 friends, I felt abandoned by my peers, it was as if they thought what 
was happening to me might contaminate them” (2008, p. 309).  
Some authors state the importance of support but do not specifically recommend 
or identify the forms of support, whereas other authors identify specific direct support 
41 
 
strategies or indirect strategies which may result in support. Included among those studies 
that cite the importance of support is that of Berlinger (2011), who advocates for better 
institutional support for caregivers involved in errors to help them focus their attention on 
the affected patient. Similarly, Waterman et al. (2007) explored support following errors 
and discussed the importance of support mechanisms. Reportedly, “ninety percent of 
physicians disagreed (37% strongly) that hospitals and health care organizations 
adequately support them in coping with stress associated with medical errors” (Waterman 
et al., 2007, p. 470). Denham, who studied the perspective of health care leaders in 
relation to second victims, reported that leaders identify a need to support second victims 
“as much as and as strongly as we support the patients and their families,” noting that 
second victims “have the right to be treated with respect” (2007, p. 111).   
 Edrees et al., in a 2011 study, examined the importance of support structures for 
second victims and the findings confirmed for the investigators the need for second 
victim support strategies within health care organizations. As a result of the study, John 
Hopkins Hospital has established a peer-support program. Similarly, van Pelt (2008) 
described an adverse medical event and the ensuing apology and open communication 
between physician and patient that led to the development and implementation of a 
structured peer-based support service. The support service for care providers following 
adverse events is entitled “Medically Induced Trauma Support Services” (van Pelt, 2008, 
p. 250). The Harvard Consensus statement provides anecdotal evidence for the 
importance of a caregiver support program. “The absence of a structured support system 
can have a longstanding and detrimental impact on a clinician’s ability to provide patient 
care following an adverse event” (Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical 
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Errors, 2006, p. 17). This consensus statement resulted in a peer support system created 
within the Boston hospitals.  
 The types of indirect strategies identified which may result in support are found in 
several studies including Christensen et al. (1992), whose recommendations included 
bringing open discussion into mainstream medicine. Similarly, Engel, Rosenthal, and 
Sutcliffe (2006) concluded that physician training programs need to promote coping by 
providing emotional support and learning opportunities as a result of medical mishaps. 
Mechanisms which are increasingly being utilized within quality and risk initiatives, such 
as disclosure strategies, are also identified by authors as a component of support 
mechanisms to health care providers (Clancy, 2012). It is clear that there is a beginning 
recognition of the link between the experience of the second victim and support, but 
literature providing evidence of the success of support programs remains to be developed. 
2.5 Organizational Culture 
By definition culture is “the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of 
a racial, religious, or social group; the characteristic features of everyday existence shared 
by people in a place or time” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2012). “Notions of ‘culture’ 
have deep roots in the anthropological literature going back many decades” (Davies, 
Nutley, & Mannion, 2000, p. 111). “Organizational culture is defined as the pattern of 
values, beliefs and expectation shared by the organization’s members” (Wakefield, 
Wakefield, Uden-Holman, & Blegen, 1996, p. 196). Common norms of employee action 
are based on the values and beliefs of employees who interact with an organization’s 
structure, control systems, and people (Wakefield et al., 1996).  
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 Davies et al. provide a historical view of organizational culture, noting that the 
application of ideas about culture when applied “to organizations rather than indigenous 
people began in the United States in the immediate post war period but came to popular 
attention in the 1980s” (2000, p. 111). Organizational culture within health care is clearly 
demonstrated by Davies et al. in their description of several levels of culture within the 
National Health Service (NHS). First are “the underlying assumptions that represent the 
unconscious and ‘taken for granted’ beliefs that structure the thinking and behaviour of 
an individual” (Davies et al., 2000, p. 112) such as those ingrained in medical care “about 
measurability, aggregation and transferability of knowledge” (Davies et al., 2000, p. 114). 
The assumptions give rise to the second level of culture which is the organizational 
values “that operate at a more conscious level and represent the standards and goals to 
which individuals attribute intrinsic worth” (Davies et al., 2000, p. 112). “Values 
constitute the basic foundations for making judgements and distinguishing ‘right’ from 
‘wrong’ behaviour” (Davies et al., 2000, p. 114), such as the Hippocratic17 principle of 
medicine. And finally, “more visible still are those artefacts that represent the concrete 
manifestations of culture” such as ceremonies, traditions, and incentive structures (Davies 
et al., 2000, p. 112). In health care these may include dress codes, standard ways of 
running services, such as waiting lists, admissions, and methods of performance 
assessment, such as peer review. Davies et al. make an important observation that “the 
organizational culture cannot be tackled in isolation from such issues as the 
                                                 
17 In the medical profession conduct has traditionally been based on the Hippocratic 
principle of placing the needs of individual patients above broader economic and 
corporate objectives (Davies et al., 2000, p. 114). 
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organizational structure, financial arrangements, lines of control and accountability, 
strategy formulation, or human resource management initiatives” (2000, p. 116). 
 Within the literature of organizational culture there is an additional concept that is 
important to acknowledge, namely organizational climate. Denison provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the difference between organizational culture and 
organizational climate in his 1996 review. He notes that the two literatures, those of 
organizational cultural and organizational climate, present contrasting perspectives with 
little overlap. “Culture refers to the deep structure of organizations, which is rooted in the 
values, beliefs, and assumptions held by organizational members. Meaning is established 
through socialization to a variety of identity groups that converge in the workplace” 
(Denison, 1996, p. 624). “Climate, in contrast, portrays organizational environments as 
being rooted in the organization’s value system, but tends to present these social 
environments in relatively static terms, describing them in terms of a fixed set of 
dimensions” (Denison, 1996, p. 624). To simplify this perceived divergence, Denison 
notes “the culture and climate literatures actually address a common phenomenon: the 
creation and influence of social contexts in organizations” (1996, p. 646). 
 As noted above, Clancy (2012) discusses the systematic nature of patient safety 
events, and states that health care-associated injuries are events associated with the 
process or structure of care, rather than with a patient’s condition. Included is helpful and 
interesting discussion about safety culture “that focuses on the role of systems and de-
emphasizes blame” (Clancy, 2012, p. 2). In essence Clancy is describing organizational 
culture under the specific umbrella of safety culture since the focus of her commentary is 
patient safety events. All of these related concepts -- organizational culture, organization 
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climate and safety culture -- are provided to address the potential components of 
organizational culture within health care.  
 Cox and Howarth (1990) provided insight into the concept of organizational 
culture. In this 1990 commentary, the concept was reported to be relatively new. The 
authors make the point that “for human organizations there is the added complexity of 
existing at two different levels, the objective and the subjective” (Cox & Howarth, 1990, 
p. 107). 
 At the objective level, an organization is defined by its written policies, rules of 
operation and procedures, its communication channels and its physical 
interchanges of materials and products within and between its different 
environments. At the subjective level, an organization is represented in people's 
understanding of it and attitudes towards it, both individual and collective (Cox & 
Howarth, 1990, p. 107). 
 
Cox and Howarth argue that “a healthy organization requires its culture (subjective 
aspects) to be in some way consistent with its structure, policies and procedures 
(objective aspects)” (1990, p. 108).  
The concept of an organizational culture is a critical concept in considering the 
experience of health care workers involved in adverse events. Wakefield et al. (1996) 
undertook a study of perceived barriers in reporting medication administration errors in 
24 acute care hospitals with 1384 respondents. The findings revealed the importance of 
considering errors in relation to organizational culture, with implications for 
understanding the experience of adverse events. In addition to organizational culture, 
Wakefield et al. also drew attention to professional culture and work group culture as 
distinct entities. Professional culture is described as the socialization of both student 
physicians and nurses “to strive for error-free practice with an emphasis on perfection” 
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(Wakefield et al., 1996, p. 196). In professional culture, “corrective measures have 
traditionally been aimed at the person to ensure that the same error was not repeated, 
rather than focusing on the underlying cause of the error and thus reducing the risk of 
someone else repeating the same error” (Wakefield et al., 1996, p. 196). Work group 
culture is described as “perhaps the most salient culture for an employee” and Wakefield 
et al. give the example that within hospitals, the nurse’s immediate work group usually 
exists on the individual patient care unit (1996, p. 197). Organizational, professional and 
work group culture are all important concepts for understanding the complexity of health 
care culture.  
2.6 Healthcare Culture 
 Since at least the 1980s, social scientists have examined the nature of health care 
culture and how it shapes the experiences, values, beliefs and behaviors of health care 
providers (Armstrong, 1983; Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich, 1978; Frankenberg, 1986; Lock & 
Gordon, 1988; Wright & Treacher, 1982; Young, 1993). The fact that “culture and 
component subcultures exist in all organizations,” with hospitals being no exception 
(Nordstrom & Allen, 1987, p. 43), is pivotal to this discussion. Health care culture is 
specific to the everyday experience shared by health care providers within the context of 
a health care organization or within the context of the health care provider role. Health 
care culture provides expectations, values and processes that can be considered the 
features, beliefs, social forms and traits of that existence. Health care culture is a complex 
conception as it integrates organizational culture, the professional culture of several 
distinct groups, as well as the work group culture of many units of function. One 
individual may cross several cultures simultaneously.  
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 Health care culture is often referred to, directly or indirectly, in the literature that 
explores the experiences of second victims, and typically it is described in the context of 
providing an explanation for the second victim phenomenon. For example, the authors of 
the Harvard Consensus Statement, 2006, describe  
… a medical culture that expects physicians particularly to remain strong, 
objective, and emotionally detached from their patients afflicted by illness; a 
health care and legal system that blames the caregiver rather than the care process 
when an incident occurs; and internalization of the dictum to “first do no harm” 
that leads physicians to expect infallibility and that reinforces the adverse 
outcome as a taboo event (Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical 
Errors, 2006, p. 17). 
 Some studies have explored health care culture in relation to a specific issue or 
concern. For example, Coffey and colleagues, conducting research on disclosure, 
emphasized the culture of the health care setting in their Toronto-based study (Coffey, 
Thomson, Tallett, and Matlow (2010)).  A survey of 64 pediatric residents and three 
focus groups with 24 participants were used to gather data. The objectives of the study 
were to explore pediatric residents’ knowledge, attitudes, and self-reported behaviors 
with respect to disclosure. The contextual themes identified within that study which 
would be considered facets of health care culture were: social boundaries18, hierarchy19, 
quality of relationships20, and reputation risk. The results indicated that residents find it 
difficult to disclose errors. Contextual and social factors reportedly facilitate and inhibit 
                                                 
18 Social boundaries are created by the service which the medical resident is associated 
with and encompasses medical service; for example a neurosurgeon would be outside 
the social boundary of a general surgery resident. 
19 Hierarchy in medicine refers to the ranking of staff in order of experience, such as 
junior resident, senior resident, fellow and medical staff person. 
20 Quality of relationships refers to the relationships within the medical service between 
the ranks of medical staff. 
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disclosure, depending on the circumstance. For example, hierarchy within medicine was 
described by some as facilitating disclosure and by others as inhibiting disclosure. Those 
who felt hierarchy facilitated disclosure viewed their position as a “junior” physician to 
be protective, whereas those who felt hierarchy inhibited disclosure were concerned for 
their reputation.  
 It is often documented that staff will only report accurately and consistently in 
organizations with a positive safety culture21. Hughes and Lapane (2006) examined 
patient safety culture in nursing homes. This study’s objective was to evaluate whether 
perceptions of patient safety by employees varied by employment length, category of 
employee and shift assignment within a long term care home. The results provide some 
interesting findings in relation to health care culture. Hughes and Lapane described that 
the frequency of reporting of adverse events can be anticipated to be directly related to 
the staff’s perception of the punitive outcome of adverse event reporting. The authors 
report that “regardless of staff type, one in five reported feeling punished and two in five 
reported that reporting of errors [by colleagues] was seen as a ‘personal attack’” (Hughes 
& Lapane, 2006, p. 281). “Data from this study suggests that a ‘blame and shame’ culture 
predominates in the nursing home setting” (Hughes & Lapane, 2006, p. 283). The 
findings indicate that 60% of nursing assistants (n=636) and 80% of nurses (n=367) 
reported observing a safety problem at least once in the previous month, for a total of 676 
                                                 
21 “A positive safety culture has three key elements: working practices and rules for 
effectively controlling hazards; a positive attitude towards risk management and 
compliance with the control processes; the capacity to learn from accidents, near misses 
and safety performance indicators and bring about continual improvement” (Institution 
for Occupational Safety and Health, 2015, p. 3). 
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adverse events in the previous month. The reporting of adverse events was anticipated by 
the authors to be a fraction of this number, although no report frequency was provided.  
 The writings of Edmondson (2002) on psychological safety in work teams is 
useful to consider in relation to health care culture. Psychological safety has begun 
appearing in patient safety literature in relation to the concepts of health care culture and 
just culture (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2015). Edmondson notes that “an 
extensive literature on organizational culture examines how norms, values and beliefs 
arise in organizations to reduce the anxiety people feel confronting ambiguity and 
uncertainty” (2002, p. 2). She explains that the construct of psychological safety has its 
roots in research on organizational change conducted in the mid-1960s by Schein and 
Bennis, who reportedly identified the need to create psychological safety for individuals 
to feel secure and capable of changing (Edmondson, 2002, p. 7; Schein & Bennis, 1965). 
“If relationships within a group are characterized by trust and respect, individuals are 
likely to believe they will be given the benefit of the doubt - a defining characteristic of 
psychological safety” (Edmondson, 2002, p. 10). Importantly for an understanding of the 
experiences of second victims, Edmondson noted that “psychological safety means no 
one will be punished or humiliated for errors, questions, or requests for help, in the 
service of reaching ambitious performance goals” (2002, p. 22). 
 Nordstrom and Allen (1987) explored how culture influences behaviour in a 
hospital in their study entitled Cultural change versus behavioral change. They report on 
a multi-hospital system’s climate study conducted in three hospitals and three 
convalescent facilities in California. The authors state that “culture proves to be both 
beneficial and detrimental to groups” (Nordstrom & Allen, p. 43). An important point 
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made by the authors is that hospitals have a culture, “however, one should not assume 
that all health care institutions have the same culture. A given hospital will be drastically 
different from others” (Nordstrom & Allen, p. 44). They note that “the reasons for 
differences lie in variations in management, local economy, technology and 
specialization, and socialization needs” (Nordstrom & Allen, p. 44).  
 Speroff et al. (2010), in a cross-sectional analysis of surveys in 64 Intensive Care 
Units in 40 hospitals in the U. S., which included 1406 participants from nursing, 
ancillary staff, allied staff and physicians, examined cultural variation across hospitals to 
determine if an organizational group culture shows better alignment with patient safety 
climate. The term group culture was used to denote a culture which is indicative of 
teamwork as distinguished from a bureaucratic organizational culture. The authors report 
that the findings of the study support their premise “that hospitals vary in organizational 
culture and that the type of culture within the hospital would relate to perceived safety 
climate” (Speroff et al., p. 594). In addition, “organizations characterized as having group 
culture are more effective, and hospitals with hierarchical culture are less effective at 
implementing quality improvement” (Speroff et al., p. 594). The authors conclude that 
“the current study’s findings in combination with prior research suggest that a healthcare 
organization’s culture is a pivotal force to contend with in the implementation of quality 
improvement and the development of a patient safety climate” (Speroff et al., p. 595).   
Health care culture is not a static or consistent entity across health care settings. 
As there are some specificities in the culture of all health care institutions, as Nordstrom 
and Allen and Speroff, et al. assert, the organizational culture varies depending on 
different institutional aspects. It is reasonable to expect that, given the diverse natures of   
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organizational cultures, the experiences of second victims across health care cultures will 
also be variable. As noted by Lock, “culture is a necessary concept for most research 
projects, especially when culture is explicitly made to do work by the particular people or 
institutions that one is studying” (2001, p. 488).  
2.7 Power 
Power is important to this study on a number of fronts including: where power is 
identified, and how power is exercised, resisted, ignored, or dismissed by various players, 
with a focus on those health care providers – both staff and management. In particular, 
how an adverse event is managed and understood, with attention to the mechanisms of 
power that shape individual experiences. There are different types of power, and these 
can be categorized according to the resources employed to exercise the power – for 
example, coercive power from force, power from wealth, and persuasive power based on 
knowledge, information or authority (van Dijk, 1993). van Dijk (1993) notes that power 
is seldom absolute, that groups may control other groups in specific situations or social 
domains, and that dominated groups may more or less resist, accept, comply or legitimate 
such power. “Power involves control, namely by (members of) one group over (those of) 
other groups” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 254). “Dominance may be enacted and reproduced by 
subtle, routine, everyday forms of text and talk that appear ‘natural’ and quite 
‘acceptable’” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 254). 
Scholars advancing the social studies of medicine, drawing on the examination of 
power offered by theorists such as Foucault (1980) and Bourdieu (1977), have 
demonstrated that the culture of medicine is inevitably shaped by power (Gordon, 1988; 
Lock & Gordon, 1988; Lupton, 1995; Young, 1993). They argue that the culture of 
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medicine constitutes not only systems of beliefs and values, but also ideologies or 
statements about what ought to be. According to Lupton, “Foucauldian approaches stress 
that power in the context of the medical encounter is not a unitary entity, but a strategic 
relation which is diffuse and invisible” (2003, p. 120). Power, used in this context, is not 
necessarily a controlling force aimed at domination, but is closer to a form of social 
organization by which social order and conformity are maintained (Lupton, 2003). 
Therefore, power is not only a repressive force but also a productive force, “producing 
knowledge and subjectivity” (Lupton, 2003, p. 120). Foucault (1982) described power as 
a relation and, as such, certain people in relations will find themselves in different 
positions of power or domination. “Those who are marginalized or dominated will 
struggle to have their voices heard with the dialogue and may well find an alternate voice 
imposed on them” (Burkitt, 1999, p. 77). 
When adverse events happen, it may be that the clinical judgement or expertise of 
the professional is called into question and the professional is then placed in a vulnerable 
position. In 1992, Christensen, Levinson and Dunn reported on a qualitative study 
comprised of in-depth interviews with eleven physicians in which each physician 
discussed a previous mistake and its impact on his or her life. Beliefs about control were 
key for shaping the degree of distress experienced following a mistake. Those physicians 
who focused, following a mistake, on the uncertainty of their own knowledge and 
simultaneously on the certainty that disease could be potentially controlled tended to 
attribute the mistake to themselves; those who believed that medicine actually controls 
very little, by contrast, did not attribute a mistake to themselves and therefore 
experienced less distress.   
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In order to understand relations of power within an organization, it is important to 
examine the power differences between employees and their managers. Managers may 
wield coercive power and thus have the capacity to influence the lives of their 
subordinates (Milliken & Lam, 2009). The possession of power, for example, has been 
found to affect how people perceive and interpret events as well as the emotional 
reactions they have to these events (Milliken & Lam, 2009). Power may also operate in 
other more subtle ways to affect the flow of information in organizations, including the 
use of voice and silence, concepts examined in detail in the next section.  
2.8 Voice and Silence 
 Voice is defined by Brinsfield, Edwards, and Greenberg (2009, p. 4) “as the 
expression of ideas, information, opinions, or concerns and silence as withholding them.” 
The concepts of voice and silence have been explored from a number of perspectives 
including: voice or silence as a form of control, power or self-protection (eg. Ellis & Van 
Dyne, 2009); “being silenced” by an individual or an organization (eg. Morrison & 
Rothman, 2009); and the prevention of communication by silence (eg. Tangirala & 
Ramanujam, 2009). All of these forms of voice or silence seem to have important 
implications in the experience of health care providers involved in adverse events.  
 Ellis and Van Dyne (2009) used the concept of “defensive voice” to explain how 
employees respond when they experience mistreatment in the workplace. They describe 
defensive voice as a self-protective strategy used to reduce personal threats. They note 
that although defensive voice may involve complaints and rude or negative comments, it 
is primarily self-focused and is not intended to harm others or the organization. Although 
defensive voice may have a negative effect on peers, supervisors, and others in the 
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organization, it is “motivated by a sense of injustice and attempts to regain a sense of 
personal control” (Ellis & Van Dyne, 2009, p. 44). In the context of an adverse event, 
defensive voice may be used when an employee feels that an injustice is being done, to 
express frustration or in an attempt to regain their sense of control over the situation and 
protect themselves from criticism or discipline. 
 Morrison and Rothman (2009) offered a comprehensive analysis of how power is 
implicated in the decision to remain silent, discussing the psychological mechanisms 
underlying the power-silence relationship. Morrison and Rothman (2009) present 
evidence about the lack of willingness of employees to share their concerns with 
authority figures, preferring to remain silent. “Employee silence refers to the conscious 
withholding of information, opinions, suggestions, or concerns about potentially 
important organizational issues” (Morrison & Rothman, 2009, p. 112) from 
organizational leaders who may be able to address the issues. Morrison and Rothman 
report that power is one of the most important variables in silence, noting that 
fundamentally “employee silence is a reluctance to convey information to a person or 
persons with power” (2009, p. 112). The employee is in a position of relatively low 
power and the manager is in a position of relatively high power, and Morrison and 
Rothman contend that “the power imbalance inherent in organizational roles is perhaps 
the most important factor that makes employee silence a common experience” (2009, p. 
112). Morrison and Rothman (2009) highlight what they believe are two key judgements 
at the root of employee silence: that speaking up is futile and that speaking up is 
dangerous. They reason that managers behave in ways consistent with elevated power 
and staff understand those behaviours through a lens of low power, “hence, both parties 
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contribute to the silencing process, although often unaware that they are doing so” 
(Morrison & Rothman, 2009, p. 128).  
 Lind and Kulik (2009) reviewed how voice influences employees’ perceptions of 
fairness in the workplace. The authors contend that voice matters, definitely, “but it does 
not always matter to the same degree” (Lind & Kulik, 2009, p. 147). Lind and Kulik 
report that the perception of the need for voice opportunities depend on the outcome of a 
decision, relationship and confidence. “Voice matters -- but it seems to matter especially 
when people are likely to receive negative outcomes, when people are engaged in a 
strong relationship with the organization making the decision, or when people are feeling 
uncertain” (Lind & Kulik, 2009, p. 148). Lind and Van den Bos (2002) contend that 
having voice makes the uncertainty of being subject to other people’s decisions feel a lot 
more manageable psychologically. They suggest that managers be particularly focused on 
providing voice to employees in personal crises, when uncertainty is especially high and 
the positive consequences of giving voice or the negative consequences of denying voice 
will be especially powerful. Lind and Kulik (2009) note, too, that it is very important that 
organizational decision makers provide voice during periods of high organizational 
uncertainty. They conclude that “voice enhances feelings of fair treatment (Lind & Kulik, 
2009, p. 147).  
 Ashford, Sutcliffe, and Christianson (2009) analysed how leaders influence the 
use of voice by their subordinates and the factors that affect how leaders listen and 
respond to subordinates’ expressions of voice. Their findings show that employees take 
both the direct and indirect cost of voice into account (image, retaliation and a wounded 
psyche) and are reluctant to share information with those who might be threatening, such 
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as people above them in the organization (Ashford et al., 2009). Ashford et al. (2009) 
explain that leaders influence voice by virtue of their leadership style, for example, 
leaders who exhibit a supportive style and open-mindedness motivate employees to speak 
up due to a perceived opportunity for voice. “Such leadership behaviours may be 
particularly important if only to offset the dampening effects of formal organizational 
structures on voice” (Ashford et al., 2009, p. 181).   
 Tangirala and Ramanujam (2009) considered why loyal employees often feel 
compelled to remain silent about organizational problems and concerns, suggesting that 
individual factors and work contexts help explain the loyalty-silence relationship. The 
authors report inconsistent findings in the literature regarding the relationship between 
organizational loyalty and voice. They report that some studies indicate that employees 
who are strongly invested in their workplaces are inclined to speak up about their work-
related concerns when dissatisfied, while other studies reach the opposite conclusion that 
loyal employees suffer in silence in order to minimize the potential disruption of bringing 
their concerns forward. The opportunity for voice in relation to loyalty is reported as a 
key feature motivating employees to speak up. “In general, in workplaces in which the 
social contexts for speaking up are favourable, a positive relationship between employee 
loyalty and voice is expected to be found” (Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2009, p. 207). “By 
contrast, in workplaces in which the social contexts for speaking up are unfavourable, 
employees with high professional or organizational loyalty are likely to refrain from 
speaking up” (Tangirala & Ramanujam, 2009, p. 207). Tangirala and Ramanujam 
identify three contextual moderators that create a positive relationship between voice and 
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loyalty: “(1) provide employees’ perceived opportunities for voice, (2) reduce their fear 
of reprisals, and (3) increase the perceived utility of voice” (2009, p. 207).  
 Milliken and Lam (2009) considered the implications of silence for organizational 
learning. Although the authors recognize that this connection between silence and 
organizational learning is not new, they contribute to the literature by examining some of 
specific ways in which decisions about speaking up affect an organization’s capacity to 
learn, change and innovate. Milliken and Lam argue that “employees are much more 
likely to be silent about information that signals the potential existence of a problem than 
they are to be silent about information that they think will be interpreted as positive by 
management” (2009, p. 228). Even new ideas or suggestions may fall into the category of 
information that is difficult to share because ideas suggest a need for change to the status 
quo (Milliken & Lam, 2009). This skewed transfer of information leads the manager to 
have a distorted picture of how their organization is functioning, and the quality of 
decision-making decreases with organizational learning being compromised, change 
being jeopardized, and innovation lagging behind (Milliken & Lam, 2009). “An 
organization with a climate of silence is expected to be ill-equipped to deal with a 
changing environment” (Milliken & Lam, 2009, p. 240). 
2.9 Healthcare Culture and the Second Victim 
 While the concepts of health care culture and the second victim have been 
explored, as described above,22 there is a scarcity of literature that links the two concepts 
and examines the impact of health care culture on a second victim.  Nelson and Beyea 
                                                 
22 The literature in section 2.6 discussed health care culture and second victims but 
didn’t explicitly discuss how the culture shapes the experience of being a second victim. 
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(2009) provide a commentary on the role of an ethical health care culture for the 
prevention and recovery of second victims. There are two important linked concepts that 
are brought forward in this commentary, the role of ethics in achieving a positive health 
care culture and moral distress23. Nelson and Beyea note that in the study by Scott et al., 
“the clinician’s experiences reflect the overall culture of their healthcare organization and 
its programs for safety and quality” (2009, p. 323). One of the main points made is that 
health care organizations have a moral imperative to provide quality care, by establishing 
an ethics-grounded organizational culture – “one in which ethical uncertainty and 
questions can be openly acknowledged and systematically addressed” (Nelson & Beyea, 
2009, p. 324).  
In a descriptive article, Goldberg, Kuhn, Andrew and Thomas, who are 
emergency physicians, discuss the culture of medicine and its impact on the experience of 
physician error, arguing that “for a variety of reasons, disclosure of mistakes is not 
encouraged” (2002, p. 290). The authors note that there is a need for a shift in culture 
within the medical training curricula from blame to continuous improvement.   
 An early commentary by Hilfiker (1984) is widely cited in the literature. It 
describes mistakes from a physician’s perspective based on his own personal experience, 
modeling the type of sharing and transparency that, he argues, will move medicine into a 
culture of learning from mistakes rather than judging and blaming. “The cumulative 
impact of such mistakes (and the ever-present potential for many others) has had a 
devastating effect on my own emotional health, as it does, I believe, for most physicians” 
                                                 
23 Moral distress was first noted by Jameton (1984) in the nursing ethics literature. 
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(Hilfiker, 1984, p. 120). “Even the word ‘malpractice’ carries the implication that one has 
done something more than make a natural mistake, it connotes guilt and sinfulness” 
(Hilfiker, 1984, p. 121). Hilfiker encourages other physicians to become transparent 
about medical errors:  
At some point we must bring our mistakes out of the closet. We need to give 
ourselves permission to recognize our errors and their consequences. We need to 
find healthy ways to deal with our emotional responses to those errors. Our 
profession is difficult enough without our having to wear the yoke of perfection 
(Hilfiker, 1984, p. 122). 
 The concept of moral distress has been used in the context of disclosure, 
particularly in relation to how the culture of medicine may shape the distress that a health 
care provider experiences after a medical error.  
Moral distress occurs when a healthcare professional, in a given situation, knows 
or believes she knows what the ethical appropriate action is but is unable or feels 
constrained from acting because of obstacles, such as lack of supervisory support 
and/or organizational constraints” (Nelson & Beyea, 2009, p. 323).  
 
The result of lack of action “can increase staff stress, decrease morale, foster job turnover 
and diminish the organization’s culture” (Nelson & Beyea, 2009, p. 323). Moral distress 
may be experienced by the clinician but the clinician “does not feel comfortable speaking 
up about problems because of fears of retaliation or loss of one’s employment” (Nelson 
& Beyea, 2009, p. 323). The fear of speaking up about problems is compounded by fears 
of making an error or harming a patient. 
 In the case of errors, “another ethical issue exists when a clinician believes it is 
morally appropriate to disclose information about an error to the patient or family 
members; however, the supervisor or attending physician may direct the clinician not to 
talk about the case. This type of conflict serves as a clear trigger leading to moral 
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distress” (Nelson & Beyea, 2009, p. 323). Nelson and Beyea contend that to create a 
culture of quality and safety, an organization must critically examine whether it fosters an 
environment that supports clinicians when errors occur. “Additional research is needed to 
identify and understand the full complement of victims of medical errors” (Nelson & 
Beyea, 2009, p. 324) but it is a reasonable expectation that ethical quandaries and moral 
distress experienced following an adverse event will have an impact on the experience of 
the second victim.  
 Wakefield, McLaws, Whitby, and Patton (2010) conducted the first study to 
develop predictive models for patient safety behaviours in health care workers, using a 
cross-sectional survey of 5294 clinical and managerial staff in one health care region of 
Australia. “This study clearly demonstrated that two key factors influence the safety 
behaviours of all health care workers: observed behaviour of professional peers 
(Professional Peer Behaviour) and a genuine belief in the safety outcomes of the 
behaviours (Preventive Action Beliefs)” (Wakefield et al., 2010, p. 589). The authors 
note that “existing medical culture is characterized by individual concepts of clinical 
work, clinical purism and opaque accountability” and “junior doctors are quickly 
socialized to these values and behaviours” (Wakefield et al., 2010, p. 589). When 
comparing junior doctors with other respondents involved in adverse events, “they are 
more likely to perceive blame as a result of an incident, and less likely to report positively 
about management, or speak up when an error is made” (Wakefield et al., 2010, p. 589) 
indicating both a negative impact on the junior doctor and on current and future patients. 
The terms safety climate and safety culture are distinguished, with safety climate 
referring to an individuals’ attitudes towards safety and safety culture denoting the shared 
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beliefs and convictions underpinning individuals’ attitudes, the prevailing values of the 
social group. The authors note “the overall trend appears to be in favour of the term 
safety culture” (Wakefield et al., 2010, p. 585) which may be an unnecessary debate since 
the evidence seems to indicate that individual attitude is a minor contributing factor in the 
face of the prevailing values of the group.  
 In response to one health insurer decision to discontinue payment for eleven 
preventable errors such as wrong-site surgery, wrong-patient surgery, wrong type of 
surgery on correct patient, and objects left in the body post-surgery, Briefings in Patient 
Safety (2008) provided the reflections of three physician leaders on the toll errors can 
take on clinicians. The physician leaders reported that errors are distressing for health 
care workers but at the same time there is “not a lot of conversation about providing 
support” (Briefings in Patient Safety, 2008, p. 2). The promotion of a non-punitive 
culture was believed to be a strategy to facilitate discussions about errors and “give [staff 
members] permission to talk about their experiences,” allowing clinicians to learn from a 
process that is “nonthreatening and as supportive as possible” (Briefings in Patient 
Safety, 2008, p. 3). In addition, these physicians reported that “to be a safe and effective 
clinician you needed to be supported after an error” (Briefings in Patient Safety, 2008, p. 
3). They note “it’s much easier to go forward and change your practice, admit you made a 
mistake, and not do it again if you’re not constantly defensive about it and feeling guilty” 
(Briefings in Patient Safety, 2008, p. 3).  
 Two concepts which are relatively new within the discourse of patient safety and 
adverse event management are system and human factors (Reason, 2000) and just culture 
(Marx, 2001). These concepts figure prominently in the experience of second victims and 
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are considered here in order to set the context for how second victims within this study 
experience the behaviour, policies and practices of the organization.  
2.10 System and Human Factors 
It is very common for adverse events to be examined based on human error, with 
the broader context being de-emphasized in the analysis. Reason notes that “human error 
can be viewed in two ways: the person approach and the system approach” (2000, p. 
768). Reason believes that the person approach is a longstanding and widespread 
tradition that remains the dominant tradition in medicine, that focuses on unsafe acts such 
as errors and procedural violations by people in direct contact with the patient or “at the 
sharp end” (2000, p. 768). The “sharp” end, in the context of health care and patient 
safety, refers to the work of people in direct contact with the patient, in contrast to the 
“blunt” end, referring to the work of healthcare management and other organizational 
staff (Carayon & Wood, 2010). Unsafe acts are believed to arise from aberrant human 
processes such as forgetfulness and inattention, and the associated person approach 
countermeasures are directed at reducing variability in human behaviour (Reason, 2000). 
Those countermeasures or interventions include writing another procedure, disciplinary 
measures, retraining, threat of litigation or loss of employment, naming, blaming and 
shaming (Reason, 2000). In the person approach, errors are treated as moral issues 
(Reason, 2000). Reason argues that “a serious weakness of the person approach is that by 
focusing on the individual origins of error it isolates unsafe acts from their system context 
(2000, p. 769).  
The system approach, on the other hand, holds the basic premise that humans are 
fallible and that errors are expected. “Errors are seen as consequences rather than causes, 
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having their origins not so much in the perversity of human nature as in ‘upstream’ 
systemic factors” (Reason, 2000, p. 768). The system approach focuses on the conditions 
under which individuals are required to work and tries to create defences to avoid errors 
and mitigate their effects (Reason, 2000). The system approach uses the central idea of 
creating countermeasures or system defences, based on the assumption that it is difficult 
to change the human condition, but it is possible to change the conditions under which 
people work (Reason, 2000).  
Where Reason (2000) describes the person approach as distinct from the system 
approach, examining adverse events through a patient safety lens requires consideration 
of whether the healthcare professionals had the right tools and environment to perform 
their tasks in a safe and effective manner (Carayon & Wood, 2010). The United States 
Joint Commission on Patient Safety ascribes to a human factors analysis or engineering 
approach to patient safety (2015). “Human factors is a human-centered science using 
tools and methods to enhance the understanding around human behaviour, cognition, and 
physical capabilities and limitations, and applying this knowledge to designing systems in 
support of these capabilities and limitations” (The Joint Commission, 2015, p. 7). 
According to The Joint Commission, “systems thinking is part and parcel to human 
factors engineering, … we consider each layer of a system and its interconnected 
components in terms of how to design in support of human strengths and compensate for 
limitations” (2015, p. 8).  
 Carlton and Blegen (2006) conducted a literature review which provides an 
overview of the incidence of adverse drug events and the antecedents for these errors to 
occur. Carlton and Blegen note the differences in research findings reflecting perceptions 
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of individual responsibility and system responsibility as a paradigm shift. Early research 
(through to the mid-1990s) focused on individual responsibility for error with little 
system factor consideration. During the past decade, research has shifted the emphasis 
toward identification of inherent system problems which contribute to error occurrence 
(Carlton & Blegen, 2006, p. 30). Across the studies examined, the paradigm shift toward 
system responsibility was noted, and the most frequently cited causes of adverse drug 
events reflect this change. Causes cited included: interruptions and distractions, nurse 
fatigue and exhaustion, RN forgetfulness and business, high acuity and heavy workloads, 
inadequate staffing, confusion and chaos, medications arriving late from pharmacy, and 
illegible physicians orders (Carlton & Blegen, 2006, p. 33).  
“There is now broad awareness among clinicians and managers about the 
challenge of patient safety, as well as a greater understanding that problems in patients 
safety reflect systems rather than individuals alone” (Wu, 2011, p. xi). “Capturing 
information about these problems depends on reliable reporting systems” (Wu, 2011, p. 
xi) and staff who trust the organizations they work for enough to participate in those 
reporting systems.  
2.11 Just Culture 
First used by D. Marx (2001), a just culture recognizes that individual 
practitioners should not be held accountable for system failings over which they have no 
control. A just culture also recognizes that many individual errors represent predictable 
interactions between human operators and the systems in which they work, but does not 
tolerate conscious disregard of clear risk or gross misconduct (Marx, 2001). In a just 
culture, open reporting and participation in prevention and improvement is encouraged. 
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In a just culture, a focus on understanding the root of the problem allows for learning, 
process improvement, and changes to design strategies and systems to promote 
prevention. 
Just culture, as noted by Edmondson (2002), is a relatively recent concept in the 
literature on health care organizational culture. Earlier attempts to reform what was 
recognized to be a punitive culture had used the concept of no-blame culture, a concept 
that flourished in the 1990s and still endures today. Leaders in human error management, 
such as Marx (2001), chose to not refer to a no-blame culture, promoting instead the 
concept of a just culture. The development of no-blame culture acknowledged that a large 
proportion of unsafe acts were “honest errors” (the kinds of slips, lapses and mistakes that 
even the best people can make) and were not truly blameworthy, and acknowledged that 
there was not much in the way of remedial or preventative benefit to be had by punishing 
perpetrators (Marx, 2001). But this viewpoint had two serious weaknesses: 1) It ignored 
or, at least failed to confront, those individuals who willfully (and often repeatedly) 
engaged in dangerous behaviors that most observers would recognize as being likely to 
increase the risk of a bad outcome; 2) It did not properly address the crucial business of 
distinguishing between culpable and non-culpable unsafe acts (Marx, 2001). The 
development of just culture takes into consideration the reality that not all behaviours can 
be no-blame and yet promotes an organizational climate of safety and reporting of unsafe 
or risky situations or processes without fear of reprisal (Marx, 2001). 
Denham (2007) described a number of interviews with leaders in health care, such 
as Presidents, CEOs, and Medical Directors, with the purpose of identifying the rights of 
the second victim. The interviews explore concepts of safety, performance, introduction 
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of new technology, just culture and second victim. According to Denham “a Just Culture 
is one that differentiates between error and unjustifiable risk taking” (2007, p. 109). 
Denham describes some core concepts purveyed in the interviews, including just culture, 
system fault24, sharp end blunt end model25, trust, grief, the second victim, the second 
victim medical emergency26, and five rights for the second victim. The acronym, 
‘TRUST’ is used for the five rights of the second victim, which include: Treatment that is 
Just, Respect, Understanding and Compassion, Supportive Care, and Transparency. 
Several key themes were identified by Denham, including: clinicians have good will and 
good intent; there is a responsibility to support clinicians who have a right to be treated 
with respect; and employees are the most precious resources. Denham summarizes the 
finding of the study by stating: 
Your employees are going to make mistakes because they're human, and they’re 
operating in imperfect systems. Mistakes are going to be made, and it’s our moral 
obligation to support our employees and support our team members when 
mistakes are made (2007, p. 111).  
This study is unique by virtue of naming and clearly defining the rights of the second 
victim, and identifying the responsibility or obligation of the organization. 
                                                 
24 System Fault may be defined as the totality of active and latent errors within a system. 
Active errors occur at the point of contact. Latent errors refer to organization or design 
failures. 
25 The sharp end blunt end model is a conceptual framework to examine predisposing 
factors to harmful events that occur at the point of care. The “sharp end” is the part of 
the health care system in direct contact with patients, for example, personnel and 
equipment. The “blunt end” is the many layers of the health care system not in direct 
contact with patients but which influence the personnel and equipment. 
26 When caregivers are involved in an adverse event, it can become a medical emergency 
for them, equivalent to post traumatic stress disorder.  
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 To summarize, a just culture is one in which staff are treated with respect. In a 
just culture, there is a recognition that mistakes will be made, but in most cases by people 
working in imperfect systems who are trying to do the right thing. A just culture 
recognizes the importance of examining systems as well as human factors when adverse 
events happen. A just culture is one in which the organization supports staff at the time of 
mistakes without blaming or taking a punitive stance.  
2.12 Supported by the Literature 
Adverse events are known to be a reality of health care provision and the 
involvement of health care providers in adverse events has been described in a number of 
studies. It is clear from the literature that individuals and organizations within health care 
recognize the importance of the second victim phenomenon, but the experience of health 
care providers is largely unknown. There is no research that has examined the experience 
described by a second victim of providing patient care in the long-term, or the experience 
of colleagues working alongside someone who has been involved in an adverse event.  
As noted by Nelson and Beyea, “additional research is needed to identify and 
understand the full complement of victims of medical errors” (2009, p. 324). Second 
victims who were directly involved in an adverse event have been identified, but there are 
also second victims who have not been addressed in the literature, such as those health 
care providers who assisted but were not the primary care provider or health care 
providers who observe from the sidelines.  
It is clear that there is a beginning recognition of the link between education, 
health care culture, the experience of the health care provider and support for the health 
care provider. It is only in understanding how adverse events are experienced by health 
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care providers that health care organizations can move toward a positive and responsive 
environment for health care providers involved in adverse events. Further exploration of 
how health care culture shapes the experience of health care providers is a critical facet of 
this study.  
If we truly are ‘caregivers,’ then we are long overdue to move beyond the finger 
pointing and inappropriate punishment of these ‘second victims’ and treat them 
with the support and respect they deserve, in an environment of compassion and 
transparency (Paparella, 2011, pp. 264-265).  
  
This chapter critically and thematically explored the literature on adverse events 
and the second victim experience. It is evident from this literature that the experience of 
health care providers involved directly in adverse events is likely significant and yet 
remains relatively unexamined. The experiences of health care providers who are affected 
by adverse events indirectly or by association, for example by virtue of their employment, 
profession or, proximity to the location of the event, have not yet been examined. In 
addition, the effects of adverse events on the organization itself are likely significant and 
have not been addressed.   
While the concepts of health care culture and the second victim have been 
explored, there is a scarcity of literature that links the two concepts and examines the 
impact of health care culture on a second victim. It is evident from this literature review 
that this research study will contribute to a body of knowledge which is incomplete. This 
study examines the experiences of health care providers involved directly, indirectly or 
by association with an adverse event, specifically, how an adverse event is managed and 
understood. As well, this study examines whether and how the organizational culture of 
the health care organization shapes the experiences of adverse events; and it identifies 
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how organizational strategies and supports figure in to the experience of adverse events 
by health care providers. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Study: Context and Method 
3.1 Critical Ethnography 
A Critical Ethnographic inquiry was well positioned to address the questions 
posed by this study. Historically, ethnography evolved in cultural anthropology, typically 
focused on small societies (Boyle, 1994). Boyle (1994) notes that ethnography is always 
reflexive, with the researcher open to and part of the process and is presented from the 
emic (insider) perspective. A critical ethnography “does not necessarily stand in 
opposition to conventional ethnography … rather, it offers a more reflective style of 
thinking about the relationship between knowledge, society and freedom from 
unnecessary forms of social domination” (Thomas, 2004, p. 1). The ‘critical’ of critical 
ethnography refers not to complaint, in order to connote dissatisfaction, but ‘critique.’ 
Critique, in contrast to critical, “assesses ‘how things are’ with an added premise that 
‘things could be better’ if we examine the underlying sources of conditions” (Thomas, 
2004, p. 1).  
 Critical ethnography, rather than being a theory that generates a set of testable 
propositions, is a perspective about our social world that provides images, metaphors, and 
understandings, and provides value premises to ask questions and suggest ways to change 
(Thomas, 2004). It is a methodology that “strives to unmask hegemony and address 
oppressive forces” (Crotty, 1998, p. 12). The concept of “hegemony” makes explicit the 
connections between culture and power.  Hegemony is political, economic, ideological or 
cultural power exerted by a dominant group over other groups, and can be understood as 
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that part of a dominant worldview which is “naturalized” and thus does not appear as 
ideology (Scott, 2008). Hidden in the habits of everyday life and regenerated through 
repetitive, everyday acts, this type of power lies in the realm of the taken-for-granted or 
the commonsensical and may not be experienced as the implementation of power at all 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 1991; Scott, 2008).   
 The theoretical stance for this study is a critical interpretive approach, influenced 
by the work of Foucault (1977) and Geertz (1973), as applied by Lock and Gordon 
(1988). Culture in its relation to power is an important focus of this approach. Power, 
used in this context is not necessarily a controlling force aimed at domination, but is 
closer to a form of social organization by which social order and conformity are 
maintained (Lupton, 2003).  
 Critical ethnographers begin from a view of “what is out there to know,” or an 
ontology, that furnishes a set of images or metaphors in which various forms of social 
oppression constitute what is to be known (Thomas, 1993, p. 34). Van Maanen argues 
that most ethnography proceeds from a “realist narrative” entailing an “author-
proclaimed description and something of an explanation” (1988, p. 45) for the cultural 
practices observed. Relying on the participant’s point of view as filtered through the data 
collector’s interpretative framework, a realist ontology provides a detailed, “thick” 
description that lets the participants “do the talking” (Geertz, 1973, p. 7). Critical 
ethnography enabled me to use my existing knowledge as an insider to health care culture 
to explore the embodied and everyday experiences of health care providers involved in 
adverse events. 
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 Having provided a description of the background and importance of the study as 
well as the method of inquiry, I will turn now to an explanation of the specific context in 
which this research took place, and the particular methods employed. I begin with the 
geopolitical context of the organization, followed by comprehensive descriptions of study 
methods, data collection and analysis, rigor, ethics and human rights considerations and 
finally the measures taken to support research participants as they related their 
experiences of living through the aftermath of adverse events.     
3.2 Geopolitical Context 
To understand Eastern Health as an organization, it is important to understand the 
political governance structures that create its accountability. Over the last four decades, 
there has been increasing amalgamation of what was once a number of separate 
organizations and facilities providing health care in Newfoundland and Labrador. The 
first wave of regionalization occurred in the mid-1980s, when financial pressures saw the 
reduction of over seventy independent health boards to fifty-four. A second wave of 
regionalization, in the mid-1990s, was due to a reduction in federal transfer payments to 
the provinces and resulted in the fifty-four health boards being combined into fourteen. 
The largest of these was the Health Care Corporation of St. John’s (HCCSJ). It and the 
other regional health care boards came into effect April 1, 1995. The overall organization 
of the HCCSJ was a pyramid structure with the Board of Trustees at its peak. The Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) reported to the Board, and the executive positions below the 
CEO were primarily Vice-President positions that varied in title and composition over the 
years that followed. The HCCSJ adopted a program management model as its 
organizational structure, a model that continued into the time of the study.  
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The Eastern Regional Health Authority (Eastern Health) came into being on April 
1, 2005 when further provincial amalgamation of health boards and community agencies 
resulted in the creation of four provincial health authorities, as seen in Figure 1 (p. 15). 
Eastern Health was comprised of seven organizations. The amalgamation nearly doubled 
the number of employees over that of the former HCCSJ, and diversified the kind of 
services being offered because of the addition of community-based services. The final 
step in the amalgamation efforts within the Eastern health care region was the move of 
the previously independent Newfoundland Cancer Treatment and Research Foundation 
(NCTRF) into Eastern Health in 2008. The addition of NCTRF meant that the provincial 
Cancer Care program was now administered by Eastern Health.  
For the majority of the time under review in the Cameron Inquiry, the Anatomic 
Pathology Division of Eastern Health was in fact a Division of the Laboratory Medicine 
program of the former HCCSJ. When the problem with ER/PR was discovered, in May 
2005, it was just two short months after Eastern Health had been created as a new 
organization. The ER/PR testing in question and under review had occurred while the 
HCCSJ was responsible for the testing and the testing policies. Although there had been 
direction given to begin developing new policies that would replace the former HCCSJ 
policies, that process was only beginning when the crisis was identified.  
3.3 Funding for this study 
In 2011, Eastern Health established two annual Quality Healthcare Scholarships 
to promote the study of key themes identified during the Commission of Inquiry on 
Hormone Receptor Testing. The scholarships were introduced as part of the settlement 
agreement of the class action suit on estrogen and progesterone receptor (ER/PR) testing 
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and implemented in consultation with class action members. The first scholarships were 
awarded in 2012 and I was one of two first recipients. The scholarship was presented to 
me by the CEO.  
3.4 Study Methods 
 In outlining the study methods used within this critical ethnography, it is 
important to position myself as the researcher in terms of my insider role with the QRM 
department, within Eastern Health and in terms of potential conflict of interest.  
3.4.1 Researcher’s Insider Role and Conflict of Interest 
 At the beginning of the study, I held a management position within the QRM 
department with Eastern Health, as a Quality and Clinical Safety Leader. The insider role 
is addressed in the Tri-Council Policy Statement under “Conflicts of Interest” specifically 
related to Dual Roles (Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research Council of Canada, & Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada, 2014, Chapter 7, Article 7.4). “Dual roles of researchers and their 
associated obligations” -- in my case acting both as a researcher and a quality clinical 
safety leader -- had the potential to “create conflicts, undue influences, power imbalances 
or coercion” affecting relationships and the consent process (Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research et al., 2014, p. 95).  
By virtue of my position as a Quality and Clinical Safety Leader I was party to 
knowledge about adverse events that had happened within Eastern Health. It was 
therefore considered within normal practice to discuss adverse events and patient 
outcomes in the context of adverse event reviews. This experience and therefore comfort 
with the occurrence of adverse events provided an advantage in terms of having an in-
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depth and expected skill for listening to descriptions of adverse event experiences in an 
objective and open manner. That is, on one hand, participants did not experience barriers 
about discussing adverse events, since they were aware of my insider knowledge base 
and in some cases had had previous conversations with me about adverse events. On the 
other hand, participants may have been reluctant to discuss adverse events that had not 
been appropriately reported through official channels.  
My professional involvement as a Quality Clinical Safety Leader within the QRM 
department may have created participant concern about potential influence over the 
outcome of investigations of adverse events within Eastern Health as a result of 
participation or non-participation in this study. More importantly, if a serious adverse 
event were to have been disclosed to me in the context of research (for example, if a 
participant revealed that they have observed multiple patient deaths due to negligence by 
a particular physician), even where I did not have a legal duty to report the event since I 
was not operating at that time within my management role, I may have found myself 
having a moral obligation to breach researcher-participant confidentiality.    
 To separate these roles to the greatest extent possible, I explained the distinction 
between my two roles to the participants during recruitment, during the consent process, 
and during the study when required. I explained that it was not my role, in the context of 
research, to disclose information about any adverse event discussed, and that I would 
maintain confidentiality to the best of my ability. However, I could not guarantee 
confidentiality because I might find myself in a moral conflict whereby my role as 
manager might trump my desire to protect the participants’ interest. I encouraged 
participants to avoid disclosing serious adverse events that were not widely known or had 
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not been reported through the appropriate process. This insider role conflict was resolved 
early in the study when I accepted another position within the organization and was no 
longer working in the QRM department. Prior to that change in employment, I did not 
experience any moral obligation to report adverse events shared by participants. 
3.4.2 Participants 
The study included participants who were health care providers involved in an 
institutional health care adverse patient event either directly, indirectly or by association 
(see Table 3.2). Health care providers directly involved in an adverse event were defined 
as those who were responsible for the direct clinical and care decisions related to the 
patient's outcome. Health care providers indirectly involved were defined as those who 
were present at the time of the occurrence, aware of the clinical and care decisions, but 
not responsible for the clinical and care decisions related to the patient's outcome. Health 
care providers involved by association were defined as those who were not present at the 
time of the occurrence and not aware or responsible for the clinical and care decisions 
related to the patient's outcome. This included health care providers who were considered 
associated with the adverse event by someone else or who identified with the adverse 
event themselves but were not actually involved or present at the time of the event. 
Interviews were also conducted with Regional Health Authority staff who were able to 
inform the study about policy development and organizational processes that related to 
how the adverse event management and disclosure processes were structured and 
enacted. 
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3.4.3 Participant Groups 
Health care providers from a variety of health care worker groups, including 
management, nurses, physicians, pharmacy and diagnostic staff with varying years of 
work experience were invited to participate in the study.  
Table 3-1: Participants by Discipline 
 
Discipline Number of 
Participants 
Management Staff 6 
Management/Nurse 2 
Nurse 15 
Physician 7 
Pharmacy Staff 1 
Diagnostic Staff 4 
 
Several attempts were made to recruit within the medical student/resident group to no 
avail. The participation of medical students was not considered critical since physicians 
were very open about their medical school experiences and their observations of medical 
students/residents support-seeking behaviours.  
3.4.4 Target Groups 
Interviews were to be conducted with three target groups, based on inclusion 
criteria and discipline, as outlined in Table 3-2 below.  
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Table 3-2: Interview Target Groups      
                                                                                                                                          
Target Group Inclusion Criteria Discipline 
Persons who were 
directly involved in 
an adverse event 
Health care providers who were 
responsible for the direct clinical 
and care decisions related to the 
patient's outcome 
Nurses 
Pharmacy Staff 
Laboratory Staff 
Physicians 
 Persons indirectly 
involved in an 
adverse event 
Health care providers who were 
present at the time of the 
occurrence, aware of the clinical 
and care decisions, but not 
responsible for the clinical and care 
decisions related to the patient's 
outcome 
Persons who 
experienced the 
adverse event by 
association 
Health care providers who were not 
present at the time of the occurrence 
and not aware or responsible for the 
clinical and care decisions related to 
the patient's outcome 
 
However, very few persons were identified in only one target group, as many people 
described multiple experiences of adverse events. The target groups, based on inclusion 
criteria, were well represented within the participant group.  
3.4.5 Participant Recruitment 
As noted earlier, since the target groups over-lapped, most participants 
represented more than one group and the number of informants required resulted in 
interviews with thirty-five informants. 
Participants were recruited in four distinct ways including targeted presentations 
to professionals and medical students, posters, letters of invitation and personal 
invitations to known contacts within the system. The targeted presentations to 
professionals included a two minute presentation of the proposed research (see Appendix 
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C) that was conducted both for physician and nursing professional groups in the context 
of professional forums to stimulate interest in the study for the purposes of recruitment. 
Specific forums that were addressed included: i) nursing grand rounds; ii) medical grand 
rounds; iii) residents’ orientation; iv) residents’ ethics sessions. In addition, opportunities 
for recruitment were provided by clinical program managers in the context of nursing 
professional development and quality rounds. Targeted presentations to medical students 
included a two minute presentation of the proposed research (see Appendix D)  that was 
conducted at the beginning of one class with first and second year medical students, and 
during the fourth year medicine “Back to Basics” course that brings all 4th year clerks 
together. Ethics professors provided time and opportunity for these presentations.   
A poster was provided at the forums and posted on clinical bulletin boards in 
acute care facilities, long term care facilities, and in multi-staff community health sites 
(see Appendix B). The poster was also used for recruitment via social media and email. A 
letter of invitation to describe the study was provided at the professional forums to 
supplement the presentations. In addition, the letters of invitation were distributed to 
targeted Eastern Health employee groups through staff meetings via program managers 
for nursing, pharmacy and laboratory medicine (see Appendix A). Program managers at 
the Health Sciences Centre site, the Janeway Children’s Health and Rehabilitation Centre 
site and St. Clare’s Mercy Hospital site were approached about the study, including an 
explanation and opportunity to ask questions. In addition, each manager was provided 
with a package including letters of invitation and posters to be distributed at staff 
gatherings (meetings or informal gatherings). Following the initial recruitment period, 
each participant was invited to mention the study to colleagues and to provide colleagues 
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with researcher contact information and a letter of invitation if the participant was 
agreeable.  
 In addition to invitations issued within group settings, social media was used in a 
number of recruitment strategies. The Association of Registered Nurses of Newfoundland 
and Labrador (ARNNL) was approached to provide contact information for registered 
nurses who had indicated a willingness to receive information in relation to participation 
in research projects at the time of their annual registration renewal. A list was provided 
by ARNNL to me and a number of nurses were randomly selected by me. An email was 
sent by ARNNL with the letter of invitation and poster attached, inviting them to contact 
the researcher directly if interested in participation. The College of Licensed Practical 
Nurses of Newfoundland and Labrador was approached to send an email to all their 
members with the letter of invitation and poster attached. The College agreed and an all-
member email was sent. The Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses Union posted the letter 
of invitation and the poster on their Facebook27 page inviting interested parties to contact 
the researcher.   
My intention was to examine the experience of health care providers involved in 
adverse events who experienced trauma. This study does not capture the voices of those 
who were not traumatized by second victim experiences. The focus of the study was the 
experiences of second victims of adverse events; the recruitment process necessarily 
excluded those who did not feel trauma as a result of their experience (just as it excludes 
some of those who remain so extremely traumatized that they declined to talk about the 
                                                 
27 Facebook is an online social networking service.  
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experience for fear of re-living their experiences). Participants in this study are those who 
continue to feel affected by their experiences in a negative way, to a greater or lesser 
extent (that is, those who are “second victims”). By contrast, those who experienced an 
adverse event but did not come forward to participate in this study may not have felt 
traumatized.    
The recruitment strategies included a reassurance that willingness or not to 
participate would not affect their relationship with Eastern Health or specifically the 
QRM department. As described in the earlier section of this chapter on Researcher’s 
Insider Role and Conflict of Interest, I described my role and answered any questions that 
an informant had based on their own perception of my role, during recruitment. For any 
informants with whom I had previous relationships in other roles, I undertook specific 
conversation to clarify the distinction of those roles. No informant expressed any concern 
about the distinction between my role as a Quality Clinical Safety Leader and as the 
principal investigator in this study.  
3.4.6 Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
 Considering the number of health care providers involved directly and indirectly 
with any one patient, the effect of a single event could reach a large number of health 
care providers. Understanding the scope of the effect was important to fully understand 
who would best inform this study. Careful attention was paid to the nature of the adverse 
event itself to ensure that a range of types of adverse events were available for capture in 
my analysis. It was possible that the experience was dependent on the type of event, so it 
was important to include a range of events. 
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I only included individuals who were involved in health care provision either 
directly or through clinical support roles. Persons working within the health care setting 
but not considered health care professionals such as dietary, laundry, housekeeping, 
infrastructure support, security, administrative support and allied health staff were 
excluded. The exclusion was based on their involvement in non-clinical support roles, 
and therefore not care decision-makers and not based on a determination that they would 
not experience an adverse event. The decision to focus on persons in clinical support 
roles was a strategy to capture a thorough description of the experience in as close 
proximity to the event as possible, in terms of care decision-making.  
This research project was inclusive of gender, age and a range of years of 
experience within the health care provider demographic.   
3.5 Data Collection and Analysis Procedures 
3.5.1 Data collection 
 The primary method of data collection was semi-structured interviews,   
contextualized by my experience as a former “insider” in QRM. Interviews captured the 
experientially based knowledge of health care providers about adverse events, 
organizational response and forms of support. The interviews were conducted by me and 
were digitally audio-recorded to allow me to attend closely to the interview process and 
to ensure accurate capture of participant data.  
 Prior to the beginning of the interview, consent was obtained through an informed 
consent process (described below in detail, in relation to ethical considerations for the 
study) and the signing of a consent form (Appendix E). I aimed to create a welcoming, 
nonthreatening environment to maximize the willingness of participants to share their 
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experiences and beliefs.  Establishing an atmosphere of “power equality” as described by 
Karnieli-Miller, Strier, and Pessach (2009) was particularly important given my role as 
Management within Eastern Health (see Researcher’s Insider Role and Conflict of 
Interest).   
 The key informant interviews were flexible in nature. “Critical ethnography is 
especially susceptible to the need for flexibility, because the questions that are most 
interesting may not be revealed until considerable background data emerges” (Thomas, 
1993, p. 35). Questions were focused on the informant’s experience and understanding of 
the event and were designed to elicit the informant’s description of the processes 
surrounding adverse events including perceived affect, responses and support. If I noted 
emotional responses that would not be captured within the verbal response, I commonly 
asked for clarification about the emotional response to give voice to the non-verbal 
components of the interview. For example, if an informant began to cry I would ask them 
to talk about the emotion they were feeling at that time and the source of the emotion, if it 
wasn’t obvious from the verbal description.  
The location of informant interviews were organized at off-site locations, as it 
related to their workplace or former workplace. Some participants requested to meet at 
their own home and without exception all non-management participants expressed a 
desire not to meet in proximity to their workplace. Some participants explained their 
reasoning for the requested interview location as not wanting to be seen by their co-
workers or manager in relation to the study and others, who had changed jobs, expressed 
wanting to avoid feeling upset by seeing their former workplace. For example, one 
participant who had moved work locations due to an adverse event expressed a desire to 
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avoid seeing the Cameron Memorial that was located at the entrance to the former work 
location (further discussion in Chapter 5). Some of the interviews with management staff 
were arranged off-site for convenience of meeting time but others were requested in the 
informants’ offices. None of the management staff expressed concern about location 
based on association with the study or feeling upset.  
All informants were asked to share their experience of having been involved in a 
direct, indirect or by-association adverse event, or having knowledge of an adverse event. 
In addition, physicians were encouraged to describe their experience of adverse events 
while in the role of medical student/resident, their mentorship of students and residents in 
relation to adverse events, and how they perceive support is sought by medical 
students/residents. Management staff were additionally invited to share their perceptions 
of: disclosure and adverse event management within Eastern Health, providing support or 
receiving support in the context of adverse events or disclosure, and what type of support 
is available to staff and utilized by staff. 
3.5.2 Data Analysis 
 Data analysis began during the participant-researcher conversation. To retain an 
accurate account of the conversation, the interview narratives were audio-taped and then 
transcribed verbatim. Once the interview was transcribed, I reviewed the audio-tape to 
ensure accuracy. It is suggested that special attention be paid during transcription and 
subsequent audio checks to pauses, humour and emotional responses (DeVault, 1990), 
and in this study changes in volume also became important. For example, during 
particularly difficult descriptions it was not uncommon for an informant to whisper.  
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In addition to interview transcripts, data sources included reflexive interview 
notes, text (policies and legislation), blank text documents (reporting forms) and artistic 
representations. Data from all sources was subjected to content analysis. The analysis of 
the transcribed data and the interview notes occurred concurrently with the interviews. 
The transcribed data was uploaded to a qualitative software program (MAXQDA11©) 
that provided a means for the data to be organized and retrievable.  
The organization of data represented descriptions or ideas that were being 
provided by participants and seemed to share or relate to a common thread in the 
experience of adverse events. As data was analyzed, the descriptions that began to 
emerge were clarified and further explored with subsequent participants. In some cases 
clarification was sought by speaking to informants more than once. This confirmed the 
accuracy of my understanding of the experience. The spacing between interviews was 
balanced in such a way as to ensure that the process of analysis was thorough and not 
rushed, at the same time not asking participants to wait for extended periods to have an 
interview completed. Avoiding extended waits acknowledged the anxiety that some 
participants may experience waiting to revisit a particularly difficult adverse event.   
A critical interpretive approach was used to analyse the accounts of adverse event 
experiences provided by the participants. In keeping with a critical interpretative 
approach to ethnography, the primary focus was on what people said and did as well as 
the meanings they ascribed to what they said and did. Attention was also paid to moments 
of resistance to the normative assumptions within the work environment of the health 
care providers. The analysis considered points of convergence and divergence between 
and within the accounts of staff members, management and organizational leaders. The 
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analysis considered the experiences of participants specifically in relation to the concepts 
of just culture and power. 
The goal was to secure interviews with participants from all participant groups in 
addition to as comprehensive as possible representation of levels of involvement in 
adverse events (direct, indirect and by association). Once those groups and levels were 
represented in the data I continued to collect data across various roles such as staff, 
management and organizational leadership. The types of adverse events in terms of 
severity were varied within the existing data and so further recruitment to achieve varying 
levels of severity within the interviews was not required. 
3.6 Rigour 
 Steps were taken to address the credibility and transferability of the research and, 
as in all ethnographic research, the need for reflexivity in order to ensure trustworthiness. 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) credibility is one of the most important factors in 
establishing trustworthiness. Credibility was embedded in the commitment to report the 
perspectives of the informants as clearly as possible, strengthened by the opportunity to 
build trust, learn about the culture and test for misinformation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Shenton (2004) describes a number of provisions that can be made by researchers to 
ensure accuracy in the description of the phenomena under scrutiny, for example: 
adoption of well-established research methods, familiarity with the culture, random 
sampling, iterative questioning and frequent debriefing sessions with my supervisor. 
These method provisions were used in this study and are evident in the description of the 
study methods (data collection and analysis procedures) described in Sections 3.4 and 
3.5. In addition, it is important to note that I had regular debriefing sessions (minimum 
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monthly) with my principle supervisor throughout the data collection and analysis period 
to discuss alternative perceptions and to help me recognize any biases in my analysis.  
On transferability, Morse and Field (1995) suggest that providing a “thick 
description” (Geertz, 1973) of research allows for external parties to decide if a transfer 
of knowledge can be contemplated. It was reasonable to expect that the description 
captured in the data from persons involved directly, indirectly and by association with 
adverse events would inform a comprehensive understanding of the experience of adverse 
events by health care providers. In addition, sufficient contextual information about the 
site of the study has been provided to enable other individuals to determine whether the 
findings are applicable in their own settings (Shenton, 2004). Inclusion of verbatim 
interview segments and evidence of clear links between data and researcher 
interpretations also contributes to research trustworthiness.  
 The principle of reflexivity is that researchers should subject their own research 
practice to the same critical analysis that they deploy when studying their topic (Green & 
Thorogood, 2009). The interpretive process was underpinned by reflexivity as a method 
to ensure openness to possibilities in the analysis, while being aware of the influence of 
the setting and associated values and interests on my perspective. Reflexive practice was 
accomplished through the use of a reflexive journal, which enhanced understanding of 
my perspective and situated me in the interpretive process. I acknowledge that my 
position at the management level ‘produced’ thick descriptions from management and 
organizational leadership employees, who trusted me and were very forthcoming about 
their experiences because of our pre-existing relationship. I also recognized that my 
position at the management level required particular attention when building trust with 
88 
 
staff, in order to generate data that was accurate and comprehensive in reflecting their 
experiences. On that point, I believe that my personality style that connotes humility and 
nurturing and is transparently non-judgemental enabled me to build rapport and a 
relationship of trust despite the hierarchical nature of my role compared to theirs within 
Eastern Health.  
3.7 Ethics and Human Rights Considerations 
 Ethics approval was sought and received from the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Health Research Ethics Board (see Appendix F) and from the Research Proposals 
Approval Committee (RPAC) of Eastern Health (see Appendix G). While there was no 
explicit discussion, in the ethics applications, that Eastern Health and the Cameron 
Inquiry would be identified, RPAC and all participants knew that the Cameron Inquiry 
was part of the study and therefore by implication Eastern Health would be identifiable.  
3.7.1 Informed Consent 
 Informed consent was ensured by providing full disclosure of all information 
necessary for the participants to make an informed decision to participate in this research 
project. Full disclosure included, but was not limited to, details such as a description of 
the research project, the purpose described in plain language, my identity, duration and 
nature of participation, research procedures, participant responsibilities, and foreseeable 
risks and potential benefits of participating. The foreseeable risks included experiencing 
stress or anxiety about discussing a painful event or experiencing vulnerability in relation 
to sharing with a stranger. The potential benefits for informants were the opportunities: to 
explore their experience of an adverse event; to critically examine their perspective by 
describing various aspects of the experience or experiences; to deconstruct the adverse 
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event/s for closure and even healing; to reflect on the organization’s response and the 
supports experienced; and to contribute to the formation of a support response model.     
 My conflict of interest in relation to my management role within Eastern Health 
was emphasized in the consent process (when applicable), as otherwise it would have 
jeopardized the integrity of the research and the protection of participants. As mentioned, 
I explained to participants that if, in the context of the interview, they divulged an event 
that I had a moral duty to report in the context of my employment, and that had not been 
previously reported, I would be obligated to do so.  
Potential participants were informed that they were free to withdraw at any time 
and they were given details about what information would be collected and for what 
purpose, and the contact information of my research supervisor who could explain the 
scientific and scholarly aspects of the research. The key to voluntary consent is that 
consent is ongoing and informed until the project is complete. Ongoing consent was 
maintained throughout the research project by providing participants with information 
relevant to their decision to continue to participate, if the participant contacted the 
researcher. There were no changes during the research process that needed to be 
communicated for the purpose of ongoing consent.  
3.7.2 Confidentiality 
 Privacy and confidentiality were of paramount importance in this research project. 
All participants had an opportunity to exercise control over their personal information by 
consenting to or withholding consent for the collection, use and/or disclosure of 
information (Canadian Institutes of Health Research et al., 2014), that was discussed in 
the consent process, and emphasized in relation to disclosure of my role as management 
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within Eastern Health. In addition, as a researcher I treated personal information in a 
confidential manner and ensured that data was protected from breaches of confidentiality 
by safeguarding participant data by ensuring security and protecting identity. Security 
measures that were used to protect information obtained in the study included physical 
safeguards (locked filing cabinet in my home office), administrative safeguards (only I 
and a transcriptionist had access to participant data) and technical safeguards (data files 
are password protected and stored on an encrypted USB key).  
 The information that was shared in the context of research findings was assessed 
for identifying information that had the potential to breach privacy and confidentiality 
such as direct identifiers (name) or indirect identifiers (unique personal characteristics). 
Information was de-identified (direct identifiers removed) to decrease the ethical 
concerns regarding privacy as it would reduce the possibility of identifying an individual. 
I employed a transcriptionist for this research; she signed an oath of confidentiality.  
 Caution was exercised since the relatively small population in this study made 
individuals potentially identifiable. The staff population of Eastern Health (13,500) is 
primarily comprised of individuals who have lived and worked for the organization or 
one of the legacy organizations, prior to the formation of Eastern Health, their entire adult 
working life. As a result of this dynamic and the non-transient nature of the population, 
many of the informants would work in close and daily proximity with one another. In this 
written dissertation and in subsequent publications, I use aggregated stories or other 
means to ensure that no particular individual could be identified in relation to a particular 
adverse event. However, given the relatively small population of those affected by 
publically known adverse events, there was one individual who could be identifiable by 
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insiders to the organization. In that particular instance, a frank discussion was held, at the 
time of writing, with that individual who consented with no hesitation to having the story 
kept intact despite the potential that insiders could identify the source.   
3.8 Participant Support 
Research of this nature could have created heightened anxiety in some 
participants, in particular if the participant had not resolved work or personal conflicts 
related to the adverse event. I anticipated this potential participant response and had a 
plan in place to meet the need for support or guidance. Specifically, I had copies of the 
employee and family assistance program counselling contact information that I was 
prepared to provide to participants regardless of whether they identified the need for 
counselling.     
 Having outlined the study methods and data collection and analysis procedures, I 
now turn my attention to the official (text-based) discourse of risk management and 
patient safety, which will set the context to consider the experiences of the health care 
providers. The experiences of health care providers occur within a complex environment 
with several layers of policy, procedures and governance. The risk management and 
patient safety discourse provides the backdrop against which to explore the experiences 
of health care providers including the perspectives of managers and organizational 
leadership.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Policies and Procedures of Risk Management and Patient Safety: 
Evolution and Action 
The formal texts and discourse of risk management and patient safety are a core 
feature of the field I entered as critical ethnographer. Examining the official, text-based 
descriptions of risk management and patient safety – which contain both definitions and 
policies for management – is key to understanding the experience of adverse events, 
because the texts constitute orthodoxies which shape behaviour and are also resisted, 
challenged and perhaps even purposefully ignored. Bourdieu distinguishes between overt 
power, in the form of written laws or orthodoxy, and power which is hidden in the forms 
of everyday life -- what he calls doxa (1977). Hegemonic reproduction is the key 
characteristic of doxa. It is within orthodoxy (which can be roughly glossed as official 
discourse) and heterodoxy (resistance to the official discourse) that ideologies are made 
apparent, challenged, defended, altered and changed. 
Therefore, before beginning my examination of the experiences of adverse events, 
I must first examine the orthodoxy (that is, examine the official, text based discourse) that 
shapes, and is in turn (re)shaped by, the lived experiences of adverse events. In this 
chapter I begin by examining the evolution of the official (text-based) discourse of risk 
management and patient safety. Then I examine the official (text-based) discourse on risk 
management and patient safety specifically within Eastern Health, in Newfoundland and 
Labrador and in Canada including text from national professional organizations. Finally, I 
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examine a number of public judicial inquiries into adverse events that have each played a 
major role in the culture of Canadian health care.  
4.1 Evolution of the Official (Text-Based) Discourse of Risk Management and 
Patient Safety 
In the mid-1970s, as accountability for patient outcomes moved to the forefront of 
public attention, the frequency of malpractice claims and the size of financial awards and 
settlements increased substantially (Abbott, Weber, & Kelley, 2005). By the late 1970s 
and early 1980s “offering malpractice coverage became less profitable for the 
commercial carriers, and many exited the market” (Abbott et al., 2005, p. 1106). 
Commercially available professional liability insurance became prohibitively costly or 
difficult to obtain. As a result, in the 1980s, “new malpractice liability companies were 
founded by physicians” at about “the same time tort reform legislation was enacted in 
some states to limit awards for ‘pain and suffering’ ” (Abbott et al., 2005, p. 1106).  
The 1980s became a critical period when the importance of patient safety was 
recognized and strategies began to be developed to address patient safety. The medical 
sub-speciality of anaesthesia began to pay particular attention to patient safety in 1982 
when, in the U.S., the ABC television program 20/20 aired a documentary entitled The 
Deep Sleep that presented accounts of anaesthetic accidents (Pierce, 2007). In 1983, the 
British Royal Society of Medicine and the Harvard Medical School jointly sponsored a 
symposium on anaesthesia deaths and injuries, resulting in an agreement to share 
statistics and to conduct studies. In 1985 the American Society of Anaesthesiologists 
established the Anaesthesia Patient Safety Foundation (Anesthesia Patient Safety 
Foundation, 2015). The Anaesthesia Patient Safety Foundation marked the first use of the 
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term patient safety in the name of a professional reviewing organization, and 
anaesthesiology became the leading medical specialty addressing issues of patient safety. 
In 1989, the Australian Patient Safety Foundation was founded for anaesthesia error 
monitoring (Australian Patient Safety Foundation, 2015). By the late 1980s, work began 
on a National Demonstration Project on Quality Improvement in Health Care in the 
United States, as part of an effort to redesign the U.S. health care system into a system 
without errors. As a result, the U.S. Institute for Healthcare Improvement was officially 
founded in 1991 (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2015).  
At the same time as medicine was being challenged to examine patient safety in 
the U.S., the pharmaceutical industry was facing its own challenges. The 1982 poisoning 
of Tylenol capsules with cyanide in a suburb outside of Chicago is generally 
acknowledged as the beginning of the modern field of crisis management in health care. 
The fact that Johnson & Johnson, the makers of Tylenol, responded quickly by pulling all 
bottles of the medication off the shelves nationwide -- thus signalling that it was putting 
the safety of consumers ahead of profits -- served to make Johnson &Johnson an early 
role model for effective crisis management (Conway, Federico, Stewart, & Campbell, 
2011). 
The 1990s continued the pioneering efforts in patient safety and crisis 
management in the U.S. health care system when, in 1993, the Anaesthesia Adverse 
Event Protocol was introduced by Cooper and colleagues (Cooper, Cullen, Eichhorn, 
Philip, & Holzman, 1993). In the mid-1990s clinical risk management -- an approach to 
improving quality in healthcare that places special emphasis on identifying circumstances 
that put patients at risk of harm, and then acting to prevent or control those risks -- was 
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introduced (Reed, 1997). And finally the “To Err is Human” report (Institute of 
Medicine, 1999) that claimed that at least 44,000 and possibly as many as 98,000 
Americans die each year as a result of medical errors, is in large part credited with 
prompting the patient safety movement (McCaffrey, 2010). The data presented in “To Err 
is Human” arose from the Harvard Medical Practice Study of 1984, and Colorado and 
Utah data were used to repeat the study in 1992 (Brennan et al., 1991; Leape et al., 1991; 
Thomas et al., 2000). When the “To Err is Human” report was released, there was a 
transition from the use of the terms quality improvement and quality assurance to patient 
safety. The use of patient safety terminology was believed to make the issues more 
understandable and person-based or personal.  
The beginning of the 21st century in the U.S. saw the move for health care to 
incorporate or adopt strategies from other industries, such as aviation. Crew resource 
management (CRM) was recommended to be incorporated into collaborative techniques 
for improving health care (Kosnik, 2002). CRM is a communication methodology 
developed by the aviation industry, based on team-centred decision making systems. 
CRM as distinguished from other traditional continuous quality improvement and quality 
assurance initiatives stood as a new approach to assess and manage risk in health care 
domains.  
While the patient safety movement may have been driven by the U.S., Canada’s 
health care system followed a parallel evolution. Health Canada officially created and 
announced funding for the Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI) in December of 2003 
(Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2014). The Canadian Adverse Events study was 
released in 2004 (Baker et al., 2004) and the Canadian Root Cause Analysis Framework 
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was developed and released in 2006 (Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2006). In 2008, 
Accreditation Canada provided influential leadership for organizational practice changes 
in regard to disclosure through a Required Organizational Practice, supported by the 
Canadian Disclosure Guidelines (Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2008). Also in 2008 
the development of apology legislation began across Canada, with the strong support of 
CPSI and health-care organizations, providing additional incentive for open disclosure. 
And in 2012 the Canadian Root Cause Analysis Framework was re-released with the title 
“Canadian Incident Analysis Framework” acknowledging the key advancement of 
discontinuing the use of the term root cause analysis (Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 
2011b, 2012a). It was recognized that rarely is there only one root cause to a patient 
safety incident and rarely is causation correctly attributable to a system that is ill 
designed to mitigate or prevent errors from occurring.  
An important event, in 2013, was the release by CPSI of the Canadian Paediatric 
Adverse Events study (Matlow et al., 2012). The Canadian Paediatric Adverse Events 
Study is the first national study of the epidemiology of adverse events in hospitalized 
children. In addition to determining the incidence of adverse events in children 
hospitalized in Canada, the study was designed to determine and compare the types and 
preventability of adverse events in Academic Paediatric Centres and Large Community 
Hospitals. 
While many health care providers are employed by health care organizations that 
began setting policy in response to the above named national guidelines, in fact many 
health care providers are also being guided by their professional associations. In 2009, the 
Canadian Medical Protective Association (CMPA) addressed the members of the 
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Canadian Medical Association regarding restrictions on disclosure and the medical 
liability issues associated with the reporting of and response to adverse events, in two 
position papers (Canadian Medical Protective Association, 2009a, 2009b). The first 
position paper states that “while it may be reasonable to share any actual improvements 
that were made arising out of a quality improvement review, it would be inappropriate to 
reveal information that can easily be tied back to a particular event” (Canadian Medical 
Protective Association, 2009a, p. 12). The second position paper recommends that “once 
the immediate clinical needs of the patient have been addressed, the first response is to 
disclose the adverse event to the patient” (Canadian Medical Protective Association, 
2009b, p. 3).  
Having considered the evolution of discourse related to risk management and 
patient safety, I will turn now to consider written policies and procedures related to risk 
management and patient safety specifically within Eastern Health. There are a number of 
texts which I identified as important for informing the adverse event experience and 
which assisted in my analysis of participant descriptions. The next section provides an 
explanation and then examination of each identified text as it relates to the adverse event 
experience.   
4.2 Official (Text-Based) Discourse on Risk Management and Patient Safety within 
Eastern Health  
There are a number of official texts that factor into the experience of participants 
of this study, including but not limited to: Clinical Safety Reporting System form; 
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Eastern Health Disclosure Policy28; Eastern Health Occurrence Reporting and 
Management Policy29; Apology Act30; Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act31; and the Evidence Act32. There are two levels of text which are considered: text 
within the health authority, referred to as organizational policy; and text that originates 
within government, referred to as governing policies and legislation. How these texts are 
taken up and used (or ignored or dismissed) by informants in the study and how these 
texts factor into the experience of participants will be discussed in the analysis. Here, 
however, I turn already to the words of participants in this study to explain how and why 
these official texts emerged as they did within Eastern Health. 
4.2.1 Evolution of dominant discourses on risk management and patient safety within 
Eastern Health 
Eastern Health was the subject of the Cameron Inquiry in 2008/2009, occurring at 
the same time that CPSI was creating new guidelines for disclosure. Although Eastern 
Health had a disclosure policy, one of the recommendations from Cameron, according to 
a manager involved in policy development, included the directive “to do a little bit more 
and really firm up our disclosure policy.” According to that policy leader, “really, the 
impetus back in 2009… is that we needed to strengthen the policy.” Further, the policy 
leader explained that Eastern Health was directed to examine what CPSI was putting 
                                                 
28 Office of Administrative Responsibility – Eastern Health - Quality, Patient Safety and 
Risk Management  
29 Office of Administrative Responsibility – Eastern Health - Quality, Patient Safety and 
Risk Management 
30 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, SNL2009 Chapter A-10.1 
31 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, SNL2002 Chapter A-1.1 
32 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, RSNL1990 Chapter E-16 
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forward in their guidelines to strengthen the policy. Additionally, the participant reported 
that Eastern Health was expected, in conjunction with the policy development, to create 
or find an evidence-based education program to provide to the organizational leaders. The 
purpose of the education program was to integrate the strengthened policy with skill 
development, for organizational leaders, in the management of disclosure. “So the basic 
concepts were the policy development piece and then the skill development of how to 
move forward.”     
The impetus for the evolution of policies and procedures for risk management and 
patient safety within Eastern Health was multi-faceted. The Cameron Inquiry was also 
underway at the same time as the Adverse Events Task Force (AETF) was appointed by 
the provincial government, led by Robert Thompson.33 The impression of a leader within 
the Quality and Risk Management (QRM) was that “government was trying to get 
ahead…there’s going to be recommendations, and how can we kind of step up and try to 
get some of this moving.” According to a manager involved in policy development, the 
AETF was conducting “all kinds of consultations.” The task force conducted stakeholder 
consultations to identify what processes the health authorities believed were required for 
occurrence reporting and disclosure. In addition, the task force sought to identify 
common language for occurrence reporting across health authorities. As stated by a 
manager within QRM “they [AETF] were kind of the impetus in [the] creation of going 
forward.” The AETF was described as being: 
                                                 
33 Robert Thompson had managed the NL government’s participation in the Commission 
of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor Testing and held positions of Secretary to Cabinet 
(Health Issues) and Clerk of the Executive Council.    
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Tasked by the Department of Health to take this on, knowing the Inquiry was 
happening, knowing that we had to do a better job around the management of 
adverse events, and then what do the regional health authorities need in order to 
do that. 
Eastern Health was required by the AETF to provide feedback on what Eastern 
Health as an organization felt they could do to improve the management of adverse 
events. According to a QRM staff member, the result was the creation of a consultation 
paper with input from physicians, organizational leaders, directors and others. According 
to the QRM staff member, that paper identified the need for increased resources within 
the organization to provide skills development and management of adverse events, in 
addition to an electronic reporting system to streamline and increase accountability for 
the reporting of adverse events. It was described as a cascade effect by the same staff 
member who was working in Eastern Health QRM. At the same time as tasks were being 
assigned to the organization, the QRM had gotten an increased number of positions for 
quality clinical safety leaders. During the same time period as the Cameron Inquiry was 
in process, the AETF report resulted in the development of the Provincial Office of 
Adverse Events (POAE). At that point there were no official texts to support the work of 
the QRM or the POAE.  
The necessity to create clearer processes within Eastern Health for adverse event 
management and disclosure of adverse events, identified both by the Cameron Inquiry 
recommendations and by the AETF, resulted in the creation of several policies and 
guidance documents, as well as an electronic reporting system and the instituting of a 
disclosure training program. The texts applicable to this study include those as well as 
texts of the provincial government, such as The Evidence Act, that directly and indirectly 
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dictate the activities of staff of Eastern Health. As well, specific disciplines such as 
medicine or nursing provide guidelines that act in tandem with the organizational policies 
in guiding staff behaviour. My discussion of official text or orthodoxy governing risk 
management and patient safety begins with an examination of Eastern Health’s disclosure 
policy. 
4.2.2 Disclosure Policy 
The revision of the disclosure policy that existed prior to the Cameron Inquiry 
was a task assigned to the QRM as a result of the recommendations of the Cameron 
Inquiry and the AETF Report (Cameron, 2009b, 2009c; Thompson, 2008). The 
disclosure policy was originally approved in 2007, with a revision as a result of the 
Inquiry in 2009. Further revisions occurred in 2013 with the release of the new Canadian 
Disclosure Guidelines in 2011 (Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2011a; Eastern Health, 
2013a). The disclosure policy provides a step-by-step procedure of disclosure from the 
observation or discovery of an occurrence to the determination of whether the disclosure 
is individual, multi-patient or multi-jurisdictional. The procedure includes who should 
disclose, when disclosure should occur, elements to be included in the disclosure meeting 
and what should be documented. The description of time expectations include 
“immediately” to “within one to two days” (Eastern Health, 2013a, p. 3). The severity 
rating of occurrences from non-patient related to serious/severe harm is included for the 
purpose of identifying which Eastern Health leadership members are to be notified and 
how quickly.  
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The overview of the disclosure policy states that:  
Eastern Health is committed to client safety and facilitating a culture that is just 
and fair, where health care providers understand, and can act upon, their 
individual, ethical and professional responsibility in disclosing occurrences. 
Disclosure is grounded in the spirit of a just and safe culture and allows the client 
to continue to make informed health care decisions. Disclosure is the right thing 
to do (Eastern Health, 2013a, p. 1). 
 
These statements in the disclosure policy infer that the common usage of the term just 
culture is a commitment of Eastern Health. Just culture refers to the promotion of a non-
punitive culture that promotes patient safety, where open reporting and participation in 
prevention and improvement is encouraged, with a focus on understanding the root of a 
problem to promote prevention of negative outcomes for patients (Connor et al., 2007; 
Marx, 2001).  
All three versions of the disclosure policy (2007, 2009 and 2013) included 
statements that acknowledged the emotional needs of patients and family members:  
Practical and emotional support may be required for the client, substitute 
decision-maker, and/or family member. Resources required for support are 
provided by and/or arranged through Eastern Health (Eastern Health, 2013a, p. 3). 
 
The 2007 and 2009 versions of the disclosure policy did not include a procedural 
statement that acknowledged the emotional or support needs of the health care provider. 
In the process of interacting with various members of the QRM program for the purposes 
of this study, the absence of an acknowledgement of the need for support for staff 
following an adverse event within the disclosure policy became evident. The result was 
the addition to the policy, at the time of the 2013 revision, of the following statement: 
The appropriate manager informs the care provider(s), and/or team involved of 
debriefing and counseling supports available (arranged through Employee 
Assistance Program), and/or Pastoral Care and Ethics supports (arranged through 
Pastoral Services).  
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It should be noted that informing the care provider of supports available or stating that 
they “may contact their professional bodies/associations” (Eastern Health, 2013a, p. 3) is 
not an equivalent level of support described in the policy as being provided or arranged 
for the patient, substitute decision-maker and/or family member.  
Appended to the disclosure policy is a disclosure toolkit that was developed based 
on the Canadian Disclosure Guidelines (Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2011a). The 
toolkit outlines the importance of disclosure, the professional and ethical responsibilities 
for physicians and nurses, a disclosure flowchart and a planning checklist that itemizes 
the process. The disclosure flowchart is a pictorial representation of the required 
notifications from the time an occurrence is identified through to documentation. In 
essence, the disclosure policy provides a description, a pictorial representation, and a 
checklist, all designed to inform the health care provider of the expectations of the 
organization in relation to an occurrence.  
4.2.3 Disclosure Training 
In 2009, an exploration of models for skill development in disclosure began, in 
conjunction with the revision of the disclosure policy, partially as a result of the AETF 
report that recommended “targeted disclosure training” (Thompson, 2008, p. 139). 
Ultimately, a disclosure program entitled “Disclosing Unanticipated Medical Outcomes” 
from the Institute of Healthcare Communication, located in the province of Alberta, was 
selected and a train-the-trainer model was initiated, with a staff member from the QRM 
initially sent for training (Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2015; Institute for Healthcare 
Communication, 2016)). The Institute of Healthcare Communication training was 
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sponsored in Canada by the College of Family Physicians of Canada for nine years from 
2006 to 2014. Within Eastern Health, several faculty were trained by the Institute of 
Healthcare Communication and many learners (executive members, management and 
physicians) received training from 2010 to 2014. Specifically the training was for those 
individuals who were directly involved in informal or formal disclosure activities. 
Several of the participants in this study participated in the Eastern Health disclosure 
training and a small number had been trained as faculty by the Institute of Healthcare 
Communication. 
4.2.4 Occurrence Reporting and Management Policy 
 The occurrence reporting and management policy was originally approved in 
2007 and, similarly to the disclosure policy, was revised in 2011 to reflect the 
recommendations of both the Cameron Inquiry and the AETF Report. The overview in 
the policy states that “Eastern Health is committed to a reporting and learning 
environment where occurrences and close calls are openly identified, reported, and 
managed in an efficient and comprehensive manner” (Eastern Health, 2011a, p. 1). In 
addition, the overview includes a number of statements that reportedly reflect Eastern 
Health’s support for occurrence reporting and management, such as the following: 
“Effective management of occurrences supports the spirit of a just culture, complements a 
culture of safety, and strengthens the organization’s integrity” (Eastern Health, 2011a, p. 
2). Correspondingly to the disclosure policy, the occurrence reporting and management 
policy highlights the concept of a just culture.  
The policy names the Client Safety Reporting System (CSRS) as the mechanism 
to be used for occurrence reporting and management within Eastern Health. In addition, 
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the policy outlines the responsibilities for reporting and managing the reported 
occurrence by role, including reporter, manager and Quality Clinical Safety Leader. 
Among the policy statements are the following: 
An occurrence report must be completed for all occurrences, including Close 
Calls34; 
The employee or agent35 must immediately communicate the occurrence to the 
most appropriate care provider; 
The health care provider must also document on the health record that an 
Occurrence Report form has been completed (Eastern Health, 2011a, p. 2).  
According to the scope of the policy this “applies to all employees and agents of Eastern 
Health” (Eastern Health, 2011a, p. 3). The responsibilities as outlined in the procedure 
include an expectation that the reporter “record only factual information about the 
occurrence“ and “not express personal opinion, attribute fault or lay blame,” another 
indication of the intention to apply just and non-punitive attributes to the policy (Eastern 
Health, 2011a, p. 3). The policy includes a list of the definitions for the severity rating 
scale for occurrences from Close Calls (Level 0) to Severe (Level 6)36. 
 The original intention of the policy was to capture the activities of managing 
occurrences as part of a quality assurance process that enabled the organization to learn 
from the occurrences and evaluate “systemic factors that may have contributed to the 
event” to prevent future recurrences (Eastern Health, 2011a, p. 2). Following the release 
                                                 
34 A Close Call is defined as “a potential adverse event that did not actually occur due to 
chance, corrective actions, and/or timely intervention” (Eastern Health, 2011a, p. 6). 
35 An agent is defined as “a person, other than an employee, authorized by Eastern 
Health to act on its behalf, and includes physicians, volunteers, and pastoral care 
workers as well as staff of contractors (Eastern Health, 2011a, p. 5). 
36 An event occurred that resulted in patient/resident/client death (Eastern Health, 2011a, 
p. 4) 
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of the AETF report and the Cameron Inquiry report, one of the most significant policy 
revisions was the addition of a statement that allows the occurrence report to be provided 
outside the organization and outside the intention of systems learning. Specifically the 
policy statement states that “the patient/resident/client can request a copy of the 
Occurrence Report through the Quality and Risk Management Department” (Eastern 
Health, 2011a, p. 2). As described by a policy leader within the organization: 
So in kind of the spirit of openness and . . . it was a section added . . . if the client 
is involved in an event and there is an occurrence report, they have an opportunity 
to request that . . . it was a different way of looking at it, which historically is a bit 
of a change because if you look at it in the true sense of the literature, occurrence 
reports were considered solely a quality assurance activity, and then occurrence 
reports back in the day were kept for systems learning. . . . Here it is [now], I’m 
sending it out to the world. 
This shift in policy changed the perception among staff who now felt that occurrence 
reports were potentially harmful or punitive and increased the sense of personal and 
organizational vulnerability that in the view of staff in QRM may have impacted the 
confidence staff felt in reporting. One participant reported that prior to this change  
the occurrence report . . . would be considered protected under the Evidence Act 
in any type of proceeding at all, . . . our own legal counsel representing us would 
not even have access to occurrence reports, so it was really treated as a quality 
assurance activity, which was most [common] across the country . . . it’s a quality 
assurance activity.   
The second significant policy revision was the addition of a statement requiring 
the health care provider to document in the patient’s record the fact that an occurrence 
report had been completed. The documentation tied the occurrence report directly to the 
patient’s record so that, in the event that the patient was requesting their health record, the 
occurrence report was now inherently part of the patient’s record.  
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4.2.5 Client Safety Reporting System 
The client safety reporting system (CSRS) is an electronic tool used to manage 
occurrences from a reporting and documentation perspective. The use of CSRS for 
reporting and managing occurrences “is considered a quality assurance activity” (Eastern 
Health, 2011a, p. 1). The development of an electronic reporting system for Eastern 
Health was tasked to the QRM as a result of the AETF report. As stated in the AETF 
report:  
While the establishment of an electronic occurrence reporting system may be 
seen, at first, to be just another IT project, it is actually the opportunity for 
communication, cultural change, and a new beginning. It is the most important 
recommendation of the Task Force (Thompson, 2008, p. 138). 
CSRS was implemented in 2009 using a phased-in approach in all managerial 
units within the Health Authority, with the implementation completed in 2011. CSRS 
replaced a paper-based reporting system. CSRS is a web-based application with the 
operating system and data housed on the Eastern Health server that allows for report 
generation and ensures data security. CSRS was purchased from Datix®, a company 
based in the United Kingdom, with the Eastern Health application developed through a 
collaboration with the QRM. Orientation to CSRS is the responsibility of Quality Clinical 
Safety Leaders from the QRM, both for users and managers. The orientation includes 
discussion about how the purpose and intention of CSRS is to be a quality improvement 
tool and not a system for staff performance review or punitive action.  
The occurrence reporting and management policy directs the reporter to complete 
the report “within 24 hours after the occurrence, where possible” (Eastern Health, 2011a, 
p. 3). CSRS is accessed on the Eastern Health website homepage, with the reporter using 
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the link entitled “Report Occurrences and Close Calls”. The link directs the reporter to 
the report form that is to be completed by the person who identified the occurrence or 
close call. The report form has a number of mandatory fields and drop-down menus to 
assist the reporter in completing the form. As stated above, the report is intended to 
include only factual information about the occurrence. 
The report form begins with details about the reporter, other persons involved and 
the date and time of the occurrence. When CSRS was introduced, users were instructed 
that reporting could be done anonymously, but as the QRM has continued to manage the 
reporting system, there is recognition that anonymous reporting does not allow the 
managers to effectively analyse the occurrence, and therefore anonymous reporting is 
now discouraged. The main body of the report directs the reporter to provide details about 
the type of occurrence and the severity of the occurrence, and to complete text fields 
providing a description of the facts and contributory factors. With the revision of the 
disclosure policy, as discussed earlier, questions about disclosure and documentation, 
have been added to CSRS as additional fields, acting as reminders to complete these 
tasks. The final reporter function is submission of the completed report.  
The submission of a completed CSRS report causes a number of automated 
processes to occur, including: an email to the reporter with the occurrence number to 
verify the completed report, an email notification to the manager for the clinical/service 
area, and the electronic filing of the report in a Datix® folder that can be reviewed by the 
manager and Quality Clinical Safety Leader. For any occurrence that is reported as 
serious or severe (Level 5 or 6), an automated email notification is also sent to the 
Program Director, the Director of QRM, the VPs of the program and quality portfolios, 
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the Program Clinical Chief and the CEO of Eastern Health, and the occurrence is 
available for review by anyone responsible for the clinical/service area. The manager of 
the clinical/service area is responsible for the initial management of the occurrence, with 
support provided by the Quality Clinical Safety Leader from the QRM. The occurrence is 
reviewed and investigated by the manager and the documentation of the findings is 
recorded in the occurrence report. The occurrence is moved through a series of electronic 
folders within the reporting system based on who is responsible for the follow-up. 
Initially the manager is responsible for the occurrence and once the manager has 
completed their follow-up, the occurrence is moved to a folder that creates a notification 
for the Quality Clinical Safety Leader that the occurrence is ready for QRM review and 
documentation. The final process of review is done by QRM where the occurrence is 
categorized based on type, the severity is finalized, and the occurrence is closed.  
As noted above, the CSRS report requires the health care providers involved in 
the event to be identified and the reporter is asked to identify any system related issues 
that may have contributed, but the report does not require any information about support, 
if any, being provided to the health care provider. There are a variety of documentation 
processes in addition to CSRS outlined below. 
4.2.6 Root Cause Analysis Concise Investigation 
 The investigation of an occurrence that results in the determination of a severity 
of Level 4, that is, moderate and defined as “an event occurred that resulted in initial or 
prolonged hospitalization, and/or caused temporary (physical and/or psychological) 
patient/resident/client harm” (Eastern Health, 2011a, p. 4), is documented by the Quality 
Clinical Safety Leader on a Root Cause Analysis Concise Investigation Form, referred to 
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within QRM as a Concise Investigation. The purpose of the form is to provide a format to 
document the examination of the occurrence beyond simply severity and type. The 
required documentation includes a description of the scope of the investigation, a detailed 
chronology of events including date and time, a description of the detection of the 
occurrence, identification of care and service delivery issues, contributory factors, root 
causes, lessons learned, recommendations and arrangements for sharing and learning. The 
form also requires documentation of the involvement, disclosure and support of the 
patient and family. Similarly to the CSRS report, the Root Cause Analysis Concise 
Investigation does not include any information about support, if any, being provided to 
the health care provider.  
Completion of the Concise Investigation Form is the responsibility of the Quality 
Clinical Safety Leader who seeks assistance from the program/service manager for details 
not outlined in CSRS, such as ongoing patient outcome, specific staff involvement, 
manager-identified care and service delivery issues, contributory factors and root causes. 
In addition, the Quality Clinical Safety Leader uses reference documents such as the 
patient’s chart, laboratory results, diagnostic imaging reports, organizational policies and 
procedures and best practice literature. The Quality Clinical Safety Leader may meet with 
staff involved in the occurrence to seek clarification for aspects of the occurrence that are 
not well understood. The reporter of the occurrence who was the individual who 
identified the occurrence may not be aware of the contributory factors and root causes of 
the occurrence. Although the form requires documentation of the involvement, disclosure 
and support provided to the family at the time of the occurrence, this level of occurrence 
does not normally involve formal disclosure to the family. In most cases either the health 
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care provider at the time of the identification of the occurrence or the program/service 
manager shortly thereafter will discuss the incident with the patient and their family.  
4.2.7 Quality Case Review 
 The quality case review document was finalized in 2011 in response to the 
recommendations of the Cameron Inquiry and the AETF report. “The purpose of the 
quality case review is to review, assess and evaluate the provision of health care” 
(Eastern Health, 2011b, p. 6) and is considered a quality assurance activity. There is an 
extensive list provided of guiding principles for a Quality Case Review such as:  
 The review is the responsibility of the Program in which the occurrence occurred. 
The role of the Quality and Risk Management Department will be to help 
facilitate the process. 
 
The review will be an objective, factual gathering of information. 
 
The review will be conducted in a spirit of openness and transparency. 
 
The review will seek input from client/families, employees, and agents (including 
physicians) of Eastern Health (2011b, p. 6). 
 
All Level 5 and 6 category occurrences (serious and severe) are assessed by the 
program’s leadership in collaboration with the Quality Clinical Safety Leader to 
determine whether a Quality Case Review should be initiated, and this assessment is 
documented on the Quality Case Review Checklist and Preliminary Investigation 
Template. There are five key directives or criteria provided for determining whether a 
Quality Case Review is required. First, a Quality Case Review is not recommended if the 
occurrence involves an event that requires human resources (HR), professional practice 
or another administrative body to intervene such as in a criminal act or a purposefully 
unsafe act. Second, there are a number of mandatory reasons for a Quality Case Review, 
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categorized under five headings: surgical events, products or device events, patient 
protection events, care management events and environmental events. An example of a 
surgical event requiring a Quality Case Review would be a “surgery performed on a 
wrong body part” or “retention of a foreign object in a patient after surgery or other 
procedure” (Eastern Health, 2011b, p. 16). An example of a care management event 
requiring a Quality Case Review would be a “patient death or serious disability 
associated with a medication or fluid error including, but not limited to, errors involving 
the wrong drug” (Eastern Health, 2011b, p. 17). Third, when there are key areas where 
learnings may warrant a Quality Case Review, such as “issues related to patient 
assessment believed to be a factor” (Eastern Health, 2011b, p. 7). Fourth, an executive 
team member may require a Quality Case Review when it is believed that important 
organizational learning could occur that would help promote safety. And finally, a 
Quality Case Review can be initiated by QRM through the Vice President responsible for 
QRM or a Quality Case Review can be initiated by the CEO of Eastern Health.  
In the context of the Quality Case Review, the program leadership are required to create a 
Quality Case Review committee that consists of the program leadership including 
director, medical director, possibly manager/s, a Quality Clinical Safety Leader from 
QRM and possibly the QRM risk manager. The committee is tasked with reviewing the 
details of the case and determining questions that need to be asked, answers that need to 
be sought, and persons who need to be questioned. This review of the incident may or 
may not involve meeting with the patient and their family to seek their input. It is, 
however, prescribed that, in the context of this process, the patient and their family will 
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be invited to provide questions to the committee that would be incorporated into the 
review process.  
 The Quality Case Review is expected to be completed within 28 working days, 
and at that point the committee is expected to meet with the patient and their family and 
provide details of the review and recommendations that have been determined by the 
committee. In reality, very few of the Quality Case Reviews were occurring within the 
specified time period at the time of this study; a fact that was of concern to Eastern 
Health executive and had been the subject of a review in 2013. From my observation, the 
delays in completing reviews in the specified time related to the resistance of staff to 
participate in the review process. The resistance may be related to several complex 
relations including discomfort with disclosure, concern about liability or lack of clarity 
about a particular person’s involvement in the event. In addition, delays may occur when 
there is confusion created because an incident involves more than one program and 
therefore where responsibility lies for the investigation comes into question. Delays may 
also occur when there is a perception that there is criticism of the organization in relation 
to the event, sometimes via sources external to the organization, such as news and social 
media. Disclosure and Quality Case Review are intrinsically related by virtue of the 
disclosure components that result from a Quality Case Review.  
 The stated intention of the Quality Case Review is a quality assurance process37 
but, in reality, the context that Eastern Health finds itself in makes that perspective 
unrealistic. The expectation that staff will be required to inform the Quality Case Review 
                                                 
37 Quality assurance processes are generally understood to be internal to an organization 
for the purpose of system evaluation and improvement. 
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process without protection from public enquiry may be intimidating, such as the medical 
review component in which one physician reviews the actions of another. And perhaps 
the most complex issue is that of the legal context. There are a number of statements used 
in the guideline to describe the current legal context in Eastern Health: 
A review of the Quality Assurance Committee or a Peer Review Committee is 
protected under Section 8.1 of the Evidence Act from being disclosed in a legal 
proceeding. 
 
In section 5(f) of the Access to Information and the Protection of Privacy Act 
(ATIPPA) regulations, section 8.1 of the Evidence Act is stated to prevail over 
other provisions of ATIPPA in the context of a legal proceeding. 
 
The Public Inquiries Act, 2006 at section 9, 12, 13 apply to the power to compel 
the production of documents in the context of a public Inquiry. Section 12 (3) 
states that a person cannot refuse to disclose information to the Commission of 
Inquiry on the grounds that the discussion is prohibited or restricted by another 
Act or regulations.  
 
The production of documentation can be challenged through a court application 
under section 13 of the Public Inquires Act (Eastern Health, 2011b, p. 22). 
 
At the time of this writing, no court challenge has occurred to test the protection by the 
Evidence Act of the Quality Case Review process or its documents. However, this may 
perhaps be a moot point, since retaining the concept that Quality Case Review is 
primarily a quality assurance process is difficult given the recommendations of the 
Cameron Inquiry to make the documents available outside the organization. In particular, 
recommendation 35 states that “disclosure should also involve providing the patient with 
a copy of any peer review or quality assurance report respecting the adverse event” 
(Cameron, 2009b, p. 470). This recommendation resulted in a revision to the guideline 
that states that “the patient or family will be offered a copy of the review” (Eastern 
Health, 2011b, p. 13). The question, then, is how can you expect to protect the documents 
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of a quality assurance review in a court proceeding when the organization itself has 
provided the document to the patient and their family? This is a point not lost on staff, 
and may add to the reluctance of staff to report occurrences or participate in quality 
assurance reviews.   
4.2.8 Quality Case Review Checklist and Preliminary Investigation 
The preliminary investigation process in which determination of whether a 
Quality Case Review will be undertaken in relation to a specific occurrence is 
documented on the Quality Case Review checklist. Similarly to the concise investigation 
form, the Quality Case Review checklist provides documentation of the severity and 
summary of the occurrence, the effect on the patient, and involvement, disclosure and 
support of the patient and their family. The checklist also provides documentation of the 
rationale for determining whether a Quality Case Review is indicated. The Quality 
Clinical Safety Leader collaborates with the program director and clinical chief to assess 
the criteria for Quality Case Review and to identify the members of the Quality Case 
Review committee if indicated. 
4.2.9 Quality Case Review Report 
When a Quality Case Review is undertaken, the components of the investigation 
and findings are documented on the Quality Case Review report. The report is a very 
comprehensive review, evaluation and summary of the findings of the Quality Case 
Review committee. The final section contains recommendations that the report should: 
target the elimination of the root causes; offer a long-term solution to the problem; have a 
greater positive impact on other processes, resources and schedules; be objective and 
measurable and be achievable and reasonable (Eastern Health, 2011b, p. 27).  
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 This consideration of the official discourse provided in texts within Eastern 
Health provides an important backdrop to examine the experiences of staff; but official 
texts from outside the immediate environment are also an important consideration for 
understanding the experiences of staff in Eastern Health. Written policies and procedures 
from outside the organization play a key role in organizing the activities and work 
practices of Eastern Health staff, although the texts themselves are often not visible or 
known to the staff. I will turn now to consider these external texts. These texts are 
separated into 3 sections based on their source -- either provincial, federal or discipline 
specific (that is, those that give guidance to individual staff based on their professional 
designation). I begin with those from provincial sources, which include: The Evidence 
Act, Task Force on Adverse Health Events Report, Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act and The Apology Act. The Cameron Inquiry Report would also be 
considered a provincial text, but it will be discussed within the examination of the 
Cameron Inquiry later in this chapter.  
4.3 Text in Newfoundland and Labrador 
4.3.1 The Evidence Act 
 As described in the AETF Report, all jurisdictions in Canada have legislation that 
protects individuals from being compelled “to testify in a legal proceeding about their 
participation in a peer review or quality assurance activity” (Thompson, 2008, p. 18). 
This protection is regarded as essential to creating an open environment in which health 
care providers are able to share opinions and make recommendations (Thompson, 2008). 
Thompson notes that in Newfoundland and Labrador “this protection in respect of quality 
assurance committees and peer review committees” is provided in the Evidence Act 
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(2008, p. 18). Interestingly, Cameron in Recommendation 33, discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.7.3, directs the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador to consider 
“whether section 8.1 of the Evidence Act38 remains relevant” (2009b, p. 469). 
The Evidence Act was originally tabled as statute in 1990, with amendments 
made as recently as 2012. It includes a section on Inadmissible Evidence, commonly 
referred to as section 8.1 in Eastern Health documents. This section of the Act applies to 
certain committees within the health authority including “(b) a quality assurance 
committee … as defined under the Hospital and Nursing Home Association Act39, and (c) 
a peer review committee … as defined under the Hospital and Nursing Home Association 
Act” (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2014a, 8.1(2)). Reports are also 
specifically addressed in this section: 
No report, statement, evaluation, recommendation, memorandum, document or 
information, of, or made by, for or to, a committee to which this section applies 
shall be disclosed in or in connection with a legal proceeding (Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2014a, 8.1(3)). 
Furthermore the expectations of an individual as witness are also addressed:  
where a person appears as a witness in a legal proceeding, that person shall not be 
asked and shall not (a) answer a question in connection with proceedings of a 
committee set out in subsection (2); or (b) produce a report, evaluation, 
recommendation, memorandum, document or information, of, or made by, for or 
to, a committee to which this section applies (Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 2014a, 8.1(4)). 
The recommendations of the Cameron Inquiry as will be discussed in Section 4.7.3 do 
not align with the Evidence Act in terms of the protection of quality assurance activities. 
Therefore the clarity that Eastern Health was directed to provide as a result of the 
                                                 
38 RSNL1990, c. E-16 
39 RSNL 1990, c. H-8 
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Cameron Inquiry within both its disclosure policy and its occurrence reporting and 
management policy have resulted in revisions that now make inadmissible evidence 
public knowledge by providing copies of committee reports and evaluation documents to 
patients and their families.40  
4.3.2 Task Force on Adverse Health Events Report 
The AETF report also provided recommendations that addressed the processes of 
quality assurance and protection of regional health authority documents and review 
processes. As introduced earlier, the AETF was appointed in May 2007 with a specific 
scope and mandate in part: 
to examine and evaluate how the health system identifies, evaluates, responds and 
communicates in regard to adverse events within the health system; to examine 
relevant best practices in other jurisdictions; . . . and to make such 
recommendations as may be appropriate (Thompson, 2008, p. ix).  
 
The process the AETF undertook was one of consultation. The consultations involved a 
number of key informants including health authority leadership, committee of health 
authority safety and quality officials, the public, relevant stakeholders using a variety of 
methods ranging from regular dialogue, written submissions and a symposium. “The 
Task Force was not established to look at specific adverse events, but rather to determine 
if the Newfoundland and Labrador health and community services system responds 
appropriately to adverse events when they happen” (Thompson, 2008, p. ix). 
                                                 
40 Whether or not the Quality Review documents that are provided to families are or are 
not admissible in court and whether the evidence act extends to families who are in 
possession of quality reports is not a consideration of this study. The fact that families 
are in possession of quality review documents figures into the experience of health care 
providers and that experience is a consideration of this study. 
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 The report provides a lengthy discussion acknowledging the emotional and 
physical effects that the health care professional may experience in the context of an 
adverse event:  
Care for the caregivers is a significant aspect of adverse event management. When 
an event occurs, and the possibility for stress and anxiety on the part of the 
provider is identified, it is important to provide them with information on 
informal and formal support mechanisms available to them (e.g., debriefing by 
other health care professionals, Employee Assistance Programs, psychological 
counselling). This support needs to be made available in a timely and appropriate 
manner. Providers should also be aware that they will not be exposed to any 
recrimination simply based on their involvement in an adverse event. 
Nonetheless, they should also be counselled to consider, where appropriate, 
obtaining advice from their professional association or legal counsel. They should 
be given appropriate access to leave time or alternative clinical responsibilities 
(Thompson, 2008, p. 90). 
The resultant recommendations include two that specifically acknowledge concern about 
the legal protection and emotional needs of staff. Recommendation 3 states that “legal 
protection be provided for employees to ensure there are no negative repercussions or 
reprisals against them for participating in occurrence reporting according to established 
policies” (Thompson, 2008, p. xii). There is no evidence in the Eastern Health occurrence 
reporting and management policy that acknowledges this recommendation or suggests 
whether Eastern Health intends to provide such protection. Recommendation 15 directs 
the Regional Health Authority to “develop policies and procedures for responding to the 
emotional and psychological needs of care providers who are affected by adverse events” 
(Thompson, 2008, p. xvi). As discussed, the Eastern Health disclosure policy includes a 
statement about how a health care provider may access support, but there are no 
procedures in place to respond to the emotional and psychological needs of health care 
providers. In Eastern Health accessing support is left to the individual to organize either 
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through employee and family assistance program, their professional organization or 
through personal resources.  
 The AETF report41 also makes recommendations similar to the Cameron Inquiry 
recommendations discussed in Section 4.7.3 that create the expectation of an open 
process of quality review, including the provision that “factual information in peer 
reviews and quality reviews be disclosed to patients” and that “when a request is made by 
the Minister, Regional Health Authorities will provide copies of peer reviews and quality 
assurance reviews” (Thompson, 2008, p. xv). An adverse event management process was 
recommended in the report (see Figure 4-1) that shows disclosure to the patient and their 
family at the time of the event. In addition, following the quality or peer review team 
assessment there is dissemination of the findings that also includes patients and their 
families, thereby altering the process from internal quality assurance to a public process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 The AETF report was released in December of 2008 followed very soon afterward by 
the Cameron Inquiry Report in March of 2009. 
121 
 
Figure 4-1: Adverse Event Management Process (Thompson, 2008, p. xi) 
 
4.3.3 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 
 The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act42 (ATIPPA) was 
brought into force in 2002 with several amendments made since that time. The purpose of 
the Act was to make public bodies “more accountable to the public and to protect 
personal privacy by 
             (a)  giving the public a right of access to records; 
             (b)  giving individuals a right of access to, and a right to request correction of, 
personal information about themselves (Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 2014b, p. 3.(1)). 
As a result of the attachment of occurrence reports to the patient record, the occurrence 
becomes part of the patient’s record and therefore is subject to an ATIPPA request.  
                                                 
42 SNL2002, c. A-1.1 
 
122 
 
4.3.4 Apology Act 
 Both the Cameron Inquiry and AETF findings recommended the introduction in 
Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) of an Act respecting Apology. The resulting Apology 
Act43 provides the opportunity to express sympathy or regret without affecting liability. In 
other words, an apology made in connection with an event does not constitute an express 
or implied admission of fault or liability and is not admissible in a court as evidence of 
fault or liability (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2009). 
 I turn next to consider official texts from federal sources. In this category there is 
one text which is especially applicable to the discussion of staff experiences, the 
Canadian Disclosure Guidelines. The importance of this particular text is that it guides 
health authority policy and practice.  
4.4 Official Federal Discourse on Risk Management and Patient Safety 
4.4.1 Canadian Disclosure Guidelines  
 
The first Canadian Disclosure Guidelines were published in 2008 at a time when 
many health care organizations in Canada were just beginning to grapple with the 
development of policies that addressed disclosure of adverse events in a very tangible 
way. At the same time, organizations such as Eastern Health were experiencing events in 
which disclosure was coming under scrutiny. The guidelines emphasized “the importance 
of a clear and consistent approach to disclosure regardless of the variance in definitions 
across Canada related to harm and adverse events; patients have a right to be informed 
about all aspects of their care” (Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2008, p. 8). While the 
                                                 
43 SNL2009, c. A-10.1 
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guidelines focused “on the disclosure of adverse events, they emphasize that all harm 
must be communicated to patients, irrespective of the reason for the harm” (Canadian 
Patient Safety Institute, 2008, p. 8). 
The 2008 version of the guidelines provided six guiding principles: patient-
centred healthcare, patient autonomy, healthcare that is safe, leadership support, 
disclosure is the right thing to do and honesty and transparency (Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute, 2008). In addition, the guideline provided a list of recommended elements to be 
included in a disclosure policy, an indication of CPSI’s commitment to assisting 
organizations to develop policy in the area of disclosure (Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute, 2008, p. 31).  
The revision of the Canadian Disclosure Guidelines, entitled Canadian Disclosure 
Guidelines: Being Open with Patients and Families, published in 2011, followed closely 
a new strategic plan in 2010 for CPSI. A successful organization is defined according to 
five key achievements:  
Embrace prevention of all avoidable harm to patients as a core objective. 
Support all healthcare providers to make safety a top priority in their work. 
Nurture and support a commitment to improvement at all levels of the 
organization. 
Achieve long period of incident-free care without becoming complacent or 
overconfident. 
Adopt leading methods to measure, monitor and report on performance (Canadian 
Patient Safety Institute, 2011a, p. 6) 
The guidelines aimed “to help organizations achieve this success by being open and 
honest with patients and families about patient safety incidents” (Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute, 2011a, p. 6), a concept highlighted in the document title.  
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This version of the guidelines proposed to harmonize the language of patient 
safety in Canada with that of the International Classification for Patient Safety being 
developed by the World Health Organization. For this reason, the following terms using 
the associated definitions, provided below, were integrated into the 2011 document: 
Patient safety incident – An event or circumstance which could have resulted, in 
unnecessary harm to a patient. 
Harmful incident – A patient safety incident that resulted in harm to the patient. 
Replaces “adverse event” and “sentinel event.” 
No harm incident – A patient safety incident which reached a patient but no 
discernible harm resulted. 
Near miss – A patient safety incident that did not reach the patient. Replaces 
“close call” (Canadian Patient Safety Institute, 2011a, p. 11). 
The final category of text to be considered is discipline specific text which factors 
into the experience of staff by virtue of their individual responsibility to their professional 
associations who have text that addresses specific components of adverse event 
management.  
4.5 Discipline Specific Official Discourse on Risk Management and Patient Safety 
 Within any health care organization there are a number of licensed professionals 
that practice their discipline according to guidelines provided by their professional 
association including, for example, physicians, nurses, pharmacists and laboratory 
technologists. In addition, licenced professionals are also subject to the policies of the 
employing organization. Physicians in particular have been provided with various official 
texts by their professional association to guide their practice regarding adverse events and 
disclosure.  
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4.5.1 Canadian Medical Protective Association  
The Canadian Medical Protective Association (CMPA) published three 
documents in 2008/09 addressing the topic of adverse events. The first document, 
Communicating with your patient about harm: Disclosure of adverse events (Canadian 
Medical Protective Association, 2008), provides a disclosure roadmap that describes the 
disclosure process from the initial clinical care to post-analysis disclosure of actions 
taken. The document provides a step by step outline of how to approach and accomplish 
disclosure, including answers to frequently asked questions such as: “What are my 
obligations to disclose?” “If I say ‘I’m sorry’ will I get sued?” and “I am aware of a 
possible adverse event that occurred under the care of another physician or health care 
provider. Should I provide disclosure to the patient directly?” (Canadian Medical 
Protective Association, 2008, pp. 32-33) In essence the document encourages physicians 
to disclose adverse events and provides a clear process to accomplish the task.  
The second document, Learning from adverse events: Fostering a just culture of 
safety in Canadian hospitals and health care institutions (Canadian Medical Protective 
Association, 2009a), “describes the requirements and processes for reporting adverse 
events and close calls,” (p. 4) and the best approach for individuals and organizations to 
review these events. As well, it contains an explanation of “how CMPA members and 
other health care providers can foster a just culture of safety within a hospital/institution” 
(Canadian Medical Protective Association, 2009a, p. 4). There are a number of 
statements made within the document that declare the position of CMPA, encouraging 
members in relation to adverse events: 
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CMPA supports the development of policies and procedures regarding adverse 
event and close call reporting (Canadian Medical Protective Association, 2009a, 
p. 5). 
Even if participating is not mandatory, CMPA members are encouraged to 
participate in properly structured quality improvement reviews in the interest of 
improving patient safety (Canadian Medical Protective Association, 2009a, p. 9). 
There are also a number of statements that are read as cautionary to CMPA members in 
relation to adverse events and review processes: 
These systems should focus on capturing only factual information, recognizing 
that speculations or opinions might lead to misunderstandings and inaccurate 
conclusions (Canadian Medical Protective Association, 2009a, p. 6). 
It is important to note that incident/occurrence reports may not benefit from the 
legislation that generally protects quality improvement information from being 
used in subsequent legal, regulatory or other proceedings (Canadian Medical 
Protective Association, 2009a, p. 6).44 
The role of the physician in Eastern Health is to heed the advice and cautions of the 
CMPA while weighing that against the policies and procedures of the organization, 
policies that include specific expectations regarding staff-response at the time of adverse 
events.  
The third document, Reporting and responding to adverse events: A medical 
liability perspective (Canadian Medical Protective Association, 2009b), described as a 
companion to the Learning from adverse events document addresses “the medical 
liability issues associated with the reporting of and response to adverse events” (p. 2). 
The document outlines a balanced approach to protect the nature of the learning 
environment that includes the quality improvement aspects and the public’s right to be 
                                                 
44 Incident/occurrence reports in this CMPA note refers to participation in an adverse 
management reporting system and should be distinguished from disclosure of the 
incident to the patient which is addressed above in an earlier statement. 
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provided explanations to understand how safety in health care can be improved. There is 
a depiction of an information firewall between the health care provider accountability to 
report and disclose that leads to explanations to patients and the quality improvement 
processes, called the protected discussion, that leads to improved health care (Canadian 
Medical Protective Association, 2009b, p. 4). The document provides recommendations 
for what policy makers, health care authorities, institutions, physicians and other health 
care providers should do to improve systems of care; but more importantly the document 
provides some important conclusions, including the following statements: 
The CMPA believes that the Canadian health care system has reached an 
important juncture in the area of improvements to quality of care. The path that 
would result in the widespread disclosure of quality improvement information 
threatens to undermine decades of efforts to improve care. The other path seeks to 
achieve an appropriate balance between the patient safety and the accountability 
responses, recognizes the need for both types of responses, and enables each type 
to contribute to a more effective and safer health care system (Canadian Medical 
Protective Association, 2009b, p. 13). 
The direction and support given to physicians and health care organizations in these three 
principle CMPA documents laid the ground work for more comprehensive disclosure 
processes within Eastern Health. 
4.5.2 Canadian Medical Association 
The Canadian Medical Association Code of Ethics, in Section 14, states the 
following: “Take all reasonable steps to prevent harm to patients; should harm occur, 
disclose it to the patient” (Canadian Medical Association, 2004, p. 2). Although the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Medical Association does not provide a defined policy 
document regarding adverse events, “all of the medical regulatory licensing authorities 
(Colleges) in Canada would view the disclosure of adverse events to patients as an ethical 
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and professional obligation” (Canadian Medical Protective Association, 2008, p. 32). 
“Furthermore, although specific legislation mandating disclosure may not exist in a 
particular province or territory, disclosure will likely be seen as a legal professional 
obligation in all of the jurisdictions” (Canadian Medical Protective Association, 2008, p. 
32).  
4.5.3 Canadian Nurses Association 
 The Canadian Nurses Association (CNA) provides a Code of Ethics (2008) that 
includes a brief statement about adverse events. “Nurses admit mistakes and take all 
necessary actions to prevent or minimize harm arising from an adverse event. They work 
with others to reduce the potential for future risks and preventable harms” (Canadian 
Nurses Association, 2008, p. 9). The CNA Code of Ethics also notes that provincial and 
territorial legislation and nursing practice standards may include further direction 
regarding requirements for disclosure and reporting. The Registered Nurses Act of 
Newfoundland and Labrador does not provide any direction regarding requirements for 
disclosure and reporting as it relates to adverse events in patient care in Eastern Health 
(Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2008). The Association of Registered 
Nurses of Newfoundland and Labrador (2013) competencies document referring to the 
Registered Nurse states “protects clients through recognizing and reporting near misses 
and errors (the RN’s own and others) and takes action to stop and minimize harm arising 
from adverse events” (p. 7) and “integrates quality improvement principles and activities 
into nursing practice” (p. 8). However, there is no statement of expectation regarding 
disclosure or involvement in quality reviews when adverse events occur within the 
context of the registered nurses’ practice.  
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4.6 Orthodoxy at Work 
 This chapter has provided an examination of the official text-based discourses of 
Eastern Health, the government of NL and Canada, as well as those of the various 
professional organizations, that provide guidance to Eastern Health staff in the event of 
an adverse event. The Cameron Inquiry and the AETF both resulted in reports with 
recommendations that have been integrated into the policies and procedures of Eastern 
Health. In particular, the fact that the documents that result from the Quality Case Review 
process and all quality and peer review processes are now shared outside the organization 
with patients and families automatically45, and shared with others through ATIPPA 
requests, has been demonstrated. The original intention of the Evidence Act was to 
provide legislative protection for quality assurance activities and specifically the 
protection of documents used in quality review and peer review processes. The 
recommendations of the Cameron Inquiry and AETF report have resulted in sharing of 
documents that would not have been shared, in the past, based on common understanding 
of the Evidence Act.46  
This examination of official texts sets the groundwork for examining whether and 
how the changes to policies and procedures may make it difficult for staff to confidently 
participate in quality assurance activities, since these activities are no longer internal with 
                                                 
45 In the Quality Case Review procedure documents it is clear that the Quality Case 
Review documents are automatically shared with patients and families, and this fact was 
confirmed by QRM staff. 
46 I note that some people believe that occurrence reports would have historically been 
part of the patient’s chart and therefore available as part of ATIPPA requests. This is not 
in fact the case. Prior to the integration of the Cameron Report recommendations into 
Eastern Health practice, occurrence reports were not associated with the patient’s chart.  
Moreover, historically the option existed to have the reports completed anonymously. 
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the assurance of protection from public review. At the same time that the assurance of 
protection of privacy has lessened, professional bodies have outlined clear expectations 
that members must participate in disclosure and quality review processes.   
The final section of this chapter examining the orthodoxy of risk management and 
patient safety considers three judicial inquiries. These judicial inquiries are key sources of 
orthodoxy in relation to the management of adverse events (in particular, the Cameron 
Inquiry Report) and thus are important to consider in the context of this study.   
4.7 Examination of Inquiries 
 There have been a number of public judicial inquiries47 into adverse events that 
have played a major role in the evolution of the culture of Canadian health care. Three of 
these are particularly important in the context of this study: the Grange Inquiry (1984), 
the Krever Commission (1997) and the Cameron Inquiry (2009b). 
4.7.1 The Grange Inquiry 
 The Grange Inquiry refers to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain 
Deaths at the Hospital for Sick Children, headed by Mr. Justice Samuel Grange with his 
appointment on April 21, 1983. Prior to the Commission of Inquiry, from June 30, 1980 
through to March 22, 1981, thirty-three babies and three older children (ranging in age 
from 9 days to 19 years) died on cardiac wards at Toronto’s Hospital for Sick Children. 
This period of time is referred to as the “epidemic period”, representing a 625% increase 
over previous nine month periods (Grange, 1984, p. 7). In late March of 1981, Nurse 
                                                 
47 I recognize there are many important inquiries, in addition to the ones examined, such 
as the Manitoba Pediatric Cardiac Surgery Inquest, however the intent was not to be 
exhaustive but to provide examples.  
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Susan Nelles was charged in the death of four babies, and in January 1982, a Preliminary 
Inquiry into the charges began. The Preliminary Inquiry lasted 45 days and ended with 
the discharge of Nelles, with the finding that there was not sufficient evidence at the time 
of her arrest or sufficient evidence found during the Inquiry to justify her committal to 
trial (Grange, 1984). Justice Grange concluded that “in a perfect world, she would not 
have been arrested, charged or prosecuted” (Grange, 1984, p. 221). In his final report, 
Justice Grange categorized the deaths as: “deaths by digoxin toxicity” [8], including the 
four that Nelles was charged with; deaths either “suspicious of” or “highly suspicious of” 
digoxin toxicity [15]; and “deaths from natural causes” or cause “undesignated” [13] 
(Grange, 1984, pp. 170-171). “In the end, this litigation - much like the medical mysteries 
that gave rise to it – would produce more drama than meaningful resolution” (Bowal & 
Horvat, 2011, p. 56).   
 The Nelles Preliminary Inquiry and the resultant Grange Inquiry substantially 
changed the public’s view of nursing. Although Nelles was exonerated, her name remains 
familiar to many nurses and others in health care, and in part the Inquiry transformed the 
impression by the public of nurses, from healers/carers to possible harmers and “potential 
purveyors of evil acts” (Buckley Day, 1987, p. 29). In addition to the Grange Inquiry, 
there were three additional reviews that were undertaken to attempt to resolve the 
questions at the Hospital for Sick Children. The Ontario government appointed a review 
committee chaired by Mr. Justice Charles Dubin to examine the procedures and practices 
at the Hospital for Sick Children. The review resulted in the Dubin Report that provided 
ninety-eight recommendations (Buckley Day, 1987). Simultaneously, the Hospital for 
Sick Children undertook its own study into the cause of deaths during the epidemic 
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period, completed by Dr. Harry Bain, former Chief of Paediatrics. Dr. Bain concluded 
that 34 of 36 deaths were from natural causes with two exceptions (SIDS48 and transient 
renal insufficiency49) (Buckley Day, 1987). Following the Dubin Report and the Bain 
Study, a request was made by several Hospital for Sick Children physicians, including 
Bain, for the Centre for Disease Control50 to undertake another investigation. The CDC 
investigation resulted in the Haynes Report. Despite multiple strategies to determine the 
cause of the deaths at Hospital for Sick Children, no report concluded the causes of death 
or could “say with certainty whether any crimes were ever committed on the paediatric 
cardiac ward” (Bowal & Horvat, 2011, p. 60).  
 Dr. Albert Burton51 demonstrated using Statistics Canada data that most provinces 
across Canada displayed a paediatric cardiac death pattern that mirrored that of Hospital 
for Sick Children during the epidemic period, causing him to conclude that what 
happened at Hospital for Sick Children was the same as what was happening nationwide 
(Hamilton, 1993). Inquiry conclusions that were based on the best evidence at the time 
were refuted in subsequent years. For example, Hamilton (1993) later described the 
inaccuracy of the radioimmunoassay (RIA) test used to measure the digoxin levels of the 
Hospital for Sick Children samples and the role of 2-mercaptobenxothiazole (MBT) used 
in syringe rubber plungers now known to contaminate medications or be confused with 
digoxin, a finding that refutes the conclusions of the Grange Inquiry.  
                                                 
48 SIDS is an acronym for Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 
49 Transient renal insufficiency is a form of kidney failure 
50 Centre for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia, USA 
51 Retired Professor of Biochemistry, University of British Columbia 
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 Buckley Day (1987) described the Grange Inquiry as a witch hunt and nurses as 
scapegoats. Further, she notes that “during the Grange Inquiry the knowledge possessed 
by nurses was discounted, deemed irrelevant, or simply ignored” and “one of the basic 
reasons for the differential treatment that women received throughout Commission 
proceedings is their lack of social recognition as ‘rightful knowers’” (Buckley Day, 1987, 
p. 31). The importance of this observation of the lack of social recognition as rightful 
knowers, as was observed in the Grange Inquiry, will become clear in later discussion of 
the experience of Eastern Health staff during ER/PR and in the Cameron Inquiry.  
4.7.2 The Krever Commission 
 The Krever Commission refers to the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the 
Blood System in Canada, a Royal commission headed by Mr. Justice Horace Krever, 
established by the Canadian Government in October 1993 with a report tabled in the 
House of Commons in November 1997 (Krever, 1997). It was established to investigate 
allegations that government, private and non-governmental organizations that 
were responsible for Canada’s blood supply system had allowed contaminated blood to 
be used. The findings of the report described the scope of the problem as a “nationwide 
public health calamity” (Krever, 1997, p. 3) in which the national blood supply became 
contaminated with two infectious viruses, one causing a newly emerging disease (Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus) and the other causing a disease that had existed for many years 
but had not been previously identified precisely (Hepatitis C Virus). The Krever 
Commission's fifty recommendations changed the landscape of Canadian health care by 
bringing accountability for safety in health care practice and obligation for disclosure of 
health care risks to the forefront. The recommendations had significant implications for 
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the Canadian Blood Services52, hospitals and health care providers. For example, 
obligations were stated about (1) obtaining patient’s informed consent, (2) informing 
recipients immediately upon learning of potential risks to the safety of blood components 
or products, and (3) fully disclosing risks inherent in blood products (Spencer, 
1998/1999).   
 Wilson (2007) states that, in retrospect, “the findings of the Krever Commission 
could perhaps be considered the most influential report on public health in Canadian 
history” (p. 1387). A major theme emerging from the Krever report was the importance 
of our public health system’s role in protecting the health of Canadians (Wilson, 2007), a 
role that had become eroded by a reduction in resources. “Many of the recommendations 
from the report to ensure blood safety transcend the blood system and have influenced 
many other areas” (Wilson, 2007, p. 1387), for example, the call for precautionary 
measures in managing the risk of Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and West Nile Virus. The concept of precautionary measures 
resulted from the finding that while Canada waited for scientific certainty before taking 
essential preventive measures, a national public health disaster occurred (Wilson, 2007). 
A second major contribution of the Krever commission was its identification of the vital 
role of governance in ensuring safety in public health (Wilson, 2007, p. 1388). Two 
significant problems were identified in relation to governance, the first was that the 
system was organized with cost-consideration affecting decisions related to safety and the 
second was the ambiguity about roles and responsibilities that created risk (Wilson, 
                                                 
52 The Canadian Blood Services assumed responsibility for the operation of Canada's 
blood supply system in September 1998. 
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2007). The importance of clear roles and responsibilities was demonstrated again by the 
Ontario experience of SARS, with recommendations made regarding the independence 
and leadership of the Chief Medical Officer of Health and local public health governance 
(Campbell, 2006).  
4.7.3 The Cameron Inquiry 
 The Cameron Inquiry refers to The Commission of Inquiry on Hormone Receptor 
Testing established by the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador in July 2007. The 
Honourable Justice Margaret A. Cameron was appointed Commissioner and the report 
was released in March 2009. The Commission was divided into two parts. Part I involved 
an “inquiry into and report on problems with estrogen and progesterone hormone receptor 
tests conducted between 1997 and 2005 in the Newfoundland and Labrador health care 
system” (Cameron, 2009a, p. 2; 2009b). The specific mandate of the Inquiry into the 
testing was to examine what happened to cause or contribute to the problems with testing, 
to determine when the problems came to light and whether earlier detection was possible 
(Cameron, 2009a). The public hearings were conducted from March to October of 2008, 
with a total of 131 days of sitting, ninety-three witnesses, 3,609 public exhibits and 309 
in camera exhibits (Cameron, 2009a). Part II of the Inquiry had a policy focus, that took a 
variety of forms (Cameron, 2009a, 2009c). First, “to canvass the duties, if any, of 
responsible authorities to patients, other parties within the health care system, and the 
public respecting differences in test results on re-testing” (Cameron, 2009a, p. 2). Second, 
to examine the testing and quality assurance systems in relation to best practice 
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(Cameron, 2009a). Third, the commission engaged with several experts53 who were asked 
to prepare papers on certain aspects regarding disclosure obligations and present at a 
symposium, held in April 2008, with a view to “assist in the development of 
recommendations for policy reforms” (Cameron, 2009c, p. 1). The symposium provided 
the opportunity for the experts to make presentations and respond to questions from 
parties with standing54 and the general public (Cameron, 2009a). The final phase of Part 
II was the receipt of written submissions and several replies to submissions from all 
parties with standing (Cameron, 2009a).  
 Webcasts on the commission’s website, daily broadcasts on cable television and 
transcripts of the proceedings were provided for public perusal (Cameron, 2009a). As 
well, the local television and print media provided daily interpretations of the 
commission’s proceedings. The media were perceived by staff as providing an 
incomplete and less than accurate portrayal of the events of ER/PR, as one laboratory 
staff member described:  
I think the media’s portrayal was one of my biggest disappointments.… You 
didn’t feel things were portrayed properly in the media.… It wasn’t clear that 
                                                 
53 Professor Timothy Caulfield (University of Alberta), Dr. Peter Norton (University of 
Calgary), Dr. Edward Etchells (Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre), Professor Gerald 
Robertson (University of Alberta), Professor Bernard Dickens (University of Toronto), 
Professor Joan Gilmour (Osgoode Hall Law School), Dr. Thomas Gallagher (University 
of Washington), Dr. Philip Hébert (Joint Centre for Bioethics, University of Toronto), 
Dr. Sherry Espin (Ryerson University) and Dr. Stephen Ward (University of British 
Columbia).  
54 Parties with standing for parts I and II: Her Majesty in right of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority, Dr. Kara Laing et al., Central 
Regional Integrated Health Authority, Western Regional Integrated Health Authority, 
Labrador-Grenfell Regional Integrated Health Authority, Canadian Cancer Society – 
Newfoundland and Labrador Division, Members of the Breast Cancer Testing Class 
Action; Parties with standing for part II: Newfoundland and Labrador Medical 
Association, Healthcare Insurance Reciprocal of Canada. 
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people weren’t misdiagnosed. It seemed like, [we] told people they didn’t have 
breast cancer when they did which is not at all what happened. 
 
The significance of the media’s treatment of the commission proceedings will be 
addressed later in the context of staff experiences. In addition, simultaneous commentary 
on the Inquiry was being written in other venues, such as scientific journals. For example 
Hede (2008), in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute, made comments such as 
“botched estrogen receptor tests has shaken public confidence in cancer care” and “even 
the affected patients were not told the retest results” (p. 836).  
 The commissioner provided a number of observations in her final report. First, 
she reported that “the primary causes of the changes in testing results were poor fixation 
and tissue processing, the absence of optimization of processes, the failure to follow 
proper procedures in ER/PR testing, and inadequate and/or improper antigen retrieval” 
(Cameron, 2009b, p. 451). She further noted that there were a number of contributing 
factors for each primary cause (Cameron, 2009b). Secondly, in terms of timeliness of 
reporting she noted that in her opinion, “had proper quality assurance and quality control 
policies been in place and had they been followed, the problem with ER/PR testing would 
certainly have been discovered much earlier” (Cameron, 2009b, p. 452). Further, the 
timeliness of reporting to patients was also noted as a significant issue due to decisions 
made about informing patients at their next scheduled appointment, that “could easily 
have resulted in delays of six months to a year” (Cameron, 2009b, p. 454). Thirdly, she 
reported that “the procedures and protocols within Eastern Health for ER/PR testing 
during the period from 1997 to 2005 were so deficient as to be practically non-existent” 
(Cameron, 2009b, p. 453).  
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 There were sixty recommendations set out in the Inquiry report under the 
headings of best practices for hormone receptor testing by immunohistochemistry; quality 
assurance and accountability; laboratory technologists (training and continuing 
education); physicians (recruitment, retention, sub-specialization, continuing education 
and supervision); crisis management; legislation; information management; further 
investigation; disclosure and communications; and implementation and review of the 
recommendations (Cameron, 2009b). In relation to this study, there are a number of 
recommendations that are relevant. Recommendation 3 recognizes the “critical 
importance of quality” and directs each regional health authority to have a separate 
quality portfolio and a separate position of Vice-President Quality that “must be created 
to manage this portfolio” (Cameron, 2009b, p. 460). Recommendation 12 is the need to 
ensure that the electronic occurrence reporting system is “utilized to its full potential” and 
to “prevent the repeating of similar adverse events” (Cameron, 2009b, p. 463). 
Recommendation 33 directs the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador to consider 
“whether section 8.1 of the Evidence Act55 remains relevant” (Cameron, 2009b, p. 469). 
Recommendation 34 proposes that “any conflict between section 8.1 of the Evidence Act 
and section 12 of the Public Inquiries Act, 200656 be resolved in favour of permitting 
Commissions of Inquiry to have access to peer review and quality assurance reports” 
(Cameron, 2009b, p. 469). Recommendation 35 addresses disclosure, recommending that 
“adverse event disclosure to patients include an explanation of why the adverse event 
occurred and what is being done to ensure that a similar event does not occur in the 
                                                 
55 RSNL1990, c. E-16 
56 SNL2006, c. P-38.1 
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future” (Cameron, 2009b, p. 470). In addition, recommendation 35 states that “disclosure 
should also involve providing the patient with a copy of any peer review or quality 
assurance report respecting the adverse event” (Cameron, 2009b, p. 470). 
Recommendation 36 guides the adoption of apology legislation by the Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador (Cameron, 2009b), noting the importance of apologies to 
both the care provider and the patient. Of the sixty recommendations, this is the only 
recommendation that includes concern for the care provider. Recommendation 51 states 
that all regional health authorities should have a “disclosure of adverse events” policy 
with the provision of ten elements from the facts to offers of support, although who is 
receiving support is not prescribed (Cameron, 2009b, p. 474). It is possible that the 
intention was to include support for care providers. The provision for health care provider 
support in the Eastern Health disclosure policy was discussed earlier in this Chapter.  
Following the Cameron Inquiry, the 2010 Breast Cancer Testing class-action suit 
was brought against Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority (Doucette v. Eastern 
Regional Integrated Health Authority) for a number of grievances including delays in and 
inaccurate communication of Estrogen Receptor/Progesterone Receptor (ER/PR) 
retesting results and therapeutic options with possible recurrence of breast cancer. This 
class-action suit was settled in favour of the plaintiff57 with the disclosure communication 
of the organization found deficient.   
 The inquiries provide a number of important conceptions that are useful within 
the upcoming discussion of the experience of staff within the Cameron Inquiry as well as 
                                                 
57 The plaintiff is the person who brings the suit, in this case, the members of the Breast 
Cancer Testing class-action suit. 
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the experience of staff within adverse events in general. The Grange Royal Commission 
demonstrated the potential for irreversible damage created by public perception of 
evidence within the judicial inquiry environment. The treatment of health care 
professionals and nurses in particular and the lack of social recognition as rightful 
knowers will be useful when examining the experience of various disciplines within 
Eastern Health. The Krever Commission demonstrated that ambiguity about roles and 
responsibility created significant risk, and that the delay in informing the public about 
that risk eroded public confidence in a system intended to protect the public. The 
Cameron Inquiry occurred within the local context of this study and the findings and 
recommendations are pivotal to understand the experience of staff in Eastern Health. The 
purpose of this chapter was to provide context for the adverse event experiences of staff 
in Eastern Health rather than to critique or analyse ER/PR and the Cameron Inquiry.  
This chapter and the preceding three chapters have provided the background and 
significance of this study, the method of inquiry, the study methods and procedures and 
an examination of the dominant official discourses on risk management and patient 
safety. The three chapters that follow will examine the experience of study participants 
within adverse events in Eastern Health. Chapters 5 and 6 are organized chronologically 
in relation to ER/PR, with Chapter 5 describing experiences through the period of ER/PR 
and the Cameron Inquiry and Chapters 6 and 7 describing experiences in the years after 
the Cameron Inquiry Report was released. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
In the Eye of the Storm: ER/PR 
 
 For me, the eye of the storm58 is a perfect metaphor to describe the place in which 
staff find themselves when an adverse event has occurred, the patient has been affected, 
the event has been reported, and staff members suddenly find that they are in the midst of 
a raging storm -- alone, afraid, and with little control over the series of coordinated 
activities that are unfolding. It is a strangely quiet place for the staff member because the 
flurry of activity is beyond them, outside their immediate environment. Not far away, the 
management and other staff are struggling with the fury of the storm, perhaps a very ill 
patient, an unhappy family or the media. The second victim feels the powerlessness of 
being in this isolated, deceptively calm place where they cannot in any way change the 
storm that rages all around them. Because the focus is on the raging storm, the second 
victim who is in the eye of the storm, is often forgotten. In this chapter I examine the 
experiences of staff and management in the storm known as ER/PR. 
 Not unlike the hours before a storm, in the months before ER/PR became a public 
event, certain events had begun to unfold that alerted some staff of Eastern Health of the 
impending storm. The description of ER/PR within this chapter begins in those months 
before ER/PR was made public. The ER/PR testing, which was the focal point of the 
Cameron Inquiry, was conducted within the Immunohistochemistry division of the 
                                                 
58 The “eye of the storm” was not a metaphor offered by participants, it is a metaphor 
that helps me to think through the adverse event experience. 
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pathology department of laboratory medicine. I begin by explaining the hierarchy that 
exists within laboratory medicine followed, by an examination of the experiences of staff 
in the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory.  
5.1 Hierarchy within Laboratory Medicine 
 Laboratory medicine has a well-established hierarchy based on the roles, 
responsibilities and educational preparation of the various laboratory personnel. Status 
and relations of power are defined in part by this hierarchy. Laboratory technicians are 
staff who have either been trained in college programs of several months in length or 
have been trained on-the-job. They are responsible for analysing laboratory samples and 
participating in laboratory quality assurance processes. Laboratory technologists are staff 
who have been trained in a 2-3 year college diploma program. Like technicians, they 
analyse laboratory samples, but in addition they are involved in the development of 
laboratory quality assurance processes and the interpretation of quality metrics. 
Pathologists are physicians who have speciality training in the study of disease. In the 
Immunohistochemistry Laboratory, the pathologists are anatomic pathologists and are 
responsible for examining laboratory samples of tissue, organs and tumours to determine 
disease type and stage.  
 Status within the laboratory is based on training or education. The pathologists 
hold the most status, followed by technologists and then technicians. With this status 
comes power, and the amount of power that any one person has is based on their position 
within the hierarchy. Relations of power within the laboratory hierarchy are evident in the 
opportunities that staff exercise in questioning or challenging the behaviour and opinions 
of other laboratory staff. For example, the power that the pathologists were perceived as 
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having within the laboratory prevented laboratory technologists and technicians from 
questioning the pathologists’ opinions about who was responsible for events of ER/PR. 
The position of laboratory management within the hierarchical structure depended on 
their professional qualifications. Management staff who are also physicians have greater 
status and power than laboratory staff physicians and managers who are not physicians. 
The pathologists have more power and greater status than non-physician management. 
5.2 The Experience of ER/PR in Laboratory Medicine 
ER/PR testing is the responsibility of the Immunohistochemistry division of 
Pathology within Laboratory Medicine. A laboratory staff member, who was employed in 
the laboratory medicine program within Eastern Health when ER/PR began to unfold, 
shared her perceptions. She commented on her impressions of how the staff felt in the 
early days of ER/PR:  
[R]ight from the get-go, even before [the Cameron Inquiry] … I think the initial 
reaction was that people were afraid that they were going to be blamed personally, 
and not even … so much professionally, initially. Like, some of the people were 
thinking of, “Oh, my goodness, what did I do” … and some people were very, 
very emotional about all of that. 
She described her early awareness of the Inquiry and her opinion that, “the blame game 
started very early.”  
She described how there was a hierarchy within the laboratory, stating that 
although “you’re supposed to be considered co-workers” in actual fact “you felt that the 
pathologist was above you.” She explained the implications of these relations of power 
for the functioning of the laboratory: “As lab staff, you feel that ultimately you have to 
give them [the pathologists] the right information in order for them to make the right 
judgement, so right away you felt like you’re under the gun.” The laboratory staff 
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member also was clear that the hierarchy was fundamental for shaping the way that 
blame was attributed during Cameron: “So, very early on, we felt that this was going to 
land on lab personnel [referring to technicians and technologists], ultimately, regardless 
of what was found.”  
A staff member explained that a power imbalance had begun to be exhibited 
between the pathologists and the technologists, a dynamic that was reportedly not 
discernible before Cameron. There are different classifications within the laboratory staff, 
and the staff member observed friction between staff based on those classifications, even 
before any cause of the ER/PR events was identified. She explained that some staff with 
less formal training had been grandfathered into positions in the laboratory program 
while in reality they did not have the background to totally understand the quality control 
processes that were supposed to be followed. The result, she observed, was that staff were 
no longer a team; “instead of working together, they were almost working separately” 
because, she argued, “one was better trained than the other.” The outcome of these 
dynamics within the laboratory team was that staff “could hardly function.” A divide that 
had started earlier had now become worse. She further described a divisiveness between 
the pathologists and the laboratory staff, with individuals on both sides trying to protect 
themselves, a situation that she referred to as “a huge wedge that … everybody was out to 
cover their own ass.” She recalled that before ER/PR began, “the pathologists were very 
helpful … quite willing to share, and if you’d go to them and ask them for an 
interpretation or something, they were quite willing.” With staff interactions strained and 
people no longer working in a collegial manner, the laboratory became a difficult place to 
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work. The staff member recalled that as it was coming closer to the actual time of the 
Inquiry, “things were so stressful.”   
The lack of official communication from Eastern Health in the early weeks of the 
ER/PR investigation was a critical dynamic shaping the experience of laboratory staff. 
The staff described that they were not informed about the incident by the organization at 
the time of the discovery, and reported that they only eventually became aware of the 
details from other sources. One laboratory staff member expressed the frustration of 
waiting for details: 
I mean, we were weeks … whole blocks and slides and repeating things and not 
even knowing why. No one ever said to us, “We have a problem.” Well, we didn’t 
care who the person was or what the situation was. We didn’t even know why we 
were doing all this extra work. We weren’t even told that, “Well, there’s a 
possibility that there’s an error” or “We’re checking to see if, we missed 
something” or … nothing. It was just “Take these and do them. Take these and do 
them.”  
Laboratory staff stated that they became aware of the events that were responsible for the 
additional work that was being assigned (that is, the rechecking of laboratory samples) 
during the social time of coffee and lunch breaks. Laboratory staff from all divisions 
tended to congregate for breaks in a common area of the cafeteria, and this common 
social time and space was reportedly a venue for sharing information about events across 
various divisions. The information that eventually reached the laboratory staff took the 
form of rumours. A staff member described how hearing the information in this manner 
led to fear and uncertainty amongst the staff:   
[We were hearing that] hundreds of wrong results [had] gone out and that was 
before we had even started truly testing hundreds, so how would you know there 
were hundreds. It was right away. It just went right off the rails right away. It was 
a big panic and … there was nothing right … it seemed like nothing was done 
right. 
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The staff of the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory were curious and had questions about 
the rechecking of samples, but they had not associated any anxiety or fear with the extra 
workload until their colleagues from other divisions, who were not involved but were 
hearing rumours, began to speculate about the magnitude of the wrong results. Staff from 
the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory who had interactions with colleagues from other 
divisions during coffee breaks became increasingly interested in trying to get answers 
from laboratory management about the nature of the problem that was creating the need 
for rechecking of samples. It was in the effort required to get answers that the hierarchy 
within the organization became evident. Participants believed that laboratory staff were 
unable to obtain timely answers to their questions because laboratory management were 
controlling the flow of information. As a staff member described, staff tried to get 
answers but they were not aware of the activities, decisions and processes that were 
taking place in the background, at the management level. In fact, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter, at the time that laboratory staff were struggling to understand and get 
answers, management were trying to understand and contain the event.  
Even as the Cameron Inquiry began, laboratory staff still had not been officially 
informed about the actual events that had led to the Inquiry. Despite continued attempts 
to obtain information about the reasons for the rechecking of test results, it was months 
before an official explanation was provided. A laboratory staff member described her 
recall of the delay:  
I can remember, [Quality and Risk Management (QRM) staff] coming down, we 
were going through this process and we still didn’t really know what the process 
was … or what was going to be involved, or where it was headed or … [QRM 
staff] finally came down and explained to us about the sentinel case and gave us 
the background. Here we were doing all the work. We had rerun all these tests. 
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We were still in the process of doing it, and still didn’t know why we were doing 
it, and the hearing was on at this point.  
The Cameron Inquiry became very much a daily reality for the staff working 
within the laboratories of Eastern Health. A staff member recalled that laboratory staff 
would gather around and watch the proceedings on computers in the lab. She described 
the atmosphere as very intense and the communication pathways, although informal, “as 
fast as wildfire.” She recalled the effect of the Inquiry on productivity in the laboratory: 
Very little work got done on some days … as certain people made certain 
comments, it just went through the lab like wildfire, and it was very intense … 
during the whole process it was very intense. 
And then in their off-hours, at home, staff would watch the daily review and recap of the 
day’s proceedings broadcast by local media outlets. There was usually a commentary 
associated with the broadcast provided by the media spokesperson, with comments added 
by members of the public, often by patients and patient’s families. A laboratory staff 
member reflected on the role of the media: “It was like they didn’t really have their facts 
right. … Until you’re on the other side of it you don’t realize how infuriating it is.” Staff 
would debrief each morning about the comments of the media and begin again to watch a 
new day’s proceedings. Most staff in the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory participated 
in the daily rituals of watching the Inquiry proceedings, including those who were slated 
to provide testimony at the Inquiry and those who were not.   
Prior to the beginning of the Cameron Inquiry, the laboratory medicine program 
had been undertaking several quality initiatives to increase both the profile and the public 
understanding of laboratory services within Eastern Health. One of the initiatives resulted 
in the laboratory medicine management team inviting local media outlets to come into the 
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laboratories and take film footage of staff working within the environment. 
Unfortunately, the footage was eventually used to introduce and provide additional 
background images for the Cameron Inquiry daily reporting. Individual laboratory staff 
members became identifiable by the public, and in fact some staff were so recognizable 
that they were described as the face of the event. Staff were approached regularly, in 
public and private settings, and subjected to criticism and name calling during and after 
the Inquiry. Referring to a staff member in the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory who 
had inadvertently come to embody the face of laboratory error in this way, one staff 
member recalled that:  
She had the type of face that if you saw you would remember it, and she actually 
had a person in the supermarket say to her, “How can you be out here? Aren’t you 
embarrassed to be out here when you’re over there killing people … your work is 
killing people.” Oh my god, she came to work, she was devastated. 
She reported that the staff member “never got over it, never. Every day of her life it was 
with her. And that was (pause) oh, that was heavy for her.” She described how difficult it 
was to watch colleagues “being hurt … it was absolutely devastating to her … I had met 
her several times and she would always [emphasis added] bring it up – always. Never 
ever left, never.” 
A laboratory staff member, who was not employed in the Immunohistochemistry 
Laboratory and therefore further removed from the incidents, described his impressions 
of being associated publicly with the events of ER/PR. He explained that in his view: 
… it affected everybody in the lab because you felt you were part of it, … at the 
[Gym] people would [say], “Where do you work,” and you say, “Eastern Health,” 
and they said, “Oh, you’re the ones who misdiagnosed all the people with breast 
cancer.”  
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He described “often times you felt the media wasn’t being fair” and, “they really didn’t 
capture what had happened” but it was difficult to explain the details so when he was 
asked he would say “No, that’s not really what happened.” He reported that “you couldn’t 
explain to them the details … [i]t wasn’t the diagnosis; it was part of the treatment.” 
From his perspective, trying to explain “was a waste of time”:  
… [It] was a waste of time because it was already in their minds what had 
happened and it was all the lab’s fault, and I guess you almost felt embarrassed in 
a way to be part of … I mean, I didn’t feel responsible, but you felt you were part 
of something that had hurt people and other people looked at you and they felt 
you were part of it. 
Several laboratory staff members who were not directly involved in ER/PR described the 
sentiment of feeling the stress and not wanting to be identified as responsible when they 
had not even been involved, creating a self-protective response. Two laboratory staff 
members highlighted the sentiment of guilt by association when they used descriptors 
such as: “thrown into one bucket”, “every lab” and “everybody”. They respectively 
recalled: 
I think at that time we felt the stress of the people in the pathology lab, for sure 
and everything they were going through, but everybody got thrown into one 
bucket … and I know a lot of my co-workers say you wouldn't even tell anybody 
what your profession was back in those [days] … because that was all over the 
news and, everybody was like (sigh). You know, nobody wanted to admit where 
they worked, right? It was horrible. 
[P]eople were saying, “Well, they don’t know what they’re doing,” kind of thing 
and it got translated to all … like every lab and everybody that worked there.  
Another laboratory staff member also described the sentiments of embarrassment, shame, 
feeling demeaned and feeling like one’s work was being undervalued or “forgotten.” She 
described how “no one wanted to say that they were a lab professional anymore. No one 
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wanted to say they worked for Eastern Health. … You kind of just wanted to steer clear 
of that conversation.”  
As the circumstances of the incidents became available to the public, the 
laboratory staff in the Immunohistochemistry division of the pathology laboratory 
experienced blame from other laboratory colleagues. The context in which the most 
blatant blame was described to have occurred was in a meeting organized by the 
organizational leadership intended to provide clarity about the circumstances of the 
events leading to the Inquiry and to provide support in the face of public criticism. All 
laboratory personnel were invited to participate and, as one laboratory pathology staff 
member recalled, 
They started finger pointing and, trying to fix things … and, people actually … 
standing up in front of everybody saying, “We’re all taking the blame for 
something that pathology did.”  
She expressed her disappointment in laboratory staff who expressed blame, since the 
intention of the meeting was “to sit down and discuss what happened and where we 
[were] going from there.” She further described the experience as “jaw-dropping” since 
laboratory staff were prepared to criticize the Immunohistochemistry division pathology 
staff directly: 
The whole way through it did feel like it was a blame game … people make 
inappropriate comments, insensitive comments … I would have thought that 
people would find it easier to blame someone if they didn’t think they would find 
out, but in our situation they didn’t mind standing in front of you and saying [it] 
… that was jaw-dropping … you know, because … you hear rumblings, and “I 
heard so and so say,” but to say it right to you! 
 
An Immunohistochemistry pathology laboratory staff member explained that the 
experience of ER/PR was stressful for the pathology staff, but being blamed by 
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colleagues was “devastating” for those people who had been directly involved with the 
events of ER/PR. She recounted the experience of observing a staff member who was so 
devastated by the comments of colleagues “that she left the meeting and never came back 
to work in the lab. She was a victim. … [S]he couldn’t deal with it at all. It really took her 
down, and so she never did any testing after.” A laboratory staff member recalled her 
disappointment when she experienced blame from her co-workers. She stated: 
[I]t was bad enough when you had the pathologists against you, when you had 
administration against you; but when you have your own co-workers against you, 
then it’s all for nothing … if even our own don’t believe in us, then how can I 
convince somebody [outside]. 
 The manner in which the communication with staff was managed reportedly 
caused anxiety and divisiveness within laboratory medicine. One laboratory staff 
recalled, “there was a lot of not knowing, and then asking questions and not getting 
answers, and then some people would have information and not share the information, 
and so things became very divided.” Another staff member stated that “all of a sudden, 
they kind of went, ‘you’re on your own,’ ” referring to Immunohistochemistry 
Laboratory staff. She explained that “before, we were all just one big lab,” but from this 
point on they felt alone.  
Staff who were required to testify at the Inquiry reportedly struggled with anxiety 
about how they would be supported and whether their jobs would be protected, as they 
watched other Eastern Health staff informants testify. Laboratory staff were aware that 
pathologists had their lawyers and the oncologists had their lawyers, but when the 
laboratory staff asked the question “Well, am I protected or aren’t I,” reportedly nobody 
“came to say … ‘Don’t worry about your jobs.’ ” This staff member surmised that 
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probably nobody knew about whether staff were safe in their jobs, but as she recalled 
“even to come and have that discussion with you, it never happened.” Reportedly, 
reassurance and coaching to prepare to give testimony were eventually offered by 
organizational leadership, but only after laboratory staff “started to complain.” One 
laboratory staff member reported that staff who testified met with lawyers and 
organizational leadership “to go over some of the scenarios.” He described being coached 
about the types of questions that could be expected and “the way to answer.” This 
coaching intervention was reported by laboratory staff as providing “some relief” for 
those staff who were experiencing intense anxiety as they waited for their turn to testify 
at the Inquiry.   
Collectively, staff reported experiencing anxiety about their personal 
responsibility for the events, fear about job security and stress associated with trying to 
cope with criticism and blame from the public and their colleagues. Although staff tried 
to support one another through the period leading up to and during the Inquiry, they 
struggled with trying to carry on with the regular demands of their laboratory work: 
“Some of them didn’t come every day, and some of them had very difficult days when 
they did. The ones that were directly involved, the ones that actually did the testing, were 
the ones that were more affected.”  
 After the Cameron Inquiry concluded and before the report was released, staff 
continued to work; but, as one laboratory staff member described, those were “very dark 
days” and “everybody was kind of, like, in limbo once it was all said and done and 
waiting for the report to come out.” Interactions between staff reportedly continued to be 
problematic. Up to this point there had been no formal supports provided for the staff, 
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other than to those who were providing testimony at the Inquiry, despite repeated 
requests. As one laboratory technologist in the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory put it, 
“people were getting support from their colleagues … just amongst ourselves, nothing 
higher up … we didn’t get much recognition or support or talked to, any higher.” 
The release of the Cameron Inquiry report in March of 2009, six months after the 
conclusion of the Inquiry in October of 2008, reportedly resulted in disappointment for 
the laboratory technology staff. The laboratory staff believed that when the public and 
other staff in the organization understood lab they were referring solely to the 
technologists and technicians. After the report was released, participants described that 
there was no public clarification of how the ER/PR testing went awry. There was no 
clarification of the role of laboratory technology personnel in contrast to the role of 
pathologists in the events of ER/PR. By the time the Inquiry report was released, the 
technical staff believed that they were partially responsible for the events of ER/PR, but 
they believed that the pathologists were also responsible for ER/PR. The technical staff 
recalled that they were not in a position to challenge the pathologists about taking 
responsibility for their part in the events of ER/PR.  
 Within the laboratory medicine program, the relationships between staff reached a 
crisis point when the burden of responsibility continued to be placed on the laboratory 
technologists while, the technical staff felt, the pathologists refused to acknowledge their 
role despite the report findings. In a meeting held with immunohistochemistry staff after 
the report was released, several comments were made that staff felt indicated an attitude 
of blame by pathologists toward technical staff, described by one staff member as 
“demeaning” after all that they had been through. This interaction between the 
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pathologists and the technical staff was described as a turning point in the climate of the 
Immunohistochemistry Laboratory. A laboratory staff member recalled the intensity of 
the staff response: 
Well, we went back to the lab, the rest of us, and one [person] in particular – was 
just broken. Oh, (crying) she just felt that she worked so long … For them to have 
said that, was very … she was really upset. She was broken. 
This particular interaction was described as the impetus that caused the organization to 
respond to staff requests for intervention. The same laboratory staff member explained 
that there was “some counselling” offered and there were “meetings with the staff” after 
there were multiple requests, but, in her words, “things were very, very slow in coming.”  
The actions of the organization also saw punishment meted out. Referring to a 
member of the laboratory leadership, a staff member described that after the Cameron 
report was released, a laboratory leader “showed up for work and her office was locked 
and she was removed” from her position. She claimed that, in her experience of Eastern 
Health, “somebody has to be the fall guy” -- an outcome that, she noted, seemed to 
contradict the Eastern Health policy regarding the management of adverse events. She 
described the frustration that surrounded the dismissal of the laboratory leader: 
Talk about following policies – there’s no one to blame. Well, if there’s no one to 
blame, how can one person be fired? You know, like, I don’t know. I don’t know 
if anybody or if everybody should’ve been fired, I don’t know…  
 
At first glance, it was interesting to note that laboratory staff reported that they felt 
unsupported by administration, and yet they rallied around this management staff 
member to show support. The distinction, as described by this laboratory staff member, 
was that the organizational leadership (executive) were considered to be the 
administration whereas the laboratory management (directors and managers) were not. In 
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the eyes of the technical staff the responsibility for ER/PR had been left solely with the 
technical staff and the laboratory management. Reflecting on the management of the 
ER/PR occurrences by the organizational leadership, a laboratory staff member 
emphasized that: 
The biggest error at the beginning was not telling us that we’re being investigated 
and why they were doing it; and then, there was a lot of good changes that came 
… but it’s still to this day … that mentality hasn’t changed. You know, we’re still 
… we’re the ones that got [i.e., had] to do all the extra work.   
The understood relationships within the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory 
provided tacit ways that the technologists and pathologists had worked together on a daily 
basis. The laboratory staff understood their relationships with the pathologists in certain 
ways, which they described as working closely together, having a good working rapport, 
and feeling comfortable to ask questions or seek clarification. The work of the 
Immunohistochemistry division of the pathology laboratory, like all divisions of the 
laboratory, was organized by the hierarchical structure through which the actual activities 
of the laboratory were organized and influenced. The laboratory technicians, laboratory 
technologists and pathologists each have their own policies and procedures that they have 
to follow that inform and shape their work. But quality assurance processes define the 
work of the department as a collective. The scientific and technical activities caused the 
work of the technologists and pathologists to intersect. The pathologists were dependent 
upon the work of the technicians and technologists to achieve their work.  
When the pathologists reportedly exhibited overt blame toward the technology 
staff, this created the dynamic of being criticized by a group who had previously been 
understood to act respectfully toward other laboratory staff and to play a predictable role 
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within the laboratory. Now, suddenly their behaviours (described as “critical and non-
supportive” by the laboratory staff in this study) were perceived by the laboratory staff to 
be outside of those previously understood relations. In essence, the working relationships 
between the pathologists and other laboratory staff became strained and the other 
laboratory staff began to recognize more and more the power differential at work in their 
relationships with the pathologists. The pathologists were no longer considered part of the 
understood work group but were perceived to be acting in a superior manner because of 
their credentials and status afforded them in the Cameron Inquiry as experts. Therefore 
laboratory staff did not feel comfortable speaking back or clarifying their position or 
perception. Before Cameron, pathologists did not exercise their status and power so 
blatantly within the pathologist-technologist relationship. And the most significant 
traumatic response by technical laboratory staff was reported when these pathologist-
colleagues who were considered knowledgeable about the work of the 
Immunohistochemistry Laboratory were perceived by the laboratory technicians to be 
criticizing their work and blaming the technologists. The laboratory staff reported that 
they felt that the pathologists were blaming them unfairly. 
The direct involvement of the front-line laboratory staff in ER/PR differed greatly 
from the involvement of staff in other areas of the organization such as QRM. The 
laboratory staff were unable to see the larger processes that were occurring; by contrast, 
the QRM staff were so deeply involved in the larger processes that they did not have the 
opportunity to respond to the anxiety developing among the laboratory staff.  
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5.3 The Experience of ER/PR in the Quality and Risk Management Department 
Staff in QRM provided their view of ER/PR from the standpoint of the QRM 
program. A staff member recalled that in May 2005 “the flag was raised” that there might 
be “an issue with testing for the estrogen/progesterone receptors in breast tissue.” A 
process began whereby laboratory medicine and QRM participated in the task of 
identifying women whose samples may have been implicated as an issue. A list was 
created by laboratory management, and a staff member in QRM was assigned the task of 
double checking the list to ensure that no patients were missed. A QRM staff member 
described how the list was double checked against “Meditech59 and the Cancer 
Registry.”60 A QRM staff member was also tasked with beginning a concise investigation 
to determine the probable cause and scope of the issue. Another QRM staff, describing 
the process to me, related that “very quickly” it was determined “that examining the 
processes of ER/PR was beyond the scope of a concise investigation.” She explained that 
the investigation required was so complex that the assigned staff member couldn’t do it; 
she described the problem as “bigger than [her].”  
The QRM program staff were required to make telephone contact with every 
women identified on “the list” but, according to one staff member, “telling them nothing” 
because at that point in time they “knew there were problems but [they] didn’t know any 
specifics.” The experience was described as “very traumatic” for a number of reasons, but 
particularly in terms of how difficult it was to call people, who were not expecting a call, 
                                                 
59 Meditech is the electronic patient record system used in Eastern Health. 
60 The Cancer Registry is a database of cancer patients held in the NL Provincial Cancer 
Care program. 
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and try to explain that the test in question was “related to [their] treatment” and not their 
diagnosis. One staff member explained that it was very difficult to tell someone about a 
test “which may have affected their treatment, which they probably [couldn’t] remember 
or may not even know that they had done.” In the words of one staff member, “it was a 
difficult call to make and [they] had to make hundreds of them.”  
A staff member reflected on the trauma that she felt she was being forced to inflict 
on people, in her view perhaps unnecessarily:  
So this is what we were doing to people … and we were forced to do that. Like, 
none of us wanted to do this. None of us really felt that there was a need. That 
was in our mind at that time and we felt forced that we had to call all these people 
and do this traumatic thing. So, anyway, we did all that.… In some ways it’s 
almost as if each client is an adverse event. You’re dealing with the individual 
adverse events within a huge adverse event. Because each one was different.  
She also reported that people often misunderstood the message that the QRM staff were 
trying to deliver and therefore multiple phone calls would be required to try and mitigate 
the confusion. She remembered one patient in particular who was confused after such a 
phone call: 
I can remember this poor woman I called. She went through all the cancers that 
she had had … all the cancers, all the treatments, everything else. She went 
through the whole thing – long conversation. I was on the phone well over an 
hour with her talking about all this stuff. … So at the end I did my little summary, 
“So this is what we’ve talked about and this is what … you know, it’s been great 
talking to you and I will call you, in the future.” First call next morning, “Did you 
tell me I never had cancer? I’ve been thinking about it all night.”  
One staff member recalled that, since the QRM team was not involved directly 
with any of the patients in the context of their normal workload, while making phone 
calls they also occasionally faced the unfortunate circumstance of asking for someone 
who, unbeknownst to them, was already deceased. She recalled the discomfort caused for 
159 
 
both the family and the QRM program staff when a phone call was made to a deceased 
patient’s family:  
[W]e had to go through and determine from our list who was deceased; and, of 
course, you may have missed them … and then you hear the pause and then you 
know the person is dead … guaranteed, we had one of those a day, each one of us, 
and guaranteed they just died or something traumatic. So you’re listening to that 
because I mean you’re talking to … (pauses) upset people.   
In addition, she described the trauma of laboratory results changing in the midst of an 
event that had already involved re-testing for changing results -- in essence, an 
occurrence within an occurrence. She recalled a patient who was very anxious to receive 
her updated results and so the staff member had the patient’s name and number noted so 
that when her results came in she would “call her directly.” She explained that when the 
results came in that should have included this patient’s results, “hers weren’t there.” 
Unfortunately, the out-of-province reference laboratory had “lost her blocks” which then 
required a new sample and another period of waiting for the patient. The staff member 
described how the patient’s results finally came back and indicated a change in result, 
which turned out eventually to be an error at the reference laboratory, because “there 
were some inherent issues with ER/PR.” She recalled the distress of having to explain the 
patient’s results:  
It was traumatic. … So we were after telling her that she was going to retest, wait 
for months to get the results back. “Your results are different. We’re going to 
have to do something for you. Oh wait now. No, they’re not. They’re all the same. 
Go back to normal?” Now, if that wasn’t traumatic, what was traumatic? 
During the time of making hundreds of calls to patients, the QRM team supported 
each other but reported receiving very little other support. A staff member recalled one 
organizational leader who would “call down and check on us all … and see how we were 
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doing” and ask “what kinds of calls are you getting now.” So this support was, in one 
staff member’s opinion, in part “to check on everybody” but also in part “to get 
information too.” She described this organizational leader as “a nice person” who 
provided “some support,” but in her opinion “that was it” for support. During this time of 
contacting patients, she recalled that there was “no contact with the laboratory medicine 
program or other organizational leadership.” 
A staff member explained that the QRM staff had no expertise in the area of 
ER/PR testing or the treatment option of Tamoxifen; in her words, they “had never heard 
of Tamoxifen before, let alone ER/PR,” and yet they were required by the organization to 
call all the patients and explain the purpose and possible outcome of the re-testing. She 
went on to describe how “QRM staff were working long hours with no compensation and 
very little acknowledgement.” She explained that “[t]he calls were on the weekends, 
nights … there was no pay … there was no acknowledgement. Other than [they] were 
getting the job done. That was the only acknowledgement that [they] got, as [they] went 
through.” 
One QRM leader was asked by the organizational communications department to 
speak with individuals who had questions, even though she had never worked with the 
communications department and was not a previously designated organizational 
spokesperson for the public. Reportedly this expectation created a great deal of stress. 
The QRM program staff were not only managing the notification to every patient, 
keeping track of laboratory samples and reports as they came and went within and outside 
of the organization, but they were also required by the organization to take on roles that 
had not previously been part of the role of QRM.  
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The perspective of one QRM staff member was that although the decision to retest 
was made by a group of Eastern Health staff, including laboratory and organizational 
leadership, by the time the Inquiry happened QRM was left “holding the bag” and all the 
other people were “gone to the four winds.” As time moved on, the roles and 
responsibilities of Eastern Health staff in the ongoing work of ER/PR changed. As a 
result, the QRM program staff were left with a responsibility which would normally be 
fulfilled by the laboratory program, coordinating the management of patient results. A 
QRM staff member was eventually (inaccurately in the staff member’s view) identified to 
government, by a spokesperson for Eastern Health, as the person coordinating Eastern 
Health’s response to the ER/PR events.  
A staff member described a lack of understanding by organizational leadership of 
the effect that the QRM staff’s work assignment was having on them. She described how 
she had shared her distress with an organizational leader who stated, “You are upset, over 
this?” The staff member interpreted the leader’s response as “shocked” that the staff 
member would “even be upset.” She went on to explain that the support she was 
receiving was not from the organizational leadership but from her partner and co-workers 
in QRM. The staff of QRM were also required to testify at the Cameron Inquiry. In one 
staff member’s opinion she “never would’ve gotten through it [referring to the Inquiry]” 
without her partner at home and the staff from QRM.   
 One QRM staff member described the very taxing workload and the trauma that 
the collective demands created: 
We had an Access to Information and Privacy request from a reporter, so then as 
we went on we had the class-action lawsuit [referring to Verna Doucette v. 
Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority, 2010] where we had to do stuff for 
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… that. We had to provide notification to all the participants in that. So the 
lawyers then said, basically, “Good luck with that. We’ll put the ad in the paper. 
Here’s the letter you’ve got to send out to everybody.”  
In addition, the QRM began receiving new phone calls, from the women who had been 
contacted for ER/PR results, asking for information based on the media coverage of the 
class-action lawsuit.  
So on top of all the people that you were talking to … meanwhile, they were all 
still calling in, right? “I saw this in the paper. Is this what you called me about last 
year?” … So besides talking to all the public, then you had all this other … work, 
because you had work too. So, anyway, it was a very traumatic time to go 
through.   
The anticipation of the Inquiry and then the beginning of the Inquiry itself caused 
distress within the QRM program, similar to the level of distress that the laboratory staff 
had reported. One QRM staff member who was required to testify described her 
experience of feeling frustrated as a result of being misunderstood and unsupported by 
the organizational administration in the face of the media coverage: 
I needed someone to say, “You did good, we knew you did … as best as we could 
hope you could do in the circumstances that you had,” and that was it, nothing. … 
Get on the stand. It was terrible. You know, it was absolutely … the press 
coverage was terrible. It was just bad.  
According to staff members, the organization had made a decision that staff who were 
testifying at the Inquiry would not be represented by the Eastern Health legal department 
and had not informed them that they would not be represented. Staff members had the 
experience of testifying at the Inquiry and expecting to have support from Eastern Health 
lawyers yet receiving none:  
I found out after, that the decision was made by Eastern Health not to defend any 
of us. We were not to be defended. However we did, we did. … I … fended for 
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myself. That was it, so that hurt – totally undermined by the organization, 
absolutely.61  
The lack of support reported to be provided after the Inquiry experience was 
consistent with the lack of support that staff recalled throughout the entire ER/PR 
process. One staff member described how she was offered employee and family 
assistance program support and the counsellor discussed the “trajectory of recovery” 
(Scott et al., 2009) with her. Reportedly, the counsellor used the Scott et al. model of 
recovery, in particular “Stage 6: Moving on” to explain how an individual may move 
through the stages of recovery following an adverse event. The staff member felt she was 
directed to choose one of three paths: “dropping out, surviving or thriving (Scott et al., 
2009, pp. 329-330),” and whatever she chose, she felt the take away message was “good 
luck with that.” When asked what support would have looked like for her, she explained 
that, for her, a supportive statement from the organizational leadership would have been: 
“I have good staff here.… These are good people and, given the circumstances 
that they were in, they did the best they could; and, yes, mistakes were made and, 
yes, I think they all own up to them all, but you know, they did the best they 
could, given the circumstances that they were in.” From the top on down, that’s 
what should’ve happened there, and it didn’t happen at every single level.  
One QRM leader reflected on what she viewed was the failure of the organization 
to use ER/PR as a learning experience, and the risk that was being created by the lack of 
                                                 
61 Physicians who testified at the Cameron Inquiry had their own lawyers. Some staff 
had assumed that the lawyers who prepared them to testify at the Cameron Inquiry 
would “defend” them and therefore many unionized and management (non-physician) 
staff did not seek legal help through their professional bodies or personal resources. It 
was not until they were on the stand that they realized that they had no legal support. It 
is important to note that as much as this was not technically a trial, in fact participants 
felt that they were being required to defend their actions, as indicated in the participant 
quote above. In other words, while EH lawyers helped them to prepare for the Inquiry, 
the staff commented that they did not feel defended during the Inquiry.  
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opportunity for open communication. She stated that in her opinion “we don’t talk about 
it here and we won’t learn from it because we’re going down the [same] road again. … 
[W]e’ve cut off education, training, which we did before. It’s all focused in on money.” 
She described how she believes that the organization is “leading up to the same thing 
again, and there’s no recognition of that, and now there’s no one even to talk to. … 
[P]eople aren’t approachable!” One staff member stated that if she had received support 
at the time of the Inquiry the outcome “definitely” would have been different for her. It 
was suggested to another staff member that she take some time off and complete some 
academic work which was in process, an indication for her of the lack of understanding 
that the organizational leadership had of the devastating ways in which this experience 
was framing her everyday world. 
5.4 The Experience of Public Criticism 
QRM staff reportedly experienced criticism, similar to laboratory staff, from 
people who were not involved in the incidents but took the opportunity to comment. One 
staff member described taking her daughter to a specialist after her daughter had [a health 
crisis] and the specialist said, “Well, you know, you’ve put your family, including your 
daughter, under such stress. It’s only to be expected.” Another staff member described 
experiences of being verbally assaulted by strangers in public: 
I went to a house party. This woman cornered me in the kitchen and said 
everything to me, said everything – called me down to the dirt, and she was very 
strategic, though, because she kind of blocked me off in the kitchen, and 
everybody kind of drifted out. [Partner] had no idea I was still in there getting told 
off.  
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A laboratory technologist from the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory reported similar 
experiences. He explained that it was difficult to get any relief from the incidents, even 
away from the environment:  
We went to an Immunohistochemistry conference and the opening speaker … one 
of the first statements was about this, fiasco in a little place in Canada, and you’re 
sitting there with your name tag, so you (slid down in the chair) … I can’t even 
remember exactly now what they said about it, but just as soon as they said it, it’s 
like when the doctor says “Malignant” and you don’t hear anything else. For the 
minute I think I forgot exactly what they’re talking about.  
Another participant, who was not directly involved with the events, reported having a 
similar experience of attending a conference in the United States. A conference speaker 
made reference to a lab in Canada that had an ER/PR event, and although the conference 
was in a large auditorium the staff member was feeling self-conscious thinking that this 
was her laboratory. She explained that the experience of ER/PR still haunts her and she 
was not directly involved. In her opinion “if you had been directly involved and you had 
just moved on … that would’ve been a slap in the face all over again.” She described that 
the conference was a place she never expected ER/PR to come up.  
5.5 Suffering Immortalized 
The Graces monument was created by Canadian artist James C. Smith. The 
monument, made of granite, depicts three life-sized female figures seated on three 
extensions of a cross-shaped plinth. One position on the plinth is empty to suggest the 
absence of a fourth figure. One figure holds a rose representing grace, love and beauty; 
the second figure holds a caduceus representing health and healing; and the third figure 
holds a heart representing optimism, hope, resilience and virtue (Eastern Health, 2013b).  
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Figure 5-1: Graces Memorial 
 
 
As part of the class action lawsuit brought against Eastern Health in 2010, 
described in Chapter 1 (“Verna Doucette v. Eastern Regional Integrated Health 
Authority,” 2010), the monument was commissioned by Eastern Health and erected at the 
Health Science Centre. A laboratory technologist described what she perceived to be staff 
being repeatedly traumatized by the statue. Another laboratory staff member explained 
the response of laboratory technology staff when the plan to erect the monument was 
announced: 
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[It] put the nail in the coffin, so to speak, when they decided that they were going 
to put up this monument in honour of those … [referring to the women in ER/PR], 
we felt then it was like, nobody asked us if this was a good idea. That was further 
trauma to us because we felt every day we have a reminder now (crying). 
Oh, I remember when we heard that, I mean, the place just went on the rocks – 
“Are you serious” – like, and, we tried to understand where it was coming from, 
because, obviously, the patients wanted it. They felt it was going to help them. 
In the absence of official communication from the organization to staff, and because there 
was ongoing mistrust of administration, intentions were misunderstood. Initially when the 
monument was placed, the laboratory staff thought that the organization had decided to 
create the memorial perhaps in part to punish staff for their role in ER/PR and to remind 
them of the organization’s perception that they had done wrong, although clarity was 
later provided. “We could see when things were explained, but first it was … (crying) 
hurtful.” Similarly, another staff member described her view that this is, “the 
organization’s way of continuing to punish the staff.” Staff have come to understand that 
the decision to create the memorial was outside the organization’s control. However, they 
did not understand why Eastern Health located the memorial beside the main entrance to 
their workplace.  
Two laboratory technology staff from the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory 
shared that although they understood that the monument was placed at the HSC because 
both the Immunohistochemistry Laboratory and the Cancer Care program are located at 
this site, they never enter or exit the building through the main entrance because of its 
proximity to the monument. They described efforts to find alternative routes of travel to 
and from the building to avoid the daily reminder of the hurt and pain of ER/PR. Another 
laboratory staff member said that she only goes in the main door in the winter when the 
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monument is covered with snow, “when it disappears, completely covered, that’s the only 
relief.”  
Figure 5-2: Graces Memorial partially obscured by snow 
                                      
5.6 After the Storm 
ER/PR, like any severe storm, left damage and significant memories for those 
who lived through it. After the Cameron Inquiry report was received and new 
mechanisms were put in place to respond to the recommendations of the report, including 
instituting Ontario Laboratory Accreditation standards within the organization, the work 
for those Immunohistochemistry staff who remained62 continued. They were directed to 
create procedures and guidelines that reflected enhanced quality processes. Those staff 
who had stayed through the Cameron review period understood the importance of the 
recommendations as part of the organizational plan for laboratory medicine. 
Simultaneously the organization was recruiting new management team members for 
laboratory medicine. In addition, government had created the Provincial Office of 
                                                 
62 Several Immunohistochemistry pathology staff did not remain in the department after 
the Cameron Inquiry report was released; this is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7.  
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Adverse Events (POAE) (see Chapter 4) which required annual updates about the 
progress of achieving the recommendations of the Cameron Report. The POAE had a 
staff member hired specifically to act as a liaison with the health authorities, whose role 
was to contact the NL Health Authorities each year and obtain a progress update. An 
immunohistochemistry staff member described the struggle in not achieving the required 
progress in following the recommendations of the Cameron report, when she recalled: 
“then Cameron was coming back for their yearly thing, and I was going, ‘No, we’re not 
doing this’ and ‘No, we’re not doing that’ and ‘No, no, no.’ ”  
A staff member described periods of reliving the events of the Inquiry, including 
the months leading up to the Inquiry. He believed that: 
When an adverse event happens and the organization doesn’t support the person, 
they end up devastated, and that support would’ve looked from the beginning—
like, people acknowledging that this is difficult. I can catch myself … I can 
ruminate for an hour and just relive … “I should’ve said this. I should’ve said 
that. I should’ve said the other thing.” Like, I can … and I catch myself and I have 
to stop and say, “Okay, stop, that’s enough of that; I can’t go down that road,” but 
I’m down that road before I even realize I’m down there.  
 
He reflected on the difference between collegial support and organizational support, in 
his perception of events surrounding the Inquiry:  
[Name] and [name] never went on the stand, but they carried the weight just as if 
they did. [name], I mean, she was there for me. Like, it was the same crowd that 
came to support me over there when I was on the stand. … You know, like, it was 
just great support, but it was them. It wasn’t any of the other crowd [referring to 
the organizational leadership].  
A QRM staff member described what she believed is the key element of her 
experience, as described in detail earlier in this chapter, “there’s a couple of things … the 
key thing, though, is that they made the decision not to defend us and never told us. So 
I’m like a fool, given all this stuff.” She reflects on moving forward: 
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You know what … I can’t get rid of it. I don’t know why I can’t. I know I get 
frustrated because I can see it coming again. I can see it coming, and we’re going 
to have another thing and it’s all going to come … it’s all going to blow up. 
Apparently, we’ll never have an Inquiry again, but stuff will blow up and there’ll 
be all this inner turmoil and all that, and I find that frustrating because we never 
learned from it; but, you know, I should be just saying, “Shag it,” and move on. 
Another staff member, summarizing her experiences, described the trauma and finally the 
future as she sees it, in the wake of Cameron:  
Through all that I gave this my all. Like, that was it. It’s a terrible thing to say, but 
this is as good as it gets for me. … I did it [work related to ER/PR] every night, 
every weekend … I sat in that office and I did … whatever – for what – for 
absolute what? … This is not who I am … I mean, it was just ... it was hard what 
happened to me, and then it’s hard what happened to ... [referring to her co-
workers], we were all broken. 
Several participants, reflecting on their experiences, shared a common perspective 
that the organization did not learn from the events that occurred throughout the ER/PR 
testing scandal. They believe that, as a result, staff have suffered further disappointment 
and staff morale has suffered further. A staff member described her perspective of how 
some individuals were left to shoulder the blame: 
After ER/PR … that’s when we started noticing the difference because from an 
ER/PR issue … there was so much that we could’ve learned from that issue that 
we didn’t. It … boiled down to people did the wrong thing in the lab and [QRM] 
did the wrong thing with a number of people and the disclosure and stuff, and it 
was our errors and move on. It became focused on individuals. Absolutely, and, 
really, when you look at it now … we have never talked about it. We have never 
had any kind of lessons learned or anything like that from it, except when we did 
it for optics during the Inquiry, and then even that got tossed, so we just didn’t 
learn from it. So, how could we even grow? 
Many staff who had endured the entire process of ER/PR subsequently left their 
respective disciplines, moved to other positions, resigned, or retired early, reportedly 
having felt unsupported, criticized, humiliated and publicly shamed. Others were 
removed from the organization, removed from their positions or given alternate 
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assignments, for what was perceived by the staff who remained to be an inability to work 
effectively within their respective roles.63  
This chapter has provided a comprehensive perspective of the experiences that 
staff described in ER/PR and the Cameron Inquiry period, including insight into the 
ongoing pain and suffering that staff report. There are a number of key factors that 
shaped the experience of the staff: communication; blame; power; support; being given 
status as rightful knowers; and management behaviour. The presence or absence of these 
factors will become more poignant in the next chapter, as experiences in the years 
following ER/PR are examined.   
                                                 
63 People who were removed from the organization, their positions or given alternative 
assignments included front-line staff, management staff, as well as a number of senior 
staff and government officials – individuals at all levels of involvement were affected. 
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CHAPTER 6 
After the Storm: The Question of Safety  
I joined the organization in the summer of 2009, just a few short months after the 
Cameron Inquiry report had been released, and it was clear that while the storm of ER/PR 
had passed, the memories were vivid. The 618 page, two-volume report was given a 
prominent place in many Eastern Health offices. The Client Safety Reporting System 
(CSRS) had not been in place long and staff were integrating the new policies and 
organizational expectations around reporting and disclosure into their work in a variety of 
ways. Some staff were using their direct experience of the outcomes of the Cameron 
Inquiry, having been directly involved in ER/PR, in the way they integrated the new 
policies. Other staff were using their indirect experience of having been a staff member of 
Eastern Health during that period, or having heard about the organizational responses to 
ER/PR and other adverse events, in the way they integrated the new policies. This chapter 
examines the experiences of staff in the months and years following ER/PR and the 
Cameron Inquiry.   
An adverse event report within Eastern Health follows a certain predictable path 
from the identification of the event to the closure of the report, but the permutations of 
the experiences of staff are too many to count. When an incident occurs within Eastern 
Health that may or may not have resulted in harm to a patient, there is an expectation that 
the incident will be reported through the CSRS. Within the CSRS, the reporter of the 
adverse event is asked to provide details about the incident (as was described in Chapter 
4). The reporting mechanism and the event itself create a number of activities involving 
173 
 
the reporter and people in the wider organization. When an incident is reported as a Level 
0, which indicates a close-call (an incident that did not reach the patient), the manager of 
the program/service area is notified by email that an incident has been reported and the 
manager is required to review, investigate and document his/her recommendations. 
Quality and Risk Management (QRM) is also notified of every incident and the Quality 
Clinical Safety Leader is available to assist the manager to examine the incident. There 
are a number of close-calls where it is appropriate for staff to notify the patient and their 
family, such as in the case of a potential future error due to similar circumstances, for 
example, two patients with the same name. Other close calls may involve staff reviewing 
organizational processes or equipment use.  
For an incident reported as a Level 1 or 2 -- Low/Minor (an incident that reached 
the patient but resulted in no harm), again an email notification is sent to the manager and 
QRM. An incident reported as a Level 3 or 4 -- Medium/Moderate (indicating an event 
that resulted in harm) results in the same email notifications as above but, in addition, 
may require a concise investigation and thereby involve more staff in the resolution of the 
event. The medical director of the program may be asked to review the standard of 
medical care and the Quality Clinical Safety Leader may meet with staff to further 
examine the details of the event. An incident reported as a Level 5 or 6 -- Serious/Severe 
(indicating an event that resulted in near death or death) results in email notifications to 
the program/service manager, Quality Clinical Safety Leader, QRM director, QRM risk 
management consultant, program/service director, clinical chief, vice-president for the 
program/service and CEO. Every individual notified or having access to the CSRS for a 
specific program/service can review the incident report.  
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The activities that result from a Level 5 or 6 incident are complex, involve 
multiple players, and can extend over several weeks. These activities typically include 
several meetings with staff, program leadership and the patient and their family. The 
patient, if they have survived, and their family may be invited to pose questions that will 
be used within the review process to examine the incident, with the expectation that at the 
end of the review they would receive feedback on their queries. The incident may result 
in media reports and government health department staff involvement, up to and 
including the Minister of Health. The types of activities described are activities that staff 
are aware of and in some cases have experienced. 
The chapter begins with the identification of an adverse event and then continues 
with different perspectives within event experiences including the perspectives of 
management and front-line staff, namely the second victim, other staff, program 
managers, and program leadership. The experiences are examined through the lens of the 
staff and program management and leadership.  
6.1 Identifying an Adverse Event 
Before an adverse event can be reported, an event must be recognized and 
understood by staff as an unexpected outcome within a planned action. Depending on the 
experience of staff, an outcome that has happened repeatedly in the past may be 
understood as commonplace and therefore not unexpected. In these cases, staff are 
usually not concerned about the event or harmed by it. However, when an adverse event 
is identified and staff identify personal responsibility within that event, the second victim 
experience is possible. The lived experience of staff within the reporting and subsequent 
organizational processes can magnify the second victim experience. An adverse event 
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predictably involves many people within the scope of the event, from report to closure. 
And each individual experiences the event in a unique way; how other people and the 
organization respond to the individual is also unique or experienced in a unique way.  
A nurse cried while she described a medication error that had happened a few 
years before. She described feeling physically ill when the adverse event was identified: 
I nearly fell. I still have the weak feeling thinking about how I felt. It was just this 
sick, sinking feeling. … [I]t was like the room just started spinning and I just felt 
like I was going to be swallowed up in a hole, and that’s what I wanted to do.  
In addition, she described the intense disappointment she felt that she had made an error, 
“Oh my god, what have I done and how stupid … how stupid to have done that.” She 
recalled feeling such distress at having made an error that, in her words, “could’ve 
potentially killed someone” that she took a sick leave and never returned until over a year 
later. She explained her impression that when she came back to work “it was all forgotten 
by that point, except by me, and I’ve never forgotten it to this day.” She reported her 
discomfort that the patient underwent procedures at the time of the medication error for 
which an explanation was never offered: 
[I]t was never disclosed to that patient. No … or to his family … Nooo. You just 
gave him orange juice. Said, “Drink this up.” Gave him dextrose in his IV and 
said, “We’re going to give you a bit of IV fluid now.” “We’re going to poke your 
finger every half an hour. Don’t worry about that.” Yeah, and he never questioned 
it and, yeah, don’t even remember any family being involved … No. 
The nurse retained a detailed memory about the event, even after several years: 
I remember where I was, what the patient looked like, where the other nurse was, 
where she was standing, the feeling … and every time I go to that unit, that room 
… I’m, like, “That’s where it happened.” Yeah, [I] have never forgotten it. 
In her description of the event, she used the expression “sticking like glue” to explain her 
ongoing recall about the details of the error, a reality she attributes to the potential 
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seriousness of the incident. She explained, “I could’ve killed someone … I almost ended 
this man’s life through my own negligence or lack of attention. … So when I go back in 
that room, now, I get the same physical feelings I had at the time.” At the time of this 
study, now many years after the incident, she stated:  
Even describing it to you … I still sort of get that feeling like … it’s like a queasy 
feeling. … It’s like this veil comes down over you. Like, this dark feeling comes 
down over you … it’s like your stomach falls in your boots, really.  
She recalled feeling supported by her nursing colleagues and the physician, but had no 
recall of support from the manager: 
Like, I know I certainly never felt judged by any of the nurses that I was 
incompetent, and, I would’ve filled out the incident report and submitted it and 
that. The physician was very supportive … but, I knew that … I almost killed 
him; but, I don’t remember anything from the manager. 
The nurse described the concern that she has retained throughout the years of being 
judged as incompetent based on her error. Although she uses the incident as a learning 
opportunity for her colleagues and nursing students, she continues to try and assess how 
her description is understood by others:  
[A]s I tell people about it, I gauge their reaction too, and I’m thinking, “Do they 
think I’m incompetent? Do they think I was a good nurse?” So I do wonder. Some 
people will say “Yeah, I’ve done something like that too,” right, and then others 
are, like, “Oh, I’ve never made a medication error.” “Okay, then!” You know, so 
some people do judge you. “My god, how stupid was she” or yeah, you just feel 
judged. You just feel, like, they think, “Oh, well, you must’ve been incompetent.”  
When the nurse had the experience of being questioned about how it was possible to 
make such a mistake, she mentioned the patient. “Like, how could anyone do that,” right, 
and I’m, like, “Well, you know, the patient stuck out his arm.”  
A very senior nurse recalled the experience of making a medication error and the 
adverse event being identified by the pharmacy: 
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I gave a … narcotic … I’ll never forget it. … [I]t wasn’t picked up for a couple of 
days until pharmacy noticed that the count was off … the manager called me up 
and I was, like, “Oh my god,” and I didn’t realize that I had done it until … this 
point and, … it was horrifying to me that I had done it …  I just felt horrible.  
Another nurse described what was in her view, a poorly executed procedure, the result of 
which was possible harm to the patient. She described the event as something that “took a 
long time” for her to get over it. The parents of the patient involved were described as 
“mentally challenged” and she was unsure whether the care provided would have been 
the same in other circumstances. She described being “sure [that] the child had to have 
been mentally affected in some way.” She recalled the incident as “a horrendous 
situation” but stated that she “didn’t do anything about it, even fill out an occurrence. I 
didn’t do anything, really, at the time. I was just shocked, and it was just horrible.” 
Although the nurse was not certain of the outcome for the patient, she was focused on 
how “horrendous” the situation was rather than on the occurrence as a reportable event.  
An adverse event is identified typically by the person who is directly involved in 
the event itself, but in some circumstances the event may not be identified until hours or 
days later or, in some cases, several months or years later. Most often, an event involving 
a single patient is identified almost immediately by the person or people present in the 
immediate environment. The experience described by staff begins at the point when they 
recognize or acknowledge that there is in fact an adverse event. Much of the work at the 
beginning involves coming to terms with the reality of what has happened and their 
personal role and/or responsibility as it relates to the event. Some staff reported initially 
experiencing denial or shock and described attempts to prove that there was no adverse 
event. Participants also reported that the work required in relation to the identification of 
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an adverse event often involves convincing colleagues that an event has happened and 
that it is reportable, as well as dealing with their own distress and emotional response to 
the event.  
It is clear from the descriptions that staff experienced trauma, retained detailed 
accounts of the events and questioned their own competency, but how they experienced 
the decision of whether or not to report the events is less clear. Official texts 
(orthodoxies, in the language of Bourdieu [1977]) inform the requirement of reporting 
once an adverse event is identified and yet some staff described not following that 
directive. In this next section, I explore staff and management experiences about 
reporting adverse events. 
6.2 Feeling Safe to Report an Identified Event 
Reporting adverse events is also an important part of the experience of staff 
involved in adverse events. On occasion staff experience so much anxiety or distress in 
relation to an adverse event that they fail to report in a timely manner. It was clear to me 
from the reports of participants that this behaviour, perceived as avoidance or lack of 
reporting, may be a reflection of the distress the individual is experiencing. Participants 
described the reporting process as stressful and as creating angst about the possibility of 
punishment. They explained that reporting an adverse event is not usually accompanied 
by any support mechanisms or any enquiries about how they are feeling within the 
process. The response of the person receiving the report often sets the tone for the 
experience health care providers reported. Despite ongoing messages within the 
organization about CSRS being a patient safety reporting tool and not a disciplinary tool, 
staff continue to frame reporting as it relates to themselves. This was evident in the 
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language used by staff when they discussed reporting. For example, a nurse, noted, “I 
haven’t felt the need to write myself up which I totally would if I had to.” Other staff 
reported feeling criticized or “getting flack” for reporting or considering reporting. They 
described the types of statements that other staff tend to make when someone discusses a 
need to report, “What, are you looking for brownie points for how many you can file in a 
year?” and “Why are you filling that out? We don’t do that. Why are you doing that?” 
A senior nursing program director reported that she was confused by the 
conflicting messages about staff perceptions of safety in reporting. On the one hand, staff 
would verbally report, when asked by her, that they felt safe and comfortable reporting, 
but when the results of an anonymous Patient Safety Culture Survey were examined the 
opposite was found. The program director reported that there was “a disconnect between 
what people say anonymously and what they say to your face.” She was referring to an 
incongruence in answers about comfort in reporting, when responding verbally if asked 
by a manager or director, compared to responses given in the anonymous survey. It is 
reasonable to expect that the most honest answer would be captured by the least 
threatening mode of enquiry. So if staff do not feel comfortable reporting, when it is an 
organizational requirement, it is reasonable to expect that they are not going to feel 
comfortable telling a manager or director when asked. Responses of participants imply 
that there was a self-protective mechanism that may have been operating when staff were 
verbally asked about reporting, that was not required in the survey. I felt that the 
difficulty that the director had in accepting the survey results as valid when she had asked 
the same question and received a different answer was an important observation. In her 
view, the discrepancy put the validity of the survey results in question. 
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 A nurse described the difference from one manager to another in terms of staff 
comfort with reporting events. She made the distinction that the new “approachable” 
manager was likely to create an atmosphere where staff would bring things to her 
attention and try to address an issue: 
Staff are more open to her and more willing … to go to her with concerns.… 
[T]he new manager you … know that if she comes back and says no that she 
exhausted her options. So she’s more approachable. She’s more … supportive, 
and just seems more like somebody who cares, someone who understands. I think 
people are more comfortable.  
A director described the process of conducting a quality case review and the 
response of individual staff in the context of the reporting and investigation processes. 
She noted that staff would often go home without reporting and then would later state, “I 
don’t know what to do.” A laboratory supervisor described her view of increasing staff 
comfort in reporting, and of the importance of staff involvement in the resolution of 
occurrences. She described her personal approach to making herself available to staff and 
identified the importance of support: 
I get a phone call. “I just did an occurrence. I just wanted to tell you about it. This 
is what happened” and I say, “Okay, if I have any more questions I’ll come back 
to you. If you want to talk about it I’m here” – always open-door policy here if 
anyone has any concerns about any occurrence.  
A pharmacy staff member explained that staff are deeply affected by adverse events and 
she described several avoidance type reactions, including “calling in sick the next day” or 
leaving the workplace for a few minutes or hours.  
A nurse described the attitude of senior staff toward junior staff related to how 
junior staff perceive the importance of reporting. She related that junior staff seem to 
report more often and view it as “they’re reporting an event.” Whereas older colleagues 
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reportedly state “Oh, you don’t have to waste your time with that” or “That’s such 
foolishness to be bothering with that.” She commented that she herself wondered how 
long junior staff would continue to report to such an extent before they also begin to say 
that doing so is “a waste of time.” A laboratory supervisor described the increasing 
comfort in her particular division with reporting, although she recognized that this is a 
relatively new phenomenon that did not begin until years after Cameron.  
It seems like it’s been better … Over the years people wouldn’t put it in, … they 
just refused, but … now with encouragement they’re starting to do it a little bit 
more … and now they’ll even come to me and tell me they’ve got it done, so … 
that’s a big improvement. 
 
She also described the support-seeking behaviours that she saw in staff as they 
participated in the reporting system, such as calling her “to debrief what happened, just to 
get support.” She further described how staff appreciate the opportunity to discuss the 
event, because in the past they felt they had “to defend their work or their action.” She 
believed that staff now understand that adverse event management is “just looking at 
what went wrong and what could go wrong again, and preventing that.” The laboratory 
supervisor further explained her actions to model a systems approach64 to thinking rather 
than individual responsibility:  
So almost every day you have to demonstrate that “this is not about you; this is 
about what happened.… This is to prevent something from happening again; and 
if we can do that, we’re helping somebody. We’re helping another lab, because it 
can happen again.” 
                                                 
64 In the systems thinking approach, the focus is placed on the conditions where the 
individual works i.e., the system, rather than on individual responsibility or blame 
(Queens University, 2016). 
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Some participants described a cultural shift within Eastern Health in terms of more open 
discussions about events. A nurse manager described “disclosure,” a term that she is 
using to refer to reporting as “welcome.” The nurse manager explained that events were 
“hidden” and “[n]obody talked … people knew in little pods … that a significant 
occurrence happened, but there was never any discussion; nobody talked.” But she 
reported that more recently “disclosure is more prominent … very important – big relief, 
I think, for the staff.”   
Fear, anxiety and discomfort were all described within the process of reporting, 
but the source of that fear remains unclear. It is important to note that in some cases the 
fear of reporting was a stronger motivator not to act than the organizational requirement 
to act – causing delays or failure to report. The perspective of management and staff 
differed according to the descriptions of reporting, therefore the remainder of this chapter 
explores in more depth these perspectives across the adverse event experience.  
6.3 Differing Perspectives of Management and Staff 
In what follows, I consider the responses to adverse events from multiple 
perspectives: those of second victims, other staff present at the event who also interacted 
with the care provider or patient and may be second victims themselves, staff who may 
not have been present but are aware of the event, and management and organizational 
leadership.  
6.3.1 Experience of the Second Victim 
A surgeon described an adverse event experience following a surgical procedure, 
whereby the patient died at home and the surgeon was not aware of the incident until an 
anaesthetist mentioned it. He recalled that he “didn’t hear about this for a whole week. I 
183 
 
couldn’t believe it … I didn’t know about it.” He described his own response and the 
response of the anaesthetist:  
That was devastating. I had to take a week off. I could not work that week … one 
of the anaesthetists said to me, “[name], did you know?” I said, “My god, no, I 
didn’t know” or I would’ve … gone to everybody … “Did you know what 
happened? This is what’s happened.”  
The surgeon recalled supporting the anaesthetist, who was “quite upset,” by reassuring 
him that “it wasn’t his fault.” During the time of providing support to the anaesthetist, the 
surgeon continued to process his own feelings associated with the experience, examining 
and debriefing on the events surrounding the procedure, and seeking support to manage 
his distress. He described, in a voice filled with emotion, how the event was “very 
difficult” and “completely unexpected.” He recalled getting support from surgeon 
colleagues, a family member and a nurse manager who was described as “very 
supportive” and who reportedly said, “These things happen … Did you do anything 
different?” He described this event as “probably the worst of the adverse events” that he 
had been involved in. He recalled feeling “like the bottom dropped out,” reporting that he 
“couldn’t think, couldn’t concentrate, couldn’t do anything else for that day at all.” He 
described how he couldn’t focus on his academic work, his office work or talking to 
students -- “couldn’t do any of that. Couldn’t talk to anybody, couldn’t … process … I 
took a week off … I just knew I couldn’t work.”  
The surgeon recognized the limitations of trying to provide safe care in the 
aftermath of an adverse event. When the event happened he explained that he felt unable 
“to listen to anybody or do anything that was safe to anybody.” He described how “even 
just talking to patients, I wouldn’t process the information properly. I wouldn’t be able to 
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take any history and make any sense. Like, I knew that there was no way.” He explained 
that initially he wasn’t sure a week was going to be long enough. “I didn’t know how 
long I might need for that, so I said a week.” He recalled calling his secretary and saying 
“I can’t work,” and I told [name] what had happened, and I said, “I can’t work next 
week.” In addition, he recalled informing his colleagues: “I called [name of surgeon 
colleague] and said, ‘[name], this is what’s happened. I can’t work. … I can’t,’ and he 
said, ‘No problem. I got your patients.’ ”   
The surgeon also explained that the culture of managing adverse events has 
changed during his working life. The surgeon described his experience, as a resident, of 
not being able to acknowledge adverse events or the feelings associated with them 
because, “you weren’t allowed to make a mistake, right, so you couldn’t possibly be 
upset about it because you weren’t allowed to do it in the first place, so it didn’t happen.” 
He described how difficult adverse events are even when the care provided is not an 
issue: “it’s hard on us. … I was knocked over cold. … I was devastated by all that.” He 
also explained that some of his physician colleagues hide the devastation better than he 
does; as he stated, “You wouldn’t know he was devastated by anything, and only those of 
us that know him extremely well would pick it up.” He further reflected on the change in 
the culture of adverse event management since he was a resident: 
[W]e talk about it … teach it. … We do debriefs after bad circumstances even if 
they’re beyond our control because we want to make sure that there was nothing 
we could’ve done differently or should’ve done differently or, if we could’ve 
called someone else or done something else. 
 
A paediatrician described the experience of rescuing a baby from near respiratory 
death, as a result of an adverse event, and the significant feelings that remain. She 
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recalled “the baby was in my arms and had stopped breathing. … At that moment my 
heart stopped because this baby probably would’ve died in my arms.” She recalled 
waking at night remembering the events: 
I still wake up in the middle of the night with that on my brain. Thinking, oh my 
god, if that baby had died, I don’t know if I would’ve survived.… I’ve talked to 
[another physician]. I still tell her, right, “Oh my god, that baby nearly killed me.” 
You know, let alone the baby dying, I nearly died. 
A program manager described the response of individual nursing staff in relation 
to an occurrence where there was patient harm but not death, with a system cause 
determined. She recalled that the staff “were crying, upset, couldn’t believe it happened, 
questioned their own ability. It was very, very hard on the staff … that’s a significant 
occurrence, and needing to know, ‘okay, was it me.’ ” The manager explained that she 
supported staff by stating this is “no blame … we just want to find out [what happened] 
and prevent it from happening again.” But according to her recollection “staff did blame 
themselves … I mean, the patient had to come back … for another procedure which is 
putting the patient at risk, so there was a lot of guilt on their part.” She recalled that one 
nurse in particular had great difficulty moving beyond the event. The nurse had asked to 
speak to the Quality Clinical Safety Leader who was investigating the event, a few days 
after the nurse had been interviewed by the Quality Clinical Safety Leader, “because the 
nurse was unsure what [she] had answered or how.” The manager further described that 
this particular nurse had a difficult time; the nurse was concerned about who was 
responsible. The manager reassured this particular nurse and reported that other staff 
continued to seek support as well to answer their own questions. The manager made note 
that in this particular adverse event there were no ill effects for the patient, and yet the 
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event was “huge for the staff.” She explained that, from her perspective, if the patient had 
been harmed it would have affected the staff even more negatively than it had.  
It was evident from the descriptions of participants that, following an adverse 
event, it is common for an individual to exhibit protective behaviours toward other 
patients to shield them from someone who they believe was responsible for a past 
negative outcome. A nurse recalled caring for a patient at a time when the physician on-
call was someone who, she believed, had harmed a patient in the past. She attempted an 
intervention with the patient to avoid needing help from the physician on-call; she 
recalled, “if perhaps some other doctor had been on, I would’ve said to the patient, ‘Well, 
I think you need some help and I’ll get Doctor so and so to come in.’ ” As a result of 
having been involved in a past adverse event, she was trying to protect her current patient 
from being subjected to a similar adverse event with the same physician. 
A related concept to protective behaviours is the guilt associated with the sense of 
perhaps not having done enough to try and protect the patient. A program leader 
described her devastation after an adverse event when she felt that she should have done 
more to prevent a certain care decision, although she recognized that the decision was not 
within her scope of practice: 
[It] took a long time to get over the guilt that I was involved in a process like that, 
and that I knew what I had done from my job description I had done properly, but 
should I have said, “You’re not allowed to”; and while … I had no right to make 
that judgement.… If I had put up a fight. Even though I knew it would’ve been 
fruitless, should I have put up a fight? I was devastated. 
A nurse described how the experience of being aware of another nurse involved in 
a significant adverse event, who became a champion for patient safety, helped her to cope 
with her own adverse event and also to become an advocate for patient safety. She 
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recalled that the other nurse went to various nursing units and spoke to nurses; her 
thoughts at the time were that the nurse was “brave to face all those people,” and that she 
was empowered by that bravery when she had her own adverse event. She recounted that 
the experience of observing the other nurse’s behaviour at the time of an adverse event 
“gave … a bit of strength, knowing that someone had done this and … people can learn 
from me.” She became a champion for patient safety by sharing her experience with other 
nurses and nursing students: 
I practically had it beat into everyone’s heads. … “Look, guys, I made this 
mistake; you can make this mistake,” because I considered myself a really good 
nurse, and to this day still do, but I was careless, so … I wanted people to know. 
How an individual will respond to an adverse event is related to how the event is 
defined by that person in relation to other adverse events that the person has been 
involved in or aware of. An organizational leader referenced the phenomenon of “moral 
residue crescendo” described by Gingell Epstein and Hamric (2009).65 He described 
behaviours observed within Eastern Health in relation to moral residue: 
If you have that exposure … to unfortunate situations … then you have exposure 
to it again and again and again.… You don’t get back to point zero and start all 
over again … there’s always a residue from the last time, and the next time and 
the time after that until it becomes breaking time when people just can’t take it 
any longer. It accounts for why a lot of people experience significant personal 
emotional turmoil … which goes hand in hand with professional decisions to 
leave their jobs or quit or retire or use sick leave.  
 
It appears from examining the descriptions of participants who reported having 
been involved in multiple adverse events that a cumulative effect was evident in the 
                                                 
65 The moral residue crescendo refers to the effect when moral distress occurs that leaves 
moral residue and with repeated exposures to stress events the moral residue builds in a 
crescendo-like manner (Gingell Epstein & Hamric, 2009, p. 3) 
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experiences of Eastern Health staff. Following an adverse event, the level of distress may 
be so high that staff may feel unable to function. In the stories told to me by participants, 
there were several accounts of staff leaving the work site temporarily, stories of staff 
leaving the work site and never returning to that particular role, and reports of staff 
resigning or retiring as a result of the distress of the adverse event; without exception, 
staff I spoke with reported feeling traumatized, stressed or physically ill, and 
acknowledged difficulty in providing safe and effective care or completing tasks in an 
effective manner. Blame was also evident in the accounts of staff either blaming 
themselves for making an error or blaming themselves for not protecting a patient from 
someone they knew was practicing in an unsafe manner.  
6.3.2 Experience of the Second Victim with Other Staff  
A nurse manager described a plan to undertake multi-disciplinary quality rounds, 
with all staff, to examine the processes that contributed to an adverse event. Quality 
rounds are meetings with staff of all disciplines for the purpose of explaining the findings 
of the quality case review and providing staff an opportunity to brain-storm ideas about 
recommendations or policy changes to prevent future similar events. She noted that 
physicians were invited but none participated either in the debriefing or in the quality 
round to examine processes and improve safety. She reported that nursing staff were 
frustrated by the lack of engagement by physicians in the review process: 
[We] invited physicians also and … they didn’t go, so that was frustrating on the 
staff … they found that the physicians were not involved, at that level. … So they 
[staff] did feel, like, “We’re all here and we’re trying to make a difference. Why 
are the physicians not here … any physicians?” so that was frustrating for them.  
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 A nurse recalled an event that he believed would have resulted in unnecessary 
surgery for a patient if he had not recognized the problem. He had taken over the care of a 
patient and found that the patient’s intravenous was not functioning and that therefore the 
medication the patient was supposedly not responding to, was not actually infusing. The 
patient had been booked for a surgical procedure based on the understanding that the 
patient had not responded to the medication. The nurse was describing the situation to the 
physician, in the context of asking for more time to resolve the problem before the patient 
was taken to the OR, when he was overheard by the patient care coordinator and asked to 
report the medication error in CSRS. He recalled his experience of reporting, his feelings 
of having to report, the potential risk of unnecessary surgery for the patient (that is, the 
harm that he believed could have been done to the patient had the nurse not intervened by 
discussing the medication error with the physician in charge) and the response of his 
colleagues to his reporting the medication error. The nurse explained that he felt badly 
reporting because he knew “what was going to happen,” that “the person who had had the 
patient overnight was going to get in trouble, which is what happened.” He recalled that 
other nurses had stated that he “should’ve kept [his] mouth shut and let the patient have 
[the procedure].” The nurse described how he did disclose the medication error to the 
patient and to the doctor and felt that was sufficient in terms of preventing the harms of 
an unnecessary surgery but, in his words, was “unfortunately” overheard by the patient 
care coordinator. He explained that once he filled out the occurrence report, the nurse was 
disciplined and he was shunned by his colleagues for having reported. He described 
feeling “terrible” because in his view this was “unnecessary surgery ... it was major 
surgery … there’s always risk (of things going wrong in surgery)” and yet his colleagues 
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stated they preferred this outcome for the patient rather than reporting the occurrence. 
The nurse reported that he had tried to defend his actions to his colleagues, by explaining 
the position he had been in that had led to his need to file an official report:  
I just felt terrible that everybody was angry with me, and I had to explain to 
everyone, “Look, I didn’t want to fill out this occurrence, but my PCC overheard 
me telling the doctor and insisted I had to do it, but I didn’t want to do it.”  
He explained that if he had had a choice he would not have reported the occurrence 
because he knew what the outcome would likely be: “[I] knew what the outcome was 
going to be … for that nurse, and probably for myself to some extent,” meaning that the 
nurse who had made the medication error would be disciplined, and he would be socially 
shunned for having reported the error.  
The nurse recalled that the anger from his colleagues lasted for several weeks as 
different nurses found out about the occurrence report. He stated that he felt that his 
colleagues assumed that he was “deliberately trying to report somebody.” He recalled 
being subjected to comments from colleagues at change of shift, such as “Make sure you 
don’t [naming the incident] because you might get reported,” or “There’s too much of 
this reporting going on here. We can just come to work and do our job and just keep 
everything quiet.” He described how “… it eventually goes away because someone else 
does something, and then they can move on to attack that person.” Key to his telling of 
this story is that, in his opinion, staff were prepared for a patient to undergo unnecessary 
surgery to avoid reporting the actions of another nurse. What is significant about the story 
is that he describes a culture of resistance to reporting, including both his own resistance 
to report and what he sees as a general resistance by staff to report, and he frames that 
resistance in terms of a punitive health care system that perpetuates a non-reporting 
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culture.  His description was echoed in those of other participants (described below) 
whose narratives of living through the experience of adverse events also describe a 
culture of resistance to reporting. That culture, in which reporting by staff is resisted 
through complex inter-personal coercion, shapes the experience of second victims. In this 
case, for example, the nurse who was rescuing the patient from potential harm became a 
second victim by virtue of the response of his colleagues to the reporting. 
When an adverse event happens in one program area and staff from another 
program area become aware of it, even though there may not be any discussion of the 
event with the directly-involved staff, the other staff may be affected, according to 
several participants. A staff nurse recalled that “the nurse who was involved [in an 
incident] worked with us at one point, and this person was devastated. Didn’t say 
anything. Never ever commented but was stressed and still had to work anyway.” The 
staff nurse describing the incident felt that the affected nurse didn’t feel “the support that 
they should’ve felt.” She explained that the staff on the unit where the adverse event had 
happened were impacted, but she also explained that there was an effect on her floor, an 
indication of being involved by association. The nurse explained her impressions at the 
time of the event: 
… it was hush-hush … investigating what happened. I do know that the staff that 
were directly involved felt very vulnerable and not supported, and I know that it 
impacted both floors because it’s our sister floor so it did have an effect. … It did 
play a role on both floors.    
The nurse described how the work processes changed as a result of the incident. The 
program leadership reviewed the existing policies in the context of the event investigation 
and began to enforce old policies that had never been enforced, which she described as a 
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new standard. She described how staff on the unaffected unit were also disciplined for 
the same lapse in policy that had caused the event on the affected unit. Some staff of the 
unaffected unit became second victims of the event by virtue of their knowledge of the 
outcome for the staff on the affected unit and their experience of also being disciplined by 
program leadership. The nurse was likely identifying as a second victim, when she spoke 
repeatedly about the nurse whose career had possibly been affected:  
I just feel sad for the nurse who … the nurses who it directly affected – one in 
particular … because this person was such a good nurse … and to be so badly 
impacted … that this person would possibly change careers. Like, it was that bad. 
A nurse described the difference in experience between reporting an incident 
involving a nurse and an incident involving a physician:  
I think you get less negativity if I report the doctor than if I report one of my 
colleagues, so it’s okay for me to fill out an occurrence because the doctor did A, 
B or C … don’t report your colleague but it’s okay to report it if it was the 
anaesthetist or the doctor, and maybe they feel the same way, I don’t know. 
She explained that when a physician is involved in an adverse event and it is reported, 
then there is an expectation by nurses that physicians should experience a punitive 
consequence, but rarely if ever do. Note that this is in contrast to the expectation, 
described earlier in this chapter, that incidents involving nurse colleagues should not be 
reported because there could be punitive consequences. Not only was there a different 
attitude about reporting physician colleagues as opposed to reporting nursing colleagues, 
there was also a different expectation about consequences for the individuals involved. 
The nurse explained her perspective that reporting incidents involving physicians when 
there would be no punitive outcome is “a waste of time.” She described her experience of 
her colleagues who she says believe:  
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Nothing gets done about it anyway. ... This doctor has been here now for 20 years 
and we’ve reported 15 things on this doctor, and he or she is still there so why 
should I waste my time filling that out; nothing gets done.  
In addition, she described the difference in her observations of novice nurses and more 
senior nurses: 
You have, a few nurses that are filling them out, or maybe the younger nurses … 
they haven’t got the baggage so they may fill them out more promptly, but those 
of us that have been in the system for 10 or 20 years, it’s like, “Oh well, like, this 
person’s still here. He or she has had, 20 dead [patients] over their career. Nothing 
gets done so why am I going to fill that out?”  
A nurse described the response of colleagues when she reported a transcription 
error that had put a patient at risk of harm and that, if not corrected, would have put 
future patients at risk of the same harm. She described the surprise she felt when her 
colleagues challenged her about reporting the incident rather than being concerned about 
patient safety:  
They were mad.… Well, they couldn’t understand. They were indignant. Like, 
“Really, you wrote that up,” … “Yes, I did …” I was actually shocked that the 
reaction was the reaction it was, because these are grown women and we’re not in 
high school … there were definitely whispers in the hall.… When I get there, 
everybody disappears, so you know what they’re talking about … and this is just 
right after the occurrence happened. … [I]t had to be written up.… You felt the 
animosity. They were angry and you could tell, but I’m pretty … like, I don’t 
really care. I do care. That’s a lie.  
She also noted that this group of colleagues were not her team; she was working on the 
“other side” of the schedule.66 The nurse reported that she was shocked by the reaction of 
this group of staff and explained that her experience with her usual colleagues would 
have been quite different. She defined this experience by the reaction of the staff rather 
                                                 
66 The other side of the schedule refers to a staffing model where the staff are divided in 
half and each half works together and rotates shifts together. The staff usually only work 
with the people on their own side of the schedule.  
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than by the potential outcome for the patient. If she had felt supported, her experience 
could have been quite unremarkable since the incident did not reach the patient. 
Another nurse was asked whether she felt that her workplace was a supportive 
environment and whether she felt that people received support from their colleagues. She 
responded “yes” -- if support “meant that things get covered up.” She explained that in 
her experience staff are “reluctant to report things because they’re afraid they’re going to 
get in trouble or they’re afraid it’s going to make them look bad.” And in other instances 
she reported that staff provided support by downplaying the importance of adverse events 
by stating “Ah, don’t worry about that. That’s no big deal. Sure, the patient is fine. What 
do you need to report that for?” She described how most often what she had: 
Seen more than not is probably a cover-up of things. Yeah, I think there’s still this 
feeling out there – “Oh no, we’d better not tell them because, that’ll show that we 
did something wrong and we could get in trouble” – so I think there might be a 
little bit of secrecy. 
 
The avoidance of negative consequences, as a form of support, was reported as a 
rationale for not reporting adverse events or for covering up adverse events.  
 The experience of the second victim very much depended on the response of staff 
who were indirectly involved, involved by association or not involved in the event. When 
staff incidental to the event were in agreement with the way that an event was managed 
and reported, the response tended to be supportive. Whereas when staff incidental to the 
event were in disagreement with the perception of an event or the reporting of an event, 
the response was reported as hostile and critical. These types of responses, both 
supportive and critical, could be observed to continue for weeks or months after the 
event. Staff reported feeling vulnerable and not supported, they described fear of getting 
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in trouble or being perceived in a negative light, and they demonstrated that harm to 
patients can occur when there is a resistance to report.  
Having considered the experience from the second victim’s view, the next section 
considers the second victim experience through the lens of management.  
6.3.3 Second Victim Experience through the Lens of Management 
 The second victim experience was explored from several vantage points within 
the organizational management structure. Consideration will be given within this section 
to the views of program managers, program leadership (directors) and QRM program 
leaders, and to how staff and managers experience this management view. The way that 
adverse events are experienced within the organization is dependent upon the lens 
through which the event is viewed and the person’s proximity to the event. Management 
staff are most closely aligned with the experience of staff, whereas leadership staff have a 
more distant view of staff experiences. The QRM staff tended to have a more system-
wide, organization-wide view of adverse events. This section explores the view from 
these various vantage points.  
6.3.3.1 Through the Lens of Program Managers 
A program manager described to me how staff experience adverse events and 
where and how support is provided. She provided her interpretation of adverse events in 
the context of staff as second victims. She described her impression that staff are “really 
traumatized, I think, by the whole event, and they demonstrate it in different ways, 
depending on the individual.” She recalled two events in particular, and stated that in 
both events staff found it “hard to focus, initially, very traumatized … they almost 
couldn’t [do] their day-to-day functions and tasks.” The manager observed that staff 
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“seem to carry a big burden and … they don’t really talk a whole lot about that.” She 
described that in one of these adverse events there was formal support provided when 
staff were brought together and other support people were brought in “to help the staff 
people through [the event].” In her recollection, the process of formal support tended to 
“work a little bit better” but even despite the support, “within a very short time” staff 
moved positions or changed jobs. 
The program manager also talked about the challenges faced by staff trying to 
garner support when they are unable to share confidential information in the context of 
their support-seeking behaviour, and the response of colleagues and the organization. She 
reported that in her experience she didn’t think staff were able to get support from their 
families because “they couldn’t disclose a whole lot.” In her opinion, “that’s where the 
facilitator really helped … because you’d be so stressed … on two levels – stressed with 
what was going on, but they also had to continue their day’s work, on top of that; and 
then they’d go home.” She recalled one nurse reporting how difficult it was to continue 
with activities of daily living: “just the thought of getting supper – [she] didn’t want to do 
it anymore, and [she] couldn’t cope with that.” The manager explained that her 
impression was that because staff were unable to get support at home due to the 
confidential nature of the event, she “didn’t see a lot of leave used in these employees 
because … the only support they got was at work.” She reported “there was a period of 
time when, their productivity wasn’t very good” but “management at that point used 
some extra assistance.” She explained the work environment: 
I can’t say they “weren’t functioning.” They weren’t seeing as many [patients], 
and they were using time in the office to kind of heal, which we saw very valuable 
because they couldn’t get it at home because … unless someone fully understood 
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what they were in the middle of, because it was so severe that … your co-worker 
got fired.   
She described how the staff involved in this particular event, which had led to the 
termination of their colleague, had had their confidence shaken, for example coming to 
believe that they weren’t “as good a nurse” as they thought they were when they learned 
that their “documentation wasn’t as it should be and they didn’t do the reporting when 
they should have.”   
A community health manager described her perspective that staff never 
experience healing following a traumatic event. She described her personal experience of 
identifying a breaking point when trying to manage the stress of an event involving 
children being apprehended, in the face of comments from other staff who were only 
aware of the event through the media. She explained that since no one had ever talked to 
her about the event, she created “barriers” to protect herself, and then when staff made 
comments about the event, she responded in a reactionary manner by “snapping” and 
making a rude comment back. She stated “to hear that they ‘did all that they could’ was 
just like … hitting the … button of a time bomb that had been building for years that 
didn’t really go away.” When she tried to discuss the situation with a manager at the time 
but she did not get any support, she felt there was only concern for the facts and whether 
the program was “covered.”  
I told him [manager] about the event, but that was it. It was concern with the 
factual parts of it and did we have our program covered, but there was never a 
discussion, no. Nooooooo, there was never a discussion at all to say, “Well, how 
does this make you feel,” so you could add the personal element to it. That never 
did occur. 
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In this circumstance, she reported the response of the organization as not supportive, in 
contrast to the response of an external reviewer who had asked her how she felt about the 
event at the end of the review process. She reported some closure as a result of the 
reviewer’s simple question. During our conversation she returned several times to the 
adverse event and used a variety of ways to describe how she couldn’t let it go -- in her 
words “You’re like a dog with a bone that you can’t bury. It keeps coming back to the 
surface.”  
Another manager recalled a significant adverse event and described the process of 
managing the needs of the staff. She reported that staff were included in debriefing: 
“[Quality Clinical Safety Leader name] came in … and went through the whole process 
of the occurrence.” She recalled that “the staff involved were very upset about the 
incident,” but that, from her perspective, “there was no blame.” She described how her 
intention with staff was to achieve several purposes: to “prevent this from happening 
again … to know exactly how it evolved … [and] can we make a difference?” She 
explained that it is important for staff to have “input into the solution” when trying to 
“solve the problem.” Her assessment of the outcome of this event is that it was “really a 
group effort and group support that we did, and I think it’s important.”   
The description by some managers of the second victim experience was similar to 
that of staff in two significant ways: adverse events are difficult and sometimes traumatic 
for staff; and it is important that support be available to staff at the time of an adverse 
event. It was clear that although some managers recognized the challenges of adverse 
events, they reported limitations in being able to support staff due to competing demands 
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and having to fulfil many roles within the adverse event management process which often 
prevented them from being available to staff.  
6.3.3.2 Front-line Staff Experiencing the Managers’ View 
A staff nurse (Nurse A) described an experience she had had one evening, when 
she was working a night shift with her usual colleagues on a medical unit. A call bell 
rang; one of the other nurses (Nurse B) answered the bell and then came back after a few 
minutes; and then the nurses continued to go about their business. About 10 minutes later, 
a phone call was received at the nursing station. The charge nurse took the call, and then 
appeared upset. Nurse A assumed something was wrong at home from the charge nurse’s 
expression. The charge nurse called out to Nurse B – the one who had answered the call 
bell earlier -- and asked, “What happened when you went and answered the call bell?” 
Nurse B responded, “Nothing happened, I helped him to use the urinal, came back here, 
that was it”. The charge nurse then went on to explain that the patient’s daughter had 
called to say that her father had just called her from his room to say that he had been 
assaulted by a member of the nursing staff. The family member reported that the nurse 
had tried to choke the patient when he had called for assistance with toileting. 
Nurse A explained to me what she had understood from the event at that time. 
First, Nurse B had not been gone “long enough to have done any such thing;” second, the 
patient “had a little bit of dementia;” and third, the man “never had a mark on him.” 
Nurse A further described her impression that “there was no way … if she [the other 
nurse] was going to choke you, you’d have a mark on you. There was no way that they’d 
examine you 10 minutes later and there would not be a mark on you, right?” She recalled 
that Nurse B ended up being sent home and that she (Nurse A) had been questioned about 
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the incident. She stated that “it was a pretty big deal for four or five days.” Nurse A 
described the events that followed: “The managers were called in, it was a big 
investigation.” Her description of the investigation included statements about the quality 
of the questions and her ability to be a reliable informant:  
They ask you all these … questions. … “I don’t know what happened. I was on 
the other end of the hallway.” “But what if” … I said, “But I don’t know what 
happened. I was on the other end of the hallway.” “Well, could” … I said, “But I 
don’t know. I wasn’t in the room so I don’t know what happened. … They said, 
“Well, what about the privacy curtains?” I said, “I don’t know if they were pulled 
or if they weren’t; … Like, they ask you all these kinds of inane questions, I find. 
Nurse A further reported that Nurse B was off for several days and then, when she 
returned, “it was just never discussed again.” 
Her general impression of the investigation of incidents is that “things get 
reported and investigated that are so silly, just so over the top.” Despite working in an 
environment where dementia is a common occurrence, she stated that: 
you would think that the management would understand and the patient care 
coordinator would understand dementia a little bit … nobody takes their side 
[referring to the staff], it doesn’t matter what anybody complains about here, they 
never come down on our side. [They] always end up … coming back and, “Well, 
you never did this” or “Now we’re going to do this.” They never say it’s tough. 
 
The nurse stated her opinion that despite all the communication, in the wake of 
Cameron, about the reporting system and the importance of reporting, “the management 
are still reacting the same way they’ve always.” She stated that “staff morale is really 
poor … a lot of people, they just feel unappreciated.” In addition, she explained that in 
her opinion the current climate is one where staff are afraid and where, instead of 
reporting, incidents are being concealed: 
People are actually afraid to report the silliest little things because they’re so 
afraid of being punished or suspended or getting in trouble … Morale is just … 
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ooh, it’s unbelievable … They’re very afraid of stuff going down, afraid of losing 
their jobs, being suspended, being investigated by their licensing bureau … just 
basically doing whatever we need to do just to cover so we don’t end up, being 
disciplined at some point … which is a terrible way to be trying to practice. 
6.3.3.3 Through the Lens of Program Leadership 
A program director described the quality case review process (outlined in Chapter 
4) and noted that a quality review is initiated when there is significant patient harm. She 
expressed the feeling that “it’s very stressful for frontline staff, whoever is involved, 
whether it’s a physician, a nurse, [or] a pharmacist.” She acknowledged that the review 
process usually involves the whole team, since an event does not occur in isolation. The 
program director explained that a review process is rarely initiated over an “individual 
competency issue.” She reported that she has been involved in “lots” of quality reviews 
and in her experience “it [is] never related to an individual’s practice. It’s related to the 
systems and the supports that are in place, and it’s usually a team [event].”  
The program director reported that it is challenging for people to recognize their 
contribution to an event. She used the example of physicians having difficulty 
recognizing their contribution to an error when it is reported by nursing. She stated “[i]t 
was a bit of a challenge in [program name] to actually get physicians to see when there 
was a nursing error how they contributed to it, but … it is a team and it is a team response 
to any of these issues.” She also observed that staff respond to the stress they are 
experiencing by avoiding completing the report and reaching out for help in the days 
following an event:  
[T]hey went home and didn’t do it, only to call their manager the next day and 
say, “I didn’t do it. I don’t know what to do. Can you help me, walk me through 
it,” and they’d come back in and their manager would coach them.  
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The program director explained the process that is initiated when a critical event 
is reported with a severity rating score of 5 or 6 (defined earlier in this chapter): 
So that immediately would trigger … which is a death or permanent harm … an 
investigation by the manager or by the leadership team, depending on the 
occurrence. So … myself and the chief and the quality [clinical] safety leader 
would have a discussion; ask the manager to do a quick review of the patient’s 
chart; talk to the people involved [referring to staff].  
 
She noted that the initial examination is preliminary to determine “the lay of the land” 
and whether the event is “preventable.” After the preliminary review, a decision is made 
about whether the incident has met the criteria for a quality review, and then the manager 
and Quality Clinical Safety Leader are asked to do an investigation. Again, she 
acknowledged the stress involved in the review process: 
That’s very stressful for everybody involved. So they [manager and Quality 
Clinical Safety Leader] would … interview … all staff that were involved, the 
patient or their family members … if the patient was still alive, other patients in 
the room, other staff, physicians involved, that kind of thing, they would gather 
evidence for us [the quality case review committee].  
 
She also described a process that occurs in professional practice and HR, at the 
same time as the quality case review, to examine whether the behaviour of the staff meets 
the standard of care. The program director viewed her position within the quality case 
review as removed from the investigation but leading the examination of evidence. The 
program director relayed that the difficult piece for the quality case review committee is 
communicating the review results to the patient or their family, and she specifically 
named support of the patient and/or their family as an element of the responsibility of the 
committee: 
I guess what I found … the difficult piece for us is … it was our responsibility to 
meet with the family to communicate the results of the quality review and to help 
support the patient and/or their family through this whole process.  
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Beyond the committee’s distress in relation to reviewing an event, the program director 
reviewed the various levels of distress experienced by people within the adverse event 
and review process. She demonstrated contradictory messages when just a few minutes 
earlier she explained that these events “never” related to an individual’s practice, and 
then in the following description of the factors that contribute to distress, she named the 
possibility of going “down the discipline route” which is indicative of problems with an 
individual’s practice:  
[F]rontline staff are obviously very distressed because it may go down the 
discipline route; or even if it’s not a discipline route, it’s, very stressful because 
there’s been an adverse event to a patient which we’ve deemed could be 
preventable. So that whole investigation piece is stressful … on the manager and 
the quality safety leader because it’s just a very highly charged environment, and 
they’re trying to get the facts only and keep opinions out of it and keep the whole 
process running. 
 
 The same program director explained her view of the role of support and her 
belief that the key to achieving an open and healthy environment for disclosing errors is 
to offer critical incident debriefing: 
One of the things I learned quickly in [program] was that … if it’s really bad and 
if staff need support we offer them the employee and family assistance program. 
We offer them counselling – this whole, critical incident debrief … supporting our 
staff through this along with the patient and their families is key to, I think, to 
having an open, healthy environment for disclosing errors … it’s a process. 
 
Critical incident debriefing is an intervention that could be offered by the employee and 
family assistance program staff and is usually used somewhere in the organization about 
once or twice a month. The program director explained that even though there was anger 
expressed by staff and frequent dissatisfaction expressed by patients and families about 
the quality case review approach, she is comfortable with the process:  
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Sometimes staff are really angry because we’re perceived as accusing them … 
and they’re not happy with this process. Lots of times the family and/or patient 
aren’t happy with the outcomes because we’re not blaming someone and 
disciplining someone, so it’s a whole balance, but … overall, I’m very 
comfortable with the process. 
 
The program director described the process of the quality case review and the 
position of the manager within that process. She explained her belief that the manager is 
in a good position within the quality case review since the manager does not sit on the 
review committee and is therefore at a distance from the review process. However, she 
also explained that the manager does the investigation and gathers information from staff, 
which would indicate that the manager is indeed an integral part of the quality case 
review process. In addition, there is an expectation that the manager will support staff, 
which is very difficult when the manager is in the midst of an investigative role. From the 
program director’s perspective, the process is “better for the manager because most of the 
time they don’t even sit on the quality review team. They do the investigation. They feed 
the information to a group that makes recommendations.” She explained the manager role 
as often having “to implement these recommendations which are difficult,” but from her 
perspective the manager role “doesn’t pit them against the staff. They did their 
investigation. They collect the facts. Someone else is reviewing it all from a systems-
wide performance.” She explained that “managers are part of the team who’s helping to 
fix this problem.”  
The same program director described how the experience that the manager has 
within the quality case review process “depends on the experience level of the manager.” 
She stated that a new manager can be “very traumatized … very, very traumatized 
because they don’t understand the process and they can’t see the light at the end of the 
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tunnel, but the more experienced the manager is … the more comfortable they are with 
the whole process.” Further she explained that “it’s a lot of work for a manager; and if it 
doesn’t turn out well” it can be difficult. She also described the complexity if there is also 
“a discipline piece” which in her view is “very difficult because you’re trying to say 
we’re looking at systems and improving systems, but then you also pick up a breach of 
standard. It’s very difficult because it gets very muddled and they’re never always 
separate, unfortunately.” As a director, she recognized the need for support, but at the 
same time described how the manager who is expected to be the support person for staff 
is also leading an investigation. So, in essence, the unspoken plan within the Quality Case 
Review guidelines for staff support depends on the manager. However, managers have 
such a complex role within the review process that they are unable to support the staff.  
I believe there are several important observations to make about the role of the 
manager within the quality case review process. First, there is a conflict of interest which 
makes it difficult for the staff to seek support from “the investigator” despite the ongoing 
identification of the need for support in the context of adverse events. Second, as long as 
the manager is involved in the investigative or review process it is very difficult for the 
manager to support staff despite the identification by the organization that support should 
be provided by the manager. Third, managers report moral dilemmas when they have to 
watch their staff being disciplined for something that was a systems problem. And finally, 
the managers are not at the table where those disciplinary decisions are made, but they 
are the ones who communicate and follow through on those decisions. It is not surprising, 
then, that so many staff reported feeling unsupported. The program director described her 
perspective about support: 
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I think we can do more around providing support to people when they’re going 
through this. The manager is looked to be the supportive person for staff, but 
when they’re leading an investigation, it’s really difficult. They can’t support staff 
… because they’re in a conflict they’re trying to keep their distance and not judge, 
so I think in that aspect we can have better supports. 
So her final statement “we can have better supports” is an acknowledgement that the 
organization, from this director’s viewpoint, does not have a solid plan to support staff. 
There are a number of observations that are important to draw from this statement. When 
staff describe their challenge in finding support they would not be aware that the program 
leadership are concerned but do not have a plan in place to ensure support. The managers 
who are involved in investigations and are identified as responsible for supporting staff 
are not available and there is no other plan. As well, the person in the position that is 
identified by the organization as the position ultimately responsible for ensuring support 
to staff does not feel there is a plan. It makes sense then that staff do not feel supported 
and struggle to find support when they need it.  
Another director, who was asked about the types of supports available to staff in 
the context of quality case reviews, mentioned the critical incident debriefing program 
and said that it was no longer available, stating that although it existed until 2003/2004 it 
was “no longer an established organizational program.” When I asked other 
organizational leaders about the program, it was described as “dissolved” and “gone by 
the wayside;” whereas another program director reported still using it. Program leaders 
who are expected to be able to provide the same types of interventions for staff differ 
greatly in their knowledge about the resources available.  
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6.3.3.4 Management Staff Experiencing the Leadership Approach 
A manager recalled events when she challenged the outcome of a review because 
the organizational leadership planned to suspend an employee for an “honest mistake” 
that “did not harm a patient.” The “mistake” resulted in a financial loss for the 
organization that the employee was prepared to pay back. The manager explained that the 
employer’s plan was to suspend the employee and she described how she “fought that 
they not suspend her [the employee]” and the manager “managed to talk it down to an 18-
month … letter on her file.” She reported that “the letter did as much damage as a 
suspension would” since in her view the sanction was unjustified. She described her 
struggle as a manager “to mitigate this [decision] because I know this is a really good 
nurse. She had good intentions. She’s remorseful. … I don’t agree with it.” The manager 
anticipated the outcome when organizational leadership makes decisions that are viewed 
as inappropriate; she recalled thinking at the time “if this nurse is suspended, we will 
never get disclosure again in this organization.” She reported she was “willing to be 
suspended for her” to avoid the negative consequences for the nurse and her program. 
The manager took on the role of trying to convince the leadership team 
(consisting of her own director and a HR representative) that the employee did not 
deserve a suspension. She expressed her concern about the impact that a suspension of an 
employee for an event that was considered “an honest mistake” would have on staff 
willingness to disclose in the future (using the term “disclosure” to refer to an employee 
reporting his/her own mistake). The manager was prepared to “take the suspension” to 
avoid a punitive outcome for the nurse. Although she tried to convince the nurse that the 
punitive action (the letter placed in the nurse’s file) “didn’t mean anything,” the 
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manager’s efforts to avoid this outcome indicated that she herself believed otherwise. The 
manager indicated that “there’s a lot of things that we can do,” referring to what 
managers can do to protect employees by negotiating with leadership or helping 
employees cope with leadership decisions that the manager does not agree with. The role 
of negotiation or protection in relation to organizational leadership is a critical component 
for understanding the adverse event experience of managers in Eastern Health. 
6.3.3.5 Staff Experiences of QRM 
The QRM program is intended within the organizational structure to act as a 
support program to staff at all levels of the organization from front-line staff to the CEO. 
Staff experiences of QRM, at the time of adverse events, are described in this section 
from several perspectives. A laboratory manager described the variation in responses 
between QRM staff in relation to investigations. She described the experience of working 
with me as the Quality Clinical Safety Leader for her laboratory division prior to the 
study. She explained that in the past, some QRM staff had responded to incidents in the 
laboratory with the laboratory staff feeling tense and as if they were “being investigated”, 
whereas I had responded in a non-reactionary manner of “examining the facts.” Both 
types of responses resulted in the outcome of understanding the occurrence, but the 
second type of response, as the laboratory manager recalled, “also left the staff feeling 
supported.”67  
                                                 
67 Bringing myself into the description as a staff member may seem to be self-
aggrandizing, but the point – whether or not it is in fact true or just a participant being 
kind -- was too importantly illustrative to not include. 
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One of the recommendations of the Cameron Inquiry was development of 
enhanced processes within Eastern Health to manage adverse events and continued 
expansion of the QRM department, with increased staff and clear policies and 
procedures. As a result of this direction, adverse event management processes have 
become centralized within the QRM program. A program leader, who has been present in 
the organization pre and post Cameron, described what she said was the organization’s 
“efforts to try and bring in service areas to take charge of things; there was a naiveté that 
we can have people in quality who have expertise to handle the issue.” She further 
described her experience of the change in responsibility for adverse event management 
from program to QRM: 
Even though you were there when that event happened, you don’t need to be 
bothered with it. You know, “We’re [QRM] going to take it over. We’re going to 
handle it. We’re going to manage it,” and a lot of it is just putting the spin on it, 
how we’re going to describe it and that kind of stuff, so people who were hands-
on to it, were never kept in the loop. 
 
This program leader reported that in her experience, “people say … they really felt that 
they were intentionally cut out of it [the investigation] because the experts were called in 
to handle it so, [their] involvement was ignored, and [their] worries [were ignored].” In 
her experience staff were told “Well, we’ll get in touch with you if we need you,” but her 
understanding of the meaning of such statements was, “If we need you to give us more 
information for our sake or we need someone to blame it on.”  
She stated “the creation of the Quality and Risk Management department has 
produced a further separation [emphasis added] between the event and the people 
involved, including the manager.” In the process of expansion of the QRM department 
and centralizing the responsibility for the adverse event management processes into the 
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QRM department, staff perceive that the adverse event is managed away from the 
program and away from the staff and manager who were originally involved. I believe 
this move away from the program is what the program leader refers to as “separation.” 
This perception of separation has staff and managers, in the words of this program leader, 
experiencing “worry and torment” and “loss” in terms of involvement in the adverse 
event process. The activity that occurs as a result of the QRM role in the adverse event 
process, which the staff do not participate in, contributes in large part to the storm that 
surrounds the second victim. 
The program leader reported that staff feel that the QRM program staff took the 
investigation of the event away from the people most directly involved and only asked for 
input when information was needed for the sake of the organization – to protect the 
organization, or if the organization needed someone to blame. As well the program leader 
described the staff’s perception that the QRM program was “putting a spin on it,” when 
referring to the way in which adverse events were described, a statement that indicated 
the staff’s belief that the description would not necessarily be an accurate portrayal of the 
event. The perceptions of the QRM program described in this section demonstrate how a 
program intended to be a support program specifically for the purpose of managing 
adverse events alongside the program leadership team can be redefined based on the 
experience of staff.  
It was communicated to me when I started as a Quality Clinical Safety Leader 
within the laboratory medicine program that staff had the perception that the QRM 
program had not been acting in a supportive manner. A laboratory leader went on to 
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describe the experience of working with my Quality Clinical Safety Leader style of 
investigation, one that I refer to as “collaborative incident analysis”: 
What we had when you came on-board, it was … different … there was no 
reactionary kind of mode to it or tenseness. It was all about, examining the facts 
as they are, and then we’ll get to some point to find out exactly … we might never 
find out exactly what a root cause for something was, but at least, we all sit down. 
We examine all the different facets and, helping us think through that.  
The laboratory leader recommended sharing the model that I was using within the 
laboratory medicine program. 
The opportunity to integrate knowledge about the outcome of an event weighs 
heavily in the experience of an adverse event for a staff member. Equally important is the 
opportunity to be informed about the management and organizational response to the 
event. The role of QRM in analysing and reviewing each event, facilitating a system view 
and sharing that analysis back to involved staff, is important for ongoing engagement in 
patient safety. I believe staff who are making an effort to follow the organizational 
expectations and report adverse events are not aware of how their efforts are contributing 
to patient safety when the decisions and learnings of the organization are not shared.   
6.4 A Reflection of ER/PR 
The experience of the organization in adverse events since ER/PR continued to be 
reminiscent of the experiences of the staff during ER/PR. Although the organization was 
now responding to events in a much more prescriptive manner, one participant described 
how “management are still reacting the same way they’ve always [done].” Despite 
policies that describe a desire to view all events from a systemic perspective, the 
overwhelming impression by health care providers that I spoke with was that there 
continued to be staff who were penalized for events that were described as systemic or 
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“honest mistakes.” Management and organizational leaders reported that staff are no 
longer afraid to report and that staff enjoy the processes of quality case review and 
quality rounds; and yet, when staff had the opportunity to speak anonymously within a 
survey or candidly within this study, they reported that fear still exists and reporting 
remains difficult.  
The experiences reported to this point describe the perspective of the second 
victim. Many participants also described their impression of how other staff would be 
expected to experience adverse events. This next section gives voice to how participants 
perceive the experience of others in adverse events. 
6.5 ‘Othering’ Adverse Events 
 It was common in the narratives of this study to encounter perceptions -- and 
often misunderstandings -- about how others experience adverse events. The others, for 
example, may be other disciplines, other specialties or other programs. It was common 
for informants to describe adverse events as more significant, stressful or traumatic from 
their disciplines’ vantage point or based on their own specialties’ limitations in resolving 
the issue. The experience and perception of the adverse event seemed to depend on who 
else was involved and the response of those others. 
A physician in a medical sub-specialty described his perception that other 
specialties (that is, specialties other than his own) were less impacted by adverse events, 
because the events were perceived as expected and therefore less significant. For example 
he described his perception of surgery as potentially dealing better with adverse events 
since they expected adverse events or they were able to correct their incidents without 
anyone knowing about it. By contrast, he described how in his speciality his perception 
213 
 
was that, “we might be a bit wound up more tightly about adverse events than our 
surgical colleagues.” His perception was that a surgeon would say, “That was a potential 
outcome and it was on the consent and we move on.” He also made the distinction that a 
surgeon could keep adverse events confidential, whereas a physician in a medical 
specialty could not repair the problem and would therefore have to request the help of a 
surgeon to intervene, thereby exposing him- or herself by revealing the adverse event: 
I don’t do surgery so I can’t deal with a complication that comes up in one of my 
patients. I have to rely on someone else to deal with that complication … so then 
someone else knows your mistake. … I don’t even want to call it a mistake. … 
They can know about your complication and what happened, whereas if a surgical 
colleague does the same procedure and there is a complication, they take them to 
the operating room and they fix it themselves. … [Y]ou’re not airing your dirty 
laundry out to everyone.  
Although it appeared that the physician was describing the benefit of being able to keep 
adverse events confidential, he described the constraint of medicine having to involve 
surgery as a possible benefit, as it forced reporting and created a quality assurance 
environment.  
In turn, I asked a surgeon to describe the stress of the responsibility of surgery and 
the feelings associated with an adverse event, so that I could compare it with the 
perception of the physician in a medical sub-specialty: 
The buck really stops when the surgery doesn’t go right with the surgeon. … If 
you perforate something … you’re the one that was working on it, and you always 
carry that … you don’t have an unloading. … “Well, the medication didn’t work” 
or “The disease was too severe.” … I think there’s a degree of burden there that 
you carry…. in your physical … manual dexterity skills, and that’s a very visceral 
thing; and when it doesn’t go completely as it should, there’s absolutely no one 
[to blame]. … It’s your patient. You are the one replacing the left hip. You made 
the incision on the wrong side. 
214 
 
Describing the feeling when something goes wrong in the OR, the surgeon stated “you 
get this kind of sick-to-your-stomach feeling or … I’d use words way worse than ‘bad 
feeling,’ but that’s the reality of it.” The surgeon described the dynamic of returning to 
the OR after an adverse event: 
You have to … this is done; this is over, and there’s another one and you’ve got to 
try to distance [yourself]. I’m not saying it’s easy. I’m not saying we all do it as 
well or as good as we could, but we try to. 
I decided to clarify, with a second surgeon, the impression by the physician in a medical 
sub-specialty (described above) that surgeons are not significantly affected by adverse 
events. The second surgeon responded: 
Man, people have the wrong idea about us, don’t they? No. Nooo, it’s not just 
another day. We always strive to never have a complication. I mean … at least 
that’s what we all do as surgeons. We all aim to never have a complication, and 
you can’t possibly meet that expectation, but you have to try…. That’s what 
makes it stressful, because it’s kind of an unattainable goal. Which is why you 
wake up at night sometimes. … Things are swirling around.  
 
A program manager described the perception that nurses held of physician 
engagement following an adverse event when a quality round was undertaken to examine 
the event. She highlighted what she described as “a little division, which is historical,” 
referring to the division between nursing and medicine.   
None of the physicians came to the quality rounds so they [nursing staff] feel that 
they’re not engaged. So the physicians are not engaged with the staff on that level, 
which is frustrating for the staff. So they get support from their nurse colleagues, 
but not their physician colleagues…. So that’s difficult on their part [nursing 
staff], and [it] is not for lack of asking the physician group to be included, but it’s 
just a little division, which is historical. 
I believe that the othering of adverse events and the lack of insight into the perspectives 
of other disciplines and specialties is a reflection of the separation between disciplines 
both from an educational perspective and a practice perspective. It appears from the 
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accounts of participants that a portion of the distress experienced within the adverse event 
process may be due to some individuals misunderstanding each other’s roles and 
responsibilities. 
6.6 The Legacy of ER/PR 
It is clear from the experiences described and analysed within these last two 
chapters that the experience of an adverse event can be a very personal event, a group 
event and even an organizational event. In Chapter 5, the experience of ER/PR was 
examined. Health care providers’ accounts emphasized the feeling that individuals were 
assigned responsibility and culpability for that large scale adverse event. In this chapter 
(Chapter 6) the experiences of adverse events in more recent years were examined from 
the perspectives of second victims, including those far removed from a particular event 
and its management. The narratives of experiences of second victims illustrates strongly 
that the legacy of ER/PR continues to shape current experiences of adverse events in 
Eastern Health. The commonalities across experiences and over time provide solid 
ground to describe the second victim phenomenon as experienced in Eastern Health, an 
experience that may be easily applied to other health care settings in other organizations.  
There are a number of key findings that remain important as this discussion 
moves forward. The experience for second victims begins when the adverse event is 
recognized and often involves shock, denial and the need to convince colleagues that an 
event has happened and is reportable. The response of an individual depends on their past 
experience with adverse events; but without exception, staff reported feeling traumatized 
and having difficulty providing effective care immediately following the event. The 
potential harm to patients was evident when resistance to report due to possible punitive 
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outcomes for staff created a non-reporting culture. All staff reported the need for support 
at the time of adverse events, but the limitations and conflicts that managers face in trying 
to provide support, with competing demands within the investigator role, make it very 
difficult to accomplish. Directors identified the importance of support mechanisms, 
however participant accounts indicated that there does not appear to be a solid 
organizational plan in place to provide support. Staff who shared in the anonymous 
survey about their comfort in reporting described how the fear and difficulty of reporting 
remain. Managers reported having to participate in disciplinary processes in which staff 
face punitive outcomes for system issues. And finally, the descriptions of adverse events 
by staff and management are incongruent. A key observation from the experiences of 
these participants is that the way in which ER/PR emphasized individual culpability at the 
expense of a system-wide consideration, shaped and continues to shape adverse event 
experiences within Eastern Health. 
In the next and final analysis chapter I will describe the key features of adverse 
events -- specifically, support, blame and powerlessness -- that define the experience of 
being a second victim.    
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CHAPTER 7 
Experiencing Adverse Events: Key Features  
The adverse event experience is characterized by some key features that shaped 
the experience for the second victims of adverse events who participated in this study and 
allowed them to integrate knowledge gained from the experience into their practice. This 
chapter examines three key features shaping the experience of second victims of adverse 
events: (1) support; (2) blame; and (3) powerlessness. I will examine each of these three 
key features in turn. How these features were experienced in a positive or negative way 
was unique to each individual person and each event. In what follows, I examine the 
perception of support, since the importance of support as a definer of the experience of 
second victims has been named or described by most participants.   
7.1 Support 
Support can be categorized as occurring at three important points in time within 
the adverse event experience: prior to the event in the form of anticipatory support, 
support at the time of identification or reporting of the event, and support in the aftermath 
of the adverse event that includes the period from the beginning of the investigation to the 
final outcome. Support, or the absence of support, is a key feature shaping the experience 
of second victims in adverse events in this study. The work required by staff to realize 
support is very informative of the culture and relations of power within the organization. 
Support was described by study participants from the perspective of the person being 
supported and the person supporting; it includes perceptions of sources of support and 
perceptions of a need for support. The experience of being supported or not being 
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supported, the role of the supporter in the experience and the role of the organization in 
support are each, then, important considerations. Support will be examined in five 
different ways: the perspective of the person experiencing being supported or not being 
supported, in this case, the second victim; the role of the supporter; the role of the 
organization in providing support; support seeking behaviour and finally, planning for 
support. 
7.1.1 The Experience of Being Supported or Not Being Supported 
A senior nurse recalled her experience of support and her perception that nurses 
“today” are not getting support from management: 
You supported yourself and carried on. I think nurses are more vocal than we 
were. … We put up and shut up, because it was a culture, and I think today staff 
support each other more because they don’t get support from above.  
A nurse who worked permanent night shifts described the lack of support she had 
received in the past, a pattern that she expected to continue in the future:   
No, not at all – not at all – and I do nights, so there’s no supervisor there; but I 
don’t think if I was there in the daytime that [manager] would come up to me and 
say, “Are you okay? Is this bothering you? Do you want to talk about it? Can I get 
somebody?” No, I’ve never heard of it happening, not on any floor. 
A physician described the experience of being responsible in the care of a patient 
who died unexpectedly and was so traumatized that her own safety was at risk as she 
drove home: 
I was involved in a major event … a death … it was incredibly traumatic. I 
remember leaving the hospital … and going through a red light and almost getting 
[into a car accident] because I was just in another world, thinking about what had 
happened.  
The perception she had was that the nursing staff were well supported in the event but the 
physicians (staff physician and resident) were alone: 
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[T]here was support on the floor for the nursing staff. … There was a lot of 
support around the nurse and nurses who were involved … grief counsellors … 
and I remember myself … and the resident we just kind of clung together because 
there wasn’t anything … there was the Employee Assistance Program … but, at 
that point, I didn’t even know that existed. 
 
She was disappointed by the response of colleagues; she recalled:  
A lot of other physicians were aware of what happened … and it was like, “Ah, 
don’t worry about it; you won’t get sued,” and I was, like, “Well, that’s kind of 
the least of my worries right now,” and it took a long, long, long time to get over 
it. 
She described her own self-reflection at the time, as she wondered whether everything 
that could or should have been done was done: “you had to ask yourself – was there 
anything I could’ve done differently, that this wouldn’t have happened.” In addition she 
described her impression that if she had had someone to discuss the events with, “to talk 
it through” and talk about her feelings, the outcome for her may have been different. 
Unfortunately she did not receive the support of her physician colleagues, as their 
primary concern and focus was on litigation and not feelings or processing of the events.  
[T]here was … one or two physicians … their focus was on – is there going to be 
a suit – which was not my primary concern; but, still, that was where the 
conversation started and ended, they didn’t want to hear about my feelings (uses 
sarcastic tone for emphasis)… when I thought it through … obsessively for about 
a year or more afterwards, there wasn’t a whole lot I could’ve done differently. I 
don’t think I could’ve done anything differently. 
One physician, who had the experience of not having anyone to talk to following 
an adverse event, reflected on providing support to a colleague related to another event: 
I had looked after a patient who was subsequently transferred to another 
physician, and then subsequent to that died relatively unexpectedly, and the 
physician who was involved was distressed, and, I made sure … that I would talk 
to him on a regular basis about it because he knew I knew. 
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In this circumstance, the physician felt comfortable offering peer support because of her 
prior involvement with the case and the pre-existing friendly relationship with the 
physician in question. She reported that if the situation had been different, there would 
not have been the same opportunity to offer support and quite possibly the support would 
not have been welcomed. She described the importance of peer support for reducing the 
feeling of being the only person to have ever been involved in harm to a patient: 
There would need to be a peer support that would make you feel less like you 
were the only person in the world that had done something or been involved in 
something that resulted in somebody’s harm … in harm to somebody, and … 
because there’s a shame associated with it too, if you think you are actually 
culpable. 
When examining sources of support for physicians, a physician clinical chief 
suggested that while the organization believes that the Quality Clinical Safety Leader in 
the Quality and Risk Management (QRM) program should be a source of support, 
physicians may perceive that the QRM department is organizational and therefore not a 
potential support to the physician: 
You don’t think of the organization protecting your interests. Therefore, I think 
there’d be some … even if they knew that’s who you’re supposed to call, there’d 
be some reluctance to call. They’re associated with the organization. 
Another physician clinical chief described requests for support from staff in his program 
and the reactionary nature of managing events. He expressed his belief that staff just want 
the event to go away: 
The support thing has been more of a reactionary thing. There’s a complaint 
lodged and I have to deal with it. As far as offering support … emotional support 
kind of things, not much. I think it’s something that’s needed and necessary, but I 
think for the most part it’s usually that adverse events have a degree of 
embarrassment or humility associated with them, that they just want to make it go 
away and not have it happen again. 
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As well, he described a lack of formalized preparation to provide any type of support, 
although he alluded to hoping to have something to offer from his personal resources: 
I have no training in it. I mean, just... like, most of the stuff in this job is just 
hoping you’ve got something to offer because it’s not really a job you’re trained 
for. You know, you spend decades in school learning how to do something, but... 
This wasn’t part of it. 
Exploring the source of support as a potentially important determinant of the 
adverse event experience, a surgeon stated that he gets the best support from “somebody 
who has the same expertise.” This surgeon explained that although other people, 
including family members, try to be supportive, it is not entirely helpful because of their 
lack of insider knowledge: “it didn’t mean anything coming from [spouse] because she 
had no idea.” For him, it was important that the person providing support understand the 
specific experience: 
She’s never … held anybody’s life in her hands either, which we do all the time 
without … not without thinking about it, but because you do it all the time it 
becomes your job. It’s what you do, right; and it’s only when you lose one you 
think, “Oh my god.”  
 
He described receiving support from colleagues with the same expertise: 
[Colleague] said … “You sounded upset. You don’t normally sound upset. … I 
was worried.” … It was good … he went through it first … it’s funny, he knows. 
He went through the detail with me first. He said, “So tell me about that day. Tell 
me about the patient. Tell me what happened. Tell me. You know, did you do 
this? Did you do that? Is that your normal? Is that your routine? Is this the way it 
normally goes?” … That made me feel better. It did.  
He reported on a similar approach taken by a second colleague: 
He said … take it apart. “Is there anything you would’ve done differently, 
anything you would’ve changed?” He had called me to see how things were 
going, if I was okay. 
He described providing support to this second colleague in an earlier incident involving 
the colleague’s patient:  
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I had had to do the same thing for him. … We talked about it, and he said a couple 
of things and I think he feels he can come to me with that stuff. We talk it 
through.  
The surgeon reinforced the importance of having support provided by someone 
who has the same expertise and understands the specific situation:  
Again, it’s the same thing, right – somebody who knows what you do. You talk 
through the detail. You need someone who understands and knows the surgery, 
we talk about it, sometimes you just need to talk about it, and we do.  
A laboratory staff member described her perception of receiving support, when asked 
“Who do you turn to or where do you turn to get support at the time of an occurrence.” 
She responded, “Just amongst ourselves, really, and our manager. I mean, [manager 
name] was a really good support.” A nurse working in a general medicine area described 
the support she received from her manager and others at the time of an adverse event, one 
that had been reported by the media: 
[Name of manager] was good. [Name of manager] was around a lot at that time 
because, obviously, when you need her she’s there then; and what I mean by that 
is when we needed support, she was readily available there for us. … She’s the 
one who got us all together, discussed it all with us. 
When asked if the manager’s support was unusual she stated, “No, it was just a natural 
part of her regular support to us. I would say it’s natural because we’ve had a few issues. 
It coincided with other issues on the floor.” A pharmacy staff member reported that she 
receives support from her co-workers, people with whom she has a long-term relationship 
and who understand the work: 
There are four of us [co-workers]… we tend to talk to each other. … So you build 
a relationship with someone you trust… we do the exact same thing… for us it 
works, I think because if we’re crooked we know. It’s a mutual understanding.  
One of the limitations some health care providers expressed in the context of 
seeking support was the nature of information that was often highly confidential. A nurse 
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described the difficulty in getting support, “You kind of can’t go and talk about your day 
at home to your spouse or your friend or whatever, so you kind of got to talk about it 
there [at work] or when you come back [to work].” She further described the discomfort 
created when confidential information limited her opportunity to share her feelings: 
You go home sometimes and something bothered you … like, the other day there 
was a [patient] … [who] has a lot of deficits, … all that night I was thinking 
about, that [patient], but there was nobody I could talk to or tell, but then the next 
day I went back and I was, like, “My god, I can’t get that [patient] out of my mind 
from yesterday. I feel so bad for her and her mother,” … I had to bring it up again 
because, if not, it would’ve eaten away at me. 
 
She also described the reduction in stress which resulted when she was able to discuss her 
feelings with a colleague who knew the patient: “that nurse had looked after the [patient] 
as well … so we just sort of had a little conversation about it, and now it’s kind of … the 
stress is a little bit gone.” 
A nurse described another nurse getting support in the context of a team of trusted 
nursing staff, well known to each other:  
What [name] had going for her was that there was a half dozen of us who have 
been there, who may not have made a potentially fatal error, but … I’ve made a 
med error and my gut sinks, “Damn it,” … I think if I was working with 
somebody who I didn’t know or trust … I don’t think I’d be able to open up and 
discuss it. [E]ach one of us acknowledged, “It could’ve been me this morning.” It 
could’ve been anybody, but I think she’s very well supported, but it bothered her, 
it stayed with her.  
This particular nurse who had received support was described as someone who became 
an advocate for policy change: 
She’s … the proponent of these changes in policy, she’s the one who will remind 
you, “Look, you have to check this.” Not just … “Don’t just give me an eyeball 
on the way past. I want you to see this,” and that’s a good thing. It made her hyper 
vigilant.  
Others described getting support from friends and family: 
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I’ll say to my husband, “I need to talk about this.” I think I do it more home. I just 
say to him, “Now, I don’t expect you to solve this or have any answers” You can’t 
fix it, so I’ll just say, “I just need to vent.”  
I have a couple of really, really, really close friends that … we may get together 
for a drink or something, and then I’ll say, “This happened at work,” and I find I 
[share] … more … outside of work.  
Well, they’re not nurses. They’re not medical people at all, and sometimes I think 
you’re almost better off there because you just [talk] and they just say, “Oh that 
was terrible” or something like that. 
Other nurses described how trying to share feelings at work tended to result in negativity 
and less than helpful outcomes: 
At work you sit at your coffee break and everybody vents and you don’t feel any 
better afterwards. I think it’s too much negativity. 
[Y]ou do it at work as well, but I guess I don’t know that I expect support from 
my colleagues. I think they just listen and then they say, “Oh yes, this person is an 
idiot” … which … really, that’s not the answer. … I think there is no answer. 
Like, not in the system that we have right now, there is no answer.  
A nurse in the role of program leader explained that although the program had 
several mechanisms in place to support other staff and families, it was not usual to 
provide support to staff within her own program:   
If we feel that [other] staff are upset about something, we’ll get ethics involved, 
and we … offer counselling. We’ll direct families towards grief sessions … but 
we never look after ourselves. We always say, “If after seven days you’re still 
crying, get some help.” We bounce it off each other. We rely on each other. 
She further described the way that stress was translated to the family environment: 
You know, there is a stress involved, and … everybody knows that after you … 
go through a process that’s stressful like that, whether or not there’s an adverse 
reaction, we may be a little bit more bitchy. We tell our families and they now 
know … that we will go home and probably take it out on our families.  
In some scenarios, staff colleagues take the approach that an incident shouldn’t 
bother the person. If colleagues do not recognize the event as troublesome for a staff 
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member it is unlikely that they will provide support. A nurse explained the responses that 
she had observed toward someone involved in an adverse incident:  
“You’re crazy; get over it,” or, maybe she’s got one colleague who’s kind of a 
little bit supportive. Maybe she’s got, a manager whose, like, “Suck it up, 
buttercup,” and to us maybe she was totally overreacting. 
One nurse acknowledged the importance of recognizing that individuals will respond 
differently and that the need for support is potentially missed when someone is not 
present during the incident but self identifies as a second victim: 
[W]e have to keep remembering that her reaction is her reaction, and that’s what 
we had to deal with, and, it’s the same thing … you may be missing somebody 
who … you think, “she must be fine about that. She wasn’t even there.”  
The perspective of giving and receiving support across disciplines was described 
by a senior nurse as limited by the realities of self-protective behaviours and trust:   
Sometimes … the residents will [share their frustrations] … they’ll get a bit of 
support … from the nurses. You may get some verbal support from the residents 
… at 3 o’clock in the morning and we’re all having coffee, but I think the nurses 
know very well that … although the residents might seem supportive, they would 
very quickly hang you out to dry if a situation arose where they needed to save 
their hide, so I think there’s a lack of trust. 
A physician described the process of seeking support, “Well, you’re going to talk to 
somebody who’s going to be compassionate. Choose carefully. … I mean, you pick who 
you talk to.” He recalled getting support from another colleague in a different profession, 
in this instance, a nursing colleague. He described the support as a form of reassurance, 
“this has happened and it’s unfortunate, but it does happen.”   
A physician claimed that someone who had experienced a complication or 
adverse event was more likely to be sought out for support: “You’d feel more 
comfortable talking about it to someone who is sympathetic because they’ve been in the 
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same boat.” Another possibility for support from colleagues in some organizations is 
Morbidity and Mortality rounds.68 One physician clinical chief expressed the opinion that 
Morbidity and Mortality rounds do not happen in Eastern Health due to “the concern for 
litigation,” but also wondered if the absence of such rounds was due to “difficulty 
acknowledging adverse events.” Another physician similarly described his experience 
with Morbidity and Mortality rounds and how he and his colleagues managed the need 
for collaboration and support: 
So there are presentations of complex cases, and that would be probably as close 
to Morbidity and Mortality rounds that you’d see in [sub-specialty] medicine. … I 
have one colleague who I’m very close with, so we talk about … so when I have a 
complication that comes up … I’ll often run it by him, so we have like our own 
personal mini [Morbidity and Mortality rounds] … but I can’t say I feel 
comfortable talking to all my colleagues about that.  
Similarly, another physician suggested that, in his speciality, to contemplate discussing 
an adverse event, the person would need to acknowledge that it occurred (“the whole idea 
[of] not wanting to acknowledge the adverse events”). This physician explained that in 
his speciality “we sit down and tell people, ‘You could have a complication by having a 
[procedure],’ but most people think, ‘Well, it’s really rare that it’s going to happen.’ ” His 
view is that the surgical program is more open about adverse events because they are 
expected to happen. As he described it, “there’s a floor full of people … who have just 
                                                 
68 “Morbidity and mortality (M&M) conferences are considered to be powerful 
opportunities for learning and reflection. Traditionally, the goal of M&M conferences is 
to provide a forum for faculty and trainees to explore the management details of 
particular cases wherein morbidity or mortality occurred. In carefully reviewing the 
records and specifics of care, a primary goal of these sessions is to revisit errors to gain 
insight without blame or derision” (Kravet, Howell, & Wright, 2006, p. 1192). 
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had surgery who got complications and abscesses and their wound breaks down … that 
happens and they [surgeons] deal with it and move on.”  
Reflecting on seeking support to cope with a stressful situation when the 
outcomes for a patient are not ideal, a physician confirmed that she was not necessarily 
looking for content expertise when looking for support:  
Someone who understands medicine … and doesn’t necessarily know the 
expertise of my area … of my particular specialty … but understands the stress of 
having an unhappy [patient or] family. One of my [close colleagues] and I have 
offices [that] are quite close to each other, so that sort of helps to facilitate these 
kinds of conversations. 
A laboratory staff member described the response of her and her colleagues at the time of 
an adverse event: 
We talk amongst ourselves. … I wouldn’t say we share out[side the department] 
… anything that’s happening to us … out to other labs or anything … we seem to 
be … containing it to [our] own area. 
The importance of debriefing following adverse events was emphasized by many. 
A physician clinical chief described support in the form of debriefing following a 
particular adverse event, “everyone really … the bedside nurse … and the nurses in the 
[department] and the nurse in charge and the nurse manager and the house staff who were 
involved, so it was very unique and very interesting.” This physician explained that the 
staff didn’t recognize the nurse’s distress until the actual debriefing:  
She was fluent and able to communicate her concerns; and I think, with talking 
and discussing and interacting and reassurance. There was no blame. You know, 
she hadn’t been negligent in her duties. She hadn’t overlooked anything, and I 
think she did believe us when we said, “Look, you really could not have headed 
this off. You couldn’t have recognized it. Remember, we were all around you. No 
one else saw it either.”  
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A nurse provided a thorough description of what an effective debriefing would consist of 
from her perspective, noting that this was not happening on her unit. She stated that the 
debriefing should involve all key players, including the anaesthetist, specialist, resident, 
and nurses. It should be led by the specialist, who should open the discussion with a 
general question about whether anyone present feels that something could have been 
done differently. She stressed that all those present should be given the opportunity to put 
forward suggestions:   
“This is how we could do it differently”; and if there were some system errors, 
you could say … “how can we improve that?” … [I]f the person leading it is 
good, you could work it into something where everybody learns from it, and we 
could do this better next time.  
A nurse, with many years of experience, described her view of the limitations of 
debriefing with organizational leadership. She believed that if debriefing were to be done 
by management that it would turn into a review of the process rather than being a support 
mechanism: 
I think we do a fairly good job. Between ourselves. Nurse to nurse, I think if we 
did have a formal debriefing with management I think it would turn into a 
discussion of process. “Did we do this right? Are you feeling poorly because you 
don’t think you did as well as you should? Do you think you were off on your 
CPR count?” I think it would turn into, an evaluation more so than, a supportive 
conversation.  
She offered her experience of not seeing support being offered by the organization but 
acknowledged that she had never specifically asked for support: 
No, I don’t see it, but I’ve never seen Eastern Health be emotionally supportive, 
and you know what, it may be there if I went looking for it. If I went to my nurse 
manager after that event and said, “You know what, this is bothersome” … I don’t 
know what’s out there. Maybe doors would open. Maybe it’s just me having to go 
and look for it, but it’s never been offered and I’ve never seen it. 
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Collectively, participants described their experience or vision of effective support 
as a prompt, respectful, voluntary and supportive venture that does not involve collecting 
information and is not part of any further inquiry. Some participants described the 
experience of receiving support while many others, in the recollections above, described 
not having the experience of receiving the type of support that would have assisted them 
after an adverse event. Having examined the experience of being supported, and not 
being supported, the role of the supporter is the next logical facet to be examined within 
the experience of the second victim.  
7.1.2 The Role of Supporter 
Whether or not the need for support was identified by a potential supporter was a 
critical determinant in whether or not the role of supporter was filled. A nurse described 
this dynamic: 
You may not be [supported] and you'll hear one nurse alongside another nurse 
say, “Oh, don’t let that bother you. That’s no big deal.” It might’ve been a 
medication error where the person was a diabetic and you just gave them twice 
the amount of insulin that they should’ve gotten and one nurse may say, “That’s 
no big deal. He’ll be fine,” and walk away as if that’s a non-event.  
 
Another nurse, describing how a medication error identical to the one described above 
had occurred with no harm to the patient, cried; this was three years later. She stated she 
had never really gotten an opportunity to talk about it because it was dismissed by her 
colleagues as a non-event.  
When an event is acknowledged as worthy of attention, the response of supporters 
and support mechanisms will provide a potentially different outcome for the individuals 
involved. A nurse manager described her willingness to have a counselling professional 
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come in and speak to staff, but also emphasized her own “open door” policy for 
managing stressful staff situations: 
My door is always open. Anyone wants to talk, I’m always here. The other staff, I 
went to each of them individually who were involved and spoke to them all. “Are 
you okay?” “Is there anything I can do?” “Anything you need?” “Anyone you 
want to talk to?”  
A pharmacy program leader described her approach when she provided support to staff: 
They do talk within themselves, and some of them will come and ask us for 
support, or I try to volunteer if they’re having an issue; or if I walk by them and I 
see someone who is upset, I’ll look at them and say, “Are you okay?” “Do you 
need to talk?” … A lot of times they use each other for support … once a week 
they’ll use 10, 15 minutes to talk out a situation that’s happened or … to see if 
they can fix it or come to a conclusion how to fix it, and then we try to help 
implement it. 
The role of supporter may be defined in part by the potential supporter’s 
experience of having been supported. A laboratory manager described the approach she 
took to provide support to front-line staff. She had worked with supportive managers, and 
she drew on those experiences when managing staff distress during events when large 
numbers of samples were being repeated by her own staff: 
I’m there in the background, so if they want to talk about it … I probably stayed, 
like, until 6:00 or 7:00. I probably went home, got something to eat, changed, and 
I came back then like until probably 10:00 or so. … I just wanted to let them 
know that I had their back and, even if it was just sort of an emotional support. 
A pharmacy program leader described providing “anticipatory support.” Prior to 
investigating an adverse event, she would approach anyone that she knew was directly 
involved and provide them with support before sending an email informing all staff about 
the occurrence.  
If I know the exact person I speak to them before I send the email. … I want them 
to know beforehand so they don’t read it and go, “She’s blaming me for that.”  
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Sometimes staff would offer support to someone who they did not normally have a 
relationship with. A nurse coordinator recalled such an incident:  
I went up to ICU the other day, and it was the younger nurse who had looked after 
[name], so afterwards I said, “I know that was really rough and it was a lot to it, 
but you did a really good job,” and she turned around and hugged me, and I didn’t 
know this girl. 
The role of supporter appeared to be able to be played by individuals in varying 
relationships with the person receiving the support. The important determination of the 
effectiveness of support is reported as openness to receive support and willingness on the 
part of the supporter to provide it. Having considered the experience of an individual 
receiving support and the role of individuals in providing support, we now turn to 
examine the role of the organization in support.  
7.1.3 The Role of the Organization in Support 
The role of the organization in providing support depends on whether individuals 
identify a need for support, whether the need for support is recognized and confirmed by 
others (including management and organizational leaders), and whether sources of 
support are available. The role of an organization in providing support is often refined 
over years of identifying the need for support and the role support plays in health care 
provider coping. For Eastern Health, the history of amalgamation has played a key role in 
shaping the provision of support. When the legacy boards in Eastern NL amalgamated in 
2005 and became one organization (Eastern Health), the policies that existed were no 
longer in effect. According to a leader in the QRM program, the removal of policies 
resulted in the elimination of previously existing support mechanisms, and resulted in the 
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need for program directors to bridge this gap. A QRM program leader69 related her 
impression that everything that any of the health boards had done before amalgamation, 
including any policies, was “out the window” -- “We were starting from scratch, and so 
we weren’t continuing to build on where we were.” She further described the critical 
incident debriefing process that was in place in 2003/2004 and how, in her words, it 
“dissolved”: 
There was a set group of people throughout the Health Care Corp[oration] that 
were trained as critical incident stress de-briefers … they were a team and they 
were on call. So if something happened you could call one of those team 
members. … I saw it work really well. … But that drifted away because that team 
drifted away. It just dissolved and went by the wayside. We didn’t have that 
resource anymore. So then it was all dependent on the program director. 
She also reflected on the quality of the support resources available to staff in the current 
organization. “Inconsistent is the biggest thing I find, and inconsistent is not enough, and 
I can’t say whether or not... like, employee and family assistance program and all that, 
whether or not that’s going down the route of being helpful.” A management staff 
member recalled her personal experience of receiving inadequate support following an 
adverse event in the current model: “being on the other side and seeing what resources 
were given me -- it’s like that didn’t even touch anything.” 
A nursing program manager explained that support and debriefing are most often 
organized by the management of the impacted program or, at the very least, with the 
approval of the program management. The determination of who is appropriate to be 
                                                 
69 I use the term “program leader” or “leader in the QRM program” for the QRM staff to 
avoid participants being identifiable, since there are individuals who hold a specific title. 
The term program leader for QRM is inclusive of Quality Clinical Safety Leaders, 
Managers and Directors. 
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included is usually the decision of the manager and director, and occasionally that of the 
Vice President. Although other individuals who self-identify as wanting to be included 
may be welcome, they may not be aware of the availability of organized support or 
debriefing. Providers of supportive interventions with whom I spoke, including staff in 
pastoral care and the employee assistance program, reported that the availability of 
support is not widely advertised when an adverse event happens and so therefore uptake 
is less than what is desirable from the perspectives of both managers and front-line staff. 
In a very significant adverse event at the children’s hospital, a staff member who had 
been very involved in supporting staff throughout the event recalled that he had not been 
invited to a debriefing, similar to the physician who described not receiving support when 
the nurses seemed to have been well supported. He recalled, “They had a debriefing, but I 
wasn’t included. I just thought I would’ve been considered, you know, I was there the 
whole time.” The description by the providers of support and this recollection by a staff 
member demonstrate two very different reasons for staff not availing of support. Low 
uptake can happen when the staff member is not aware an intervention is happening. Low 
uptake can also be the result of the staff person not being invited when the people 
providing the invites didn’t know that this person needed support.  
Several participants identified the importance of including everyone who felt the 
need, meaning that the opportunity needed to be widely offered:  
How wide are we casting the net … because a lot of times people’s response is 
very individual; and while I may look at you and think, “Why would that bother 
you; you were barely there,” maybe we’re casting our net and we’re catching who 
was in the room that day, but are we not catching the physiotherapist who dealt 
with this patient every day for a month, who wasn’t there that day, who was 
maybe off that week, but, I think everybody should be offered the opportunity. 
234 
 
A senior nurse, when asked what support mechanisms are built into the process of 
dealing with the aftermath of an adverse event experience, replied that in her opinion 
there are no supports: “They [referring to Eastern Health] don’t [provide support]. They 
do not, exclamation point.”  
This statement is very strident and accusatory in relation to the organization. It is 
important to note that while this sentiment was widely shared by the participants in this 
study, this study does not capture the voices of those who did not require support because 
they were not traumatized by second victim experiences. The focus of the study was the 
experiences of second victims of adverse events. Participants in this study are those who 
continued to feel traumatized (that is, those who are “second victims”). By contrast, those 
who experienced an adverse event but did not come forward to participate in this study 
may have felt adequately supported by the organization; or they may have felt that they 
had adequate support from elsewhere and therefore did not need formal support provided 
by the organization.  
A nurse who was among the ‘indirectly involved’ second victims of an adverse 
event, described being given the directive to attend a child’s funeral, an activity viewed 
by the organizational leadership as a supportive way to respond to staff distress. She 
recalled that there was no discussion about the desire to attend the funeral with those who 
were directed to participate. In this case the intervention seemed to reflect an 
organizational leader’s mistaken perception of what support would involve: 
We had a child arrest. I was told the best thing I could do was to go to the funeral. 
I went. I didn’t think I should be there. I didn’t know the family. I didn’t know the 
child. I felt like a fish out of water, but … everybody who was on shift that day 
went. The doctors, the nurses. I think administrative staff of the hospital actually 
went.  
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She further described her experience of attending the child’s funeral, an activity that she 
perceived the organization thought would be helpful: 
It was not helpful to me. I don’t think I needed to see the family suffering. I didn’t 
need to see the grandma and the little cousins who were, four and five years old 
who were absolutely devastated. Aunts and uncles … the mother’s best friend … 
everyone – I mean, it was just terrible, the most horrible thing ever, but I didn’t 
need to see that. That stayed with me and it didn’t give me closure.  
The nurse recalled the feelings and perceptions she experienced during the funeral: 
God bless this little child, but I didn’t know her. I didn’t need to say goodbye and, 
again, I didn’t need to see the family suffering … I felt out of place. I kind of felt 
like they were saying, “Who are all these people and why are they [here]” … this 
row of seats in the back, and it stayed with me. We were told, “You really should 
go. You need to be there.” I think it was probably out of respect for the family that 
maybe we’d be there – that, we were still supporting them; we were still doing all 
we could for them.  
She described how her preference would have been a chance to debrief, an opportunity 
that was never given:  
I would’ve liked some kind of a debriefing, a post-incident … I think we all 
should’ve been able to talk about. … I think we all should’ve been able to talk 
about that, people’s grief reactions and … no opportunity, never. Never.  
The program leaders that I spoke to were unsure how to effectively provide 
support to staff. One director described how organizational support could be provided by 
an “unbiased group,” similar to the support provided during Cameron. As described in 
Chapter 5, the laboratory staff and others involved in Cameron would not recommend the 
model used for support in ER/PR. Another director described the dynamic created by the 
process of the quality case review and highlighted how the role of the manager and the 
Quality Clinical Safety Leader actually “isolated and alienated staff.” The organizational 
policies indicate that the program manager would support staff, and yet this director felt 
the dynamic created by the manager’s role is not positive for staff. In addition, she 
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indicated that the program manager and Quality Clinical Safety Leader are not available; 
since they would be conducting the investigation, and according to this director are in a 
conflict based on their assignment as “investigators”. Clearly the staff who are expected 
to provide support (program manager and Quality Clinical Safety Leader) are not 
available and there is no other viable plan described. Without a clear plan for support this 
director was left hoping that in the end they “might feel alright.”  
 The description by different program leaders of their uncertainty about how to 
provide support was echoed in the experiences of staff. When a nurse was asked about 
her experience of receiving support from her nurse manager, she recalled: 
Nil, none, no acknowledgement of what happened. If something had gone wrong 
or if the Intensivist who answered the code had questioned what was done or how 
the code was run, then we would’ve been interviewed by the nurse manager, but 
in terms of … offering support, nothing. I’ve never been, no [offered support]. 
In this scenario described by this senior nurse, it was possible that the program manager 
did not identify this event as adverse for staff since the outcome was not entirely 
unexpected, but it was the nurse’s summary of “never” being offered support that was 
more telling. 
A community health nurse described the sensation of seeing an event reported in 
the media and not having had any support from her manager. She described the support 
of an external reviewer who had provided her with some closure after not feeling 
supported by the organization: 
You’re just standing there looking at the screen, and you’re watching it with 
family sometimes. You can’t make a comment … We don’t look for a lot [of 
support]. I don’t think it’s a lot anyone needs. … But [for] someone [the external 
reviewer] to say … “My god, tell me how that must’ve made you feel,” that was 
worth … that was it. And it works. It does. It works. It was almost like the book 
was closed then. 
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A relatively new staff physician summarized the impression of the support expected from 
within the organization following an adverse event: “So the word on the street is Eastern 
Health cares just about Eastern Health and doesn’t care about me. I need to call CMPA 
[Canadian Medical Protective Association], so that’s the first call.” A surgeon described 
the difficulty in seeking support from within the health care organization in terms of trust, 
“My perception is I can’t trust them so it doesn’t really matter if it’s true or not. I DO 
NOT TRUST THEM [loud voice]!” As was mentioned in the introduction to this 
dissertation, many participants, as was the case with these two physicians, personified 
Eastern Health, transforming the complex, large, multi-faceted system into “the” villain 
in the process of making sense of their experiences.   
 Inconsistency in the organization’s provision of support in adverse events comes 
through in the descriptions of staff, as well as in this director’s comments: 
People are embarrassed. … [I]t says that in the Culture of Safety Survey … they’d 
try to hide it … and fear of discipline is part of it too. It’s back to your just culture 
and it really bothers people too when … you’d have one negative experience in 
one workplace; and if the system is applied differently in another workplace, they 
don’t have the trust of the system, obviously, because we’re not all on the same 
wavelength when it comes to this. 
In addition, this director speculates that an organizational leader’s ability to respond 
“depends on experience, support and mentoring” that the leader has received.  
Some staff report that they are not receiving support in a timely manner or at all. 
Staff have speculated that the lack of timely support is because organizational leaders are 
not present 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It is clear from the reports of informants 
that, even when events occur over several days and when there are many leadership staff 
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involved in the management of the event, support is still not evident for many.70 A 
pastoral care staff member recalled providing support to a staff member after a near fatal 
adverse event: “It was a nurse who identified that we were killing him because we were 
giving him the wrong chemo[therapy], and he was getting sicker and sicker.” When this 
staff member approached the nurse to provide support, he recalled his own words at that 
time: “I just want to say thanks for what you did,” and described to me his surprise at her 
response. The nurse had replied, “You’re the first person to say that.” No one had 
acknowledged her role in identifying the problem. The participant described the shock he 
had felt at the time, “thinking there she is with all these people around in the [name of 
unit] and nobody said, ‘You did a good job to identify this.’ ” 
An organizational leader, working in a support program, was asked to debrief 
with a group of staff following an adverse event. She reported that the program leadership 
behaved in a non-supportive manner in relation to her attempts to meet with staff: 
I’ve been involved in situations where I had a manager say, “You know, that’s all 
grand, but you’re going to have to do it on your own time,” and it was really 
hostile. It put the staff in a very difficult situation. It felt very hostile … the way 
the manager spoke about it, and the director in the program … and I was ashamed 
of it myself – ashamed to be part of a management team where they were so 
insensitive.  
 A pastoral care worker described the outcome for staff of feeling the absence of 
support for themselves and their colleagues on an ongoing basis: “I would tell you morale 
is non-existent, and it’s getting worse week after week after week. You can just see 
                                                 
70 While this study sought an indepth understanding of a key informants’ experiences, 
this finding illustrates the need for survey-type statistical research to examine the extent 
to which support is available or lacking for second victims. This will be returned to in 
the recommendations. 
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people are drained. They come to work; they leave.” When support is not offered or 
provided either by individuals or the organization, then support seeking behaviour is 
required by second victims. The need to seek support and the associated difficulties 
accomplishing that was commonly described as a disappointing reality for many staff. 
7.1.4 Support Seeking  
Support seeking behaviour was very difficult for health care providers at all levels 
and across all disciplines. It was clear from the descriptions of disappointment when 
support was not provided that lack of support added to the negative perception of an 
adverse event for the second victim. All participants reported seeking the support of 
someone whom they trusted who would be supportive and yet they were seeking support 
for situations and events that involved highly confidential information about patients. The 
expectation of the organization was that supports were available to staff through 
employee and family assistance program or their professional organizations and they 
should seek support through those venues. What remained unclear was whether the 
organization was cognizant of the potential challenge that an employee faced trying to 
reach out for support from external sources, following a potentially devastating event. 
Most staff reported that they were unsure about where to get support, and so reached out 
to colleagues or family. Most described how they experienced support when the person 
understood their work and there was usually a predefined relationship that they described 
as a safe place to share.  
Staff, in particular physicians, described feeling vulnerable in relation to support-
seeking behaviours, specifically they identified fear of judgement about their professional 
competence. Edrees et al. (2011) would concur with this observation that, “in a medical 
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culture in which errors pose risks to performance evaluations and liability claims, it can 
be difficult for second victims to seek emotional support” (p. 102). Physicians also 
commonly reported that they sought support from a trusted colleague who understood 
their work and would not be judgemental. This strategy demonstrated the desire to avoid 
potential criticism or ostracism by colleagues, with Morbidity and Mortality rounds 
described as a possible vehicle for a negative outcome to occur. This experience of study 
participants was echoed in the findings of Silversides who reported that one physician 
described, “except for one or two friends, I felt abandoned by my peers, it was as if they 
thought what was happening to me might contaminate them” (2008, p. 309). Several 
physicians in the study shared the view that if a physician were to receive support in a 
nonthreatening environment, then that would reduce the feeling of being defensive and 
guilty, a finding also reported in Briefings in Patient Safety (2008):    
 The fact is, errors are distressing for healthcare workers … but there was not a lot 
of conversation about providing support; promoting a non-punitive culture will 
facilitate these discussions; to be a safe and effective clinician, you need support 
after an error; being able to talk about errors will make clinicians less likely to 
make future mistakes because they will have learned from a process that is 
nonthreatening and as supportive as possible; you just need to give [staff 
members] permission to talk about their experiences; and it’s much easier to go 
forward and change your practice, admit you made a mistake, and not do it again 
if you’re not constantly defensive about it and feeling guilty (pp. 2-3).   
Scott et al. in a 2009 U.S. study of second victims proposed that, “institutional programs 
could be developed to successfully screen at-risk professionals immediately after an 
event, and appropriate support could be deployed to expedite recovery and mitigate 
adverse career outcomes” (p. 325), an approach that would support involved staff without 
depending on their personal resources or experience to find support. 
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The ways that staff worked to receive support and the energy expended in 
support-seeking behaviours tended to define the adverse event experience. It was evident 
throughout the reflections of the events of ER/PR that staff repeatedly asked for support 
from various levels of the organizational leadership and finally described support only 
from family and close, carefully selected colleagues. There were numerous examples 
throughout the narratives of participants who sought support and spoke with a tone of 
disappointment when the support they sought was not forthcoming. Leaders in the 
organization described their disappointment in their colleagues when supporting staff was 
not a priority, and in fact in one instance staff were told they would have to obtain 
support “on their own time.”  
7.1.5 Planning for Support 
 Adverse events are a daily reality in most health care settings, with Eastern Health 
being no exception. Denham speaks of the moral obligation of the organization to support 
its employees: “Your employees are going to make mistakes because they’re human, and 
they’re operating in imperfect systems. Mistakes are going to be made, and it’s our moral 
obligation to support our employees and support our team members when mistakes are 
made” (2007, p. 111). As described earlier in this chapter, managers were identified as 
the support network for the staff and yet, as one director described, when managers were 
leading an investigation it was really difficult for them to also support staff. So the 
organizational plan for staff support was earmarked for the manager who, according to 
the program leadership, cannot provide it.   
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7.2 Blame 
Having thoroughly explored the various aspects of support and its role in the 
experience of second victims, it is now time to examine another variable within the 
experience -- blame. The role of support or non-support in the outcome of an event for a 
staff member was heightened when the staff member experienced blame, a perception 
frequently described within the study narratives. The next section of this chapter 
examines the specific instances and descriptions of blame reported by second victims and 
how those instances define the experience for the second victim.  
Blame was reported from a number of perspectives. When an adverse event is 
examined and understood as being the responsibility of an individual or program there 
may be evidence of blame in response to that event. When an adverse event is understood 
to be the responsibility of an individual or program and that individual or program has 
difficulty accepting their role within the event, blame may be directed elsewhere. The 
projection of blame to a person or a program may be done directly or indirectly. Direct 
projection of blame is done in person or in writing directly to the person or program 
identified and allows the person or program the opportunity to respond directly. Indirect 
projection of blame is done through a third party such as a patient, family member or staff 
member or through the reporting process and does not provide an opportunity for the 
person or program to respond. The projection of blame can be done by an individual, a 
group, a program or an organization. In any case, misdirected blame, as described in this 
study, created difficulty for the blamed individual or program to reach any closure with 
the event experience. 
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Staff reported that they experienced direct blame when another person who had 
assigned the responsibility of an event to them was prepared to communicate that opinion 
directly. The blame observed by nursing staff was described as sometimes happening in a 
very overt and sometimes aggressive manner. One form of blame comes directly from the 
patient, sometimes in the form of a legal suit. Reflecting on the experience of having a 
suit filed in relation to an unexpected outcome, a physician specialist described how he 
had received a telephone message from the plaintiff’s lawyer asking for information, 
prior to him having any knowledge of the patient’s intention. He recalled, “I mean, it 
gives you a physical sensation when you listen to the voice message from the lawyer. The 
message was there for a few months. I kept it and listened to it a few times, but I didn’t 
sleep that night.” He found support and “a lot of reassurance” with CMPA and was given 
the direction to have contact with the patient and her family:  
[I]t’s good to have someone who’s reliable there to talk to too. The first thing he 
said is, “Did you go up and see her after it happened,” and they had encouraged 
that. [K]eep the lines of communication open, and … go visit her on the surgery 
floor. 
Indirect blame was a more commonly reported occurrence. In this form of blame, 
the person being blamed is informed indirectly, a dynamic that may be indicative of the 
discomfort of the person placing the blame. A physician reported an experience of blame 
in the form of a letter written by a group of nurses to her clinical chief, a situation 
described with evidence of pain and hurt, but with “no closure.” She described “some 
finger pointing happening in the letter … which was … factually incorrect.” She recalled 
that her clinical chief discussed the letter with her and she discussed it with the manager. 
She reported that “it was very unsatisfactory … to this day … it was never satisfactorily 
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resolved.” This physician recounted that “the nurses who had signed the letter when they 
realized how I felt about it offered apologies such as ‘We didn’t mean to suggest that you 
didn’t do your job,’ etc., etc., so it was very unsatisfactory.” She summarized the 
experience saying: 
It was horrible. It was terrible. It was a horrible experience … I think my worst 
experience of the whole situation was when I spoke to the nurse manager to 
whom this letter had gone, and … I realized she had not reviewed the chart … that 
was my lowest point. … and then I wrote a letter in follow-up and taking 
responsibility, apologizing for all the issues that had ensued and wanted to extend 
my apologies to any nurses who were harmed or … I never had any 
acknowledgement of that letter. There was never a closure, no closure.  
 
Indirect blame also reportedly happened from a distance, when a department was 
blamed in the Client Safety Reporting System (CSRS) or through email. CSRS, similar to 
any electronic reporting system, creates the perception of distance from responsibility for 
the content, thereby allowing an opportunity to blame and criticize from afar. The staff 
member who reported the occurrence would in all likelihood never interact with the 
person being blamed or the program being criticized in the report. A pharmacy staff 
member reported that most CSRS reports to pharmacy come from nursing. I believe this 
observation was indicative of the reality that the pharmacy’s work of filling prescriptions 
is almost entirely for nurses to provide to patients. However when asked whether or not 
pharmacy felt blamed by nursing, she reported:  
Yes … there is blaming. They’ll actually … say, “You’re always making 
mistakes; can’t you get this right,” so they’re actually saying.… “There needs to 
be someone made to fix this. You need to fix it.”  There’s a lot of that kind of 
wording.  
When asked “Do you think the people would say the same thing if they were standing 
face to face or sitting across the table?” she said, “No. It’s easy to be making statements 
245 
 
like that when you’re not facing the person that you’re accusing or that you’re blaming.” 
Because of this dynamic of blame and criticism within CSRS reports, managers reported 
finding themselves wanting to vet the reports before sharing them with staff, to protect 
staff from the harm posed by this type of communication. One manager described her 
approach to managing the criticism in the written text: 
Sometimes I’ll take out some of the harsh wording and I’ll only send some of the 
content with the recommendation afterwards. Sometimes, if it’s not too harsh, I 
might let the whole thing … go, but you[‘ve] … got to read it and temper it at the 
time. 
Several participants verified the dynamic of blame or criticism when the person 
who is blamed or criticized is not present. A laboratory staff member explained that in 
her department the staff “used to point fingers and yell, and now we just go to the other 
room and point the finger through the wall where the person is not there. Definitely so, 
yes.” A nurse described how she herself has blamed other people when the responsibility 
for an incident rests with her:  
The person will never know they just got blamed. “The night shift should’ve done 
this but they didn’t, and now we got to do such and such” -- but it wasn’t that the 
night shift didn’t do it; it’s because you fooled something up. 
Another nurse reported hearing staff blaming other people who were not present and able 
to respond: 
I hear that all the time from various people saying, like, “You’re only still here 
because radiology doesn’t want to do your thing” or that sort of stuff … The 
faceless radiologists, lab people, I think, do bear a lot of the brunt of this blame. 
 
A pharmacy staff member reflected on how staff feel about the blame that they are aware 
is happening:  
I think … some of the staff get really frustrated when they are being blamed for 
everything that happens because they do get blamed for everything bad that 
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happens. “That pharmacy’s fault”; and, we’re down in the basement. People don’t 
even know we exist most of the time … other than … because a pill is missing or 
whatever. “That’s pharmacy’s fault. They didn’t send your pills.” 
Both the laboratory medicine program and the pharmacy program are support 
programs to clinical areas; staff in both programs reported experiencing blame either 
directly or indirectly. In each instance staff of support programs reported that clinical 
program staff were blaming the support program rather than taking responsibility for their 
own part in an adverse event. What appeared to be another instance of blame, was an 
issue of disclosure, where it was easier to blame the support program than to tell the 
patient the details of an adverse event. A laboratory supervisor described the case when a 
new laboratory staff member had received a serum sample from a department on the 
evening shift and proceeded to process the sample and provide a result. During the course 
of the evening another sample was received on the same patient and analysed, that 
analysis indicated an unexpected result. A second technologist repeated the samples and 
discovered the same unexpected result. According to two laboratory staff members the 
first sample had been drawn by the program staff too soon after the treatment was 
initiated which became clear to laboratory staff when the second sample produced an 
unexpected result. The physician involved met with the family and blamed the laboratory 
for providing an inaccurate result for the first sample, a sample which was the basis for 
the change in clinical care. In the words of one laboratory technologist: 
It was the sample. … but they’re saying we gave the wrong results … and the 
treatment was stopped based on that result so it was the lab’s fault … it’s easier 
probably for the clinician to not have to say, “We’ve mucked this up,” … because 
the patient died. 
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The laboratory investigation indicated that the analysis was accurate. Laboratory staff 
were feeling vulnerable because of the blame that was being directed at them and the fact 
that the disclosure to the patient’s family indicated that the laboratory was at fault. In this 
case, the family was told by the physician that “It was a lab mistake” rather than the 
physician taking responsibility for his role in the adverse event. The supervisor described 
how “all fingers are pointing to us” but in her view “the family has a right to know … 
what happened. We hope they’ll be told eventually what happened, what really 
happened.” 
Similarly, another laboratory supervisor, explained her impression that laboratory 
medicine is commonly blamed when other disciplines have made errors in collecting 
specimens such as labelling or handling the specimen:  
You phone the doctor and you say, “You’re going to have to recollect this [name 
of sample]”, you just feel in your heart that they’re telling the patient that the lab 
wouldn’t accept it … you’re still thinking the people are holding the lab 
responsible … are we getting blamed; or if the nurse or someone mislabels a 
specimen or there’s a mix-up … when it gets back to the patient at some level, 
they’re thinking “the lab mixed up again.” 
When a systems issue is identified, the responsibility or blame rests with the 
organization, and that culpability can create discomfort for organizational leadership. The 
discomfort of organizational leadership may result in the deflection of blame to a staff 
member. Although there may be multiple factors involved in any one adverse event, the 
deflection of blame to staff members can be interpreted as misplaced and result in anger 
and frustration. A program director recalled a serious adverse event resulting in a patient 
death. The event was described to me as “a systems issue,” however, the director reported 
that there was a breach of standard and, even though that breach did not contribute to the 
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patient’s death, the staff members responsible for the breach were disciplined. 
Participants’ described how when what appears to be a systems issue results in a punitive 
response from the organization toward an individual staff member, then staff are angry 
and, as in this case, may remain angry for some time. The director explained her response 
to this event and identified the probable cause of the staff’s anger as being the 
punishment of staff, although her tone indicated confusion over why staff were still 
angry:  
We had an adverse event, a major adverse event where there was a patient death, 
and it was a systems issue we determined, but the staff on that unit are still really 
angry and mad, and we’ve offered employee and family assistance program. 
We’ve done counselling. We did quality rounds. We’ve done it all.  
She described that the staff involved in the counselling intervention found it “really 
beneficial” but she further described how the anger may be linked to disciplinary action 
by the organization: 
[T]hey’re still angry and mad at us because, we determined, I guess, that there 
was a breach of standard as part of our [investigation] … that didn’t contribute to 
the patient’s death, but certainly it was one of the factors and there was some 
discipline done so they’re really angry still.  
The director was open about the challenge she faces trying to effectively manage the 
anger that staff exhibit:  
I have not figured out how we resolve some of those issues. I think we have a 
really good employee and family assistance program. I don’t find people avail of 
it enough. I find peer support works, getting the group together to debrief formally 
works better than sending an individual or two off.  
She also acknowledged the possibility of “people’s careers ruined over … an adverse 
event that … was a systems issue.” Participants’ reported that when they perceive that 
they have been treated unfairly, anger and frustration result. 
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 A pharmacy supervisor recalled an occurrence that was indicative of blame being 
used to deflect responsibility away from a nurse. She believed it was easier for the nurse 
to blame pharmacy than it was for the nurse to take responsibility or disclose the truth to 
the patient. A nursing staff member had told the patient that the pharmacy was to blame 
for a delay in receiving a medication. The pharmacy became aware of this blame incident 
when the patient called the pharmacy directly. It was considered highly unusual for a 
patient to contact pharmacy directly when a nurse had blamed pharmacy for a medication 
delay. It was reported that pharmacy staff sometimes overheard communication by nurses 
to patients, communications in which pharmacy would be blamed. As unusual as these 
events were, they provided an indication for pharmacy of the ways that blaming was 
directed toward their program.  
Staff in several different programs reported blame being directed toward their 
respective programs from other departments. For example, one participant described how 
an adverse event involving a laboratory sample had occurred and how, subsequently, a 
staff member in another program had discussed the incident with the patient’s family, 
placing blame on the laboratory, without waiting for an investigation and a conversation 
with the laboratory program:  
[T]he doctors told the biochemist, “Yeah, the lab made a mistake,” and we [the 
laboratory staff] have the proof there and, “No, it was not our fault,” and they got 
up in clinical rounds and said, “The lab made a mistake,” so, that’s how 
everybody feels, and I think … Yes, that we will be blamed for everything. You 
know, doctors, nurses, we’re being blamed. 
When staff were subjected to blame, and blame was inaccurately ascribed to a particular 
staff member, it was not unusual to see the deflection of blame to someone else as a 
result. For example, in the context of a significant outbreak of an infectious illness on an 
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inpatient unit, the nursing staff felt that they were blamed for the outbreak based on the 
timing of a report released about handwashing. A nurse on the involved unit speculated, 
“What’s to say it wasn’t a porter that came and got the patient? What’s to say it’s not 
from when they came into Emergency before they came up to the floor?” 
Experiences of blame also created generalized anxiety that extended beyond the 
actual event. A nurse reflected on an application for a new position that happened just 
prior to an adverse event. She explained that she thought she may not be awarded the new 
position based on her involvement in the adverse event, despite her assessment that there 
had been a cultural shift away from blame. She recalled that she had applied for the new 
position and then shortly afterward found out about an adverse event that she was 
involved in. She reported that her immediate response was “Gee, there’s no chance in the 
world that I’m going to get that job now.” She attributed her response to the “culture of 
blame,” although she stated “we don’t tend to be that way; I guess historically there has 
been more of a culture of blame – always trying to point a finger at somebody, right, and 
I think we are moving away from that.” She stated “nobody tried to blame me, but yet it 
seemed like I was blaming myself.” She described her fear that the incident “would 
change how people looked at me as a practitioner – as a professional.” 
 Blame that is directed at an individual not only inflicts harm, but magnifies the 
harm that may have already occurred to individuals who are second victims of the 
original event. Participants explained that whenever blame was used as a mechanism to 
deal with an adverse event, they experienced unfortunate results -- results such as loss of 
trust among colleagues, difficulty interacting with other programs and services, anger and 
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frustration that are unresolved and feeling mistreated or misrepresented. These results can 
have long lasting effects both for an individual and an organization.  
7.2.1 Unintentional Projection 
It is evident from the study findings that sometimes blame is so engrained in an 
organization that behaviours exhibited and language used are not even understood as 
blame. Unintentional projection of blame to other staff and patients is an example of how 
blame can become a part of the fabric of an organization. In describing a wrong-site 
surgery, an OR nurse, although not consciously blaming anyone for the event, mentioned 
both the surgeon and the patient. She explained that “the physician got consent for the 
wrong side:”   
[The patient] was awake and, included in the conversation. Still didn’t voice any 
concerns about what we were doing, and we even had him rolled up so he could 
see the side … and then when he woke up in the recovery room he told them that 
… we had operated on the wrong side. 
She described how she had created processes for herself that were to act as a safety net to 
prevent such an incident, but she discovered that her safety net failed:  
I had thought that based on how I conducted myself in my work in talking to the 
patient, and in checking the paperwork … and, I had my own … hurdles that I had 
to go through … if I couldn’t get past that, well then, we didn’t move forward. So 
each one of those was going to be something that would stop me from being part 
of a wrong site surgery for sure. 
The nurse described her disbelief that the incident had happened when she recounted that 
a couple of days after the incident, her manager sought her out and informed her that she 
had been “part of a wrong-site”: “And I’m like, ‘No, no I wasn’t.’ She’s like, ‘Yes, you 
were.’ I said, ‘No, it must have been the drugs in recovery.’ ” The nurse recalled her 
resistance in accepting the facts about the incident when she stated, “I didn’t believe her 
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and it took an awful lot of effort on her part to convince me that it was true.” In the 
process of describing the circumstances of this surgical incident, the nurse again 
mentioned the patient, stating: “I just thought that there was no way, if my patient was 
awake and I was confirming with him verbally what we were doing, that there could be a 
mistake.” Even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, she continued to 
question whether the incident had in fact happened. She recalled that she checked the 
patient’s chart: 
I wouldn’t believe her. I went back [to] … his chart … and looked through the 
history, found the clinic notes – and then sure enough, “Yeah, yeah, you’re right.” 
… like, I told you I felt … all the checks and balances were in place … in my 
mind it could not happen to me, right, but it did. 
She struggled to accept the facts she found in the documentation: 
It made me want to throw up… even when I looked at the documentation in 
Meditech … your mind does funny things to you. They didn’t have right or left 
spelled out. They had like … an “L” or an “R” and I tried to convince myself that 
that was what we did. 
And finally, after talking at length about her disbelief and the fact the incident had 
happened because the checks and balances had failed, the patient was mentioned again in 
what this nurse considered the summary to the story: “The bottom line is he consented for 
the left side and the lesion was on the right.” Similarly, in an incident described earlier in 
this chapter, a patient who was given insulin by mistake was unintentionally blamed 
when the nurse reported, “Well, you know, the patient stuck out his arm.” 
7.2.2 The Language of Incidents 
The manner in which language is used can be an important indicator of culture 
and power within a specific context. The phrases, “being reported” and “reporting 
someone” were evident in the conversation with a pharmacy program leader. She 
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described incidents involving the pharmacy program in two ways, either “they’re 
reported” or they “report someone else.” She stated they never “report someone else, they 
never do it unless I specifically tell them [to].” I was particularly interested in the use of 
language about “being reported” and “reporting someone” because these concepts seem 
to be intrinsically related to blame. The perspective of staff was very interesting because 
the organization described CSRS as a tool for reporting adverse events and identifying 
systems issues, not reporting behaviour or people. I pursued this avenue of enquiry by 
asking whether this pharmacy staff had had experiences where she had felt reported, as 
an individual; the answer was “yes, often.” The pharmacy program leader described her 
efforts to avoid staff taking on misplaced blame because she believed the result may be 
“pharmacists walk[ing] out” or “quit[ting] over it.” She also described the range of 
responses by staff, “I’ve seen pharmacists that are reduced to tears sitting there” and “I 
tell [other staff] about it and they don’t care [about being blamed].” She stated “the ones 
that you worry about are the people who do care” and she described how she has 
attempted to create systems learning:  
So you try to make it a system. Let’s figure out how the system failed. How did it 
fail you? Is it because we have these two products too close together, they look 
too much alike? Can we fix something? So that’s how we approach it – so try and 
take away the internalizing. 
The same pharmacy leader stated that “most of our staff are really good about 
telling on themselves.” So although she explained that “we don’t have a punitive thing … 
we don’t treat it punitively,” the descriptive language used to depict reporting was 
punitive. She also described an incident in which she demonstrated self-blame and used 
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punitive language toward herself when referring to reporting the adverse event. She 
described the event as her “biggest mistake”: 
I was devastated. I almost quit, Oh god … I remember where I was standing doing 
it. … I remember everything about it, and I even remember that I happened to be 
in the office faxing off the casual slip when I found out about it, like … But two 
of us did it wrong, so when you think about it, it was a shared blame but I took it 
all on because I was the last hands on it.  
She described reporting the event to her manager, “I went and told the manager because I 
always tell on myself.” She described the trauma of the event and walking out of the 
department: 
I remember just sitting there, and I just said, “I got to go,” and then I walked out. I 
just left. … I said “I can’t do this” and I left and they didn’t think I was coming 
back. Like, I walked out screeching and bawling. I went home.  
 
When asked about the word blame, she said she blamed herself: “Yes, indeed I did. I was 
angry.” Note that her anger was directed at herself. It is evident that individual responses 
to the requirements and experience of reporting varied between staff and was understood 
in varying ways by staff and management. 
7.2.3 Harming in the Process of Teaching 
One of the responsibilities of the QRM program is training about disclosure (as 
was discussed in Chapter 4). In the context of that training, scenarios of previous adverse 
events within the organization are often used to demonstrate the key principles. Examples 
are held up as evidence of staff becoming champions for patient safety or used to 
demonstrate the kinds of activities to avoid. In either case, staff who were involved in the 
events and had been traumatized reported being further harmed by these teaching 
moments. Staff described being required to sit through multiple presentations with the 
same examples being repeatedly used, examples that referred to incidents that they 
255 
 
themselves had been involved in. They reported that these learning sessions made it 
impossible for them to put the experience behind them, and that they were being 
repeatedly harmed by reliving the event over and over again. In addition, they sometimes 
had to listen to the interpretation of the event by people who, in all likelihood, did not 
fully understand the context nor realize that the person being discussed in the case 
scenario was in the room. One nursing coordinator reported that, in the context of an 
organizational in-service, her staff member shared the distress of hearing again about an 
incident the staff member had been involved in: 
It was such a negative experience … when people use examples in quality 
presentations, I don’t know if they’re paying attention to the continued harm to 
the staff from hearing that example over and over … because I didn’t know that 
she had been involved, and as soon as the talk came on … “Why do they keep 
using that same example? Can we just go past it?” 
Again, it was interesting to note how long an incident may remain fresh for the person 
involved. As this nursing coordinator said, “I’d say … when [the story of the incident was 
used in a learning session] it’s a number of years later … and it was that raw for her.” 
7.2.4 Fear of Blame 
Aside from blame itself, the fear of being blamed was very evident in the 
descriptions by the participants. Fear of blame was reported when a staff member felt at 
risk for the security of their position, credibility or professional status. Often the fear of 
blame is not based on the individual’s personal past experience but, rather, on hearsay 
from other staff who have been involved in adverse events. ER/PR created a substantial 
amount of fear in relation to adverse events, as most staff who were employed at the time 
experienced ER/PR as an organizational event and observed the fall-out. Those I spoke 
with who had been employed at that time reported that they have a fear of being punished 
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and that that fear stems from their experiences with ER/PR: moreover, they reported that 
this fear means that they are cautious about participating fully in patient-safety initiatives 
(As was illustrated in Chapter 5). As Leape reasons, the single greatest impediment to 
error prevention is “that we punish people for making mistakes” (Marx, 2001, p. 4). Fear 
of repercussion is reported within the literature as one of the key reasons staff do not 
report adverse events. Such fear is based on experiences of feeling blamed in the context 
of adverse event investigation and management. Wachter and Pronovost in a review of 
the Institute of Medicine’s To Err is Human, report that, “Most errors are committed by 
good, hardworking people trying to do the right thing. Therefore, the traditional focus on 
identifying who is at fault is a distraction” (2009, p. 1401).  Similarly, Paparella argues 
that, “Historically, the punitive approach to errors in health care has been to ‘Name,’ 
‘Blame,’ ‘Shame,’ and ‘Retrain’ the individual(s) involved in the error. Instead of 
carefully examining the safety system issues that may have contributed to the error in the 
first place, staff are told to be ‘more careful’ and ‘follow the five rights.’ ” (2011, pp. 
263-264).  
7.2.5 Absentee Blaming 
Blame was described by both laboratory and pharmacy staff as having occurred in 
the context of conversations, in emails, in CSRS reports and through third parties such as 
patients or family members. The blame was often described as inappropriate or 
misplaced. Interestingly, blame often happened when the person was not there to hear it. 
A new term I have coined to capture this dynamic is “absentee blaming,” meaning an 
individual is blamed when they are not present during the discussion of responsibility. 
This blame may be assigned by someone who knows the person being blamed but it may 
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also be assigned by someone they do not know and who does not know them.  
Several informants reported instances of absentee blaming, when an individual 
was explaining a situation to a patient, and was trying to avoid taking responsibility for 
an event. The person would then explain the event by placing blame on someone who 
was not there to address the accusation. For example, a blood sample that was 
mislabelled or lost by nursing staff would be explained as a laboratory error; a physician 
who mislabelled a pap-smear would tell the patient that the laboratory made an error; or a 
medication that was late coming from pharmacy because the order was never sent, would 
be explained as a pharmacy failure. Managing this type of blame is quite difficult because 
the individual or program that is the target of the blame cannot address the issue and 
correct the patient’s impression, and individuals within that program are left not trusting 
that colleagues in other disciplines will treat them fairly. 
Wu (2000) has addressed this phenomenon in relation to physician blaming:   
 
In the absence of mechanisms for healing, physicians find dysfunctional ways to 
protect themselves. They often respond to their own mistakes with anger and 
projection of blame, and may act defensively or callously and blame or scold the 
patient or other members of the healthcare team (p. 726).  
Support and blame have been explored from many positions within the adverse 
event experience. The perspectives of the second victim and of other staff and 
management, the role of leadership and the organization in those experiences and the 
reality of the pain of the second victim have been explicated. However, the pinnacle of 
the pain that the second victims in this study describe is the trauma of being rendered 
powerless by virtue of events over which they have no control.   
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7.3 Powerlessness and Resistance 
 Many of the stories recounted about the trauma experienced by the second victims 
of adverse events involved being caught up in something that was perceived as unjust and 
feeling powerless to address the situation. For example, some staff described the 
difficulty of whether to report an adverse event when doing so might expose a colleague 
to a punitive outcome. Others struggled with the difficulty of watching a colleague being 
disciplined when the event was a system failure. Still others described the difficulty of 
knowing that the patient or their family may never know the truth of what happened 
because physicians or the organization were being protected from scrutiny. Members of 
the QRM program staff experienced difficulty having knowledge of unjust situations, as 
they were party to information that seemed to indicate a systemic problem whereby, they 
felt, organizational welfare was placed ahead of the welfare of staff and patients. The 
difficulties experienced by staff were described by an organizational leader, who stated 
that situations where the quality of care is not what you feel it “ought to be, … becomes 
more burdensome and takes more out of everyone … until it becomes breaking time 
when people just can’t take it any longer.” He believed that the accumulation of 
knowledge of unjust situations resulted in “significant personal emotional turmoil … 
which goes hand in hand with professional decisions to leave their jobs or quit or retire or 
use sick leave.”  The themes of powerlessness and resistance emerged particularly in 
relation to discussions of being silenced in the context of the adverse event experience.  
7.3.1 Staff Perception of Being Silenced 
Within the period of identification of an adverse event, the silencing of staff was 
described as a significant dynamic that interfered with reporting and created discomfort. 
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The silencing of staff was reported as most often originating from colleagues who 
downplayed or denied the significance of an event, but silencing also reportedly occurred 
from superiors at all levels of the organization. Often the purpose of the attempted 
silencing was to avoid the reporting of an occurrence that may result in negative 
outcomes for themselves or staff colleagues. When staff were forced to acknowledge a 
reportable event the response often involved verbal attacks or shaming to reduce the 
likelihood of future reporting.  
One nurse recalled an adverse event that resulted in a patient death, and the 
communication from the physician was that no one was to discuss the event outside the 
room.  
The baby was born. It was deceased, unfortunately, by this time, and I can 
actually remember – the obstetrician looking at us and saying, “You guys will not 
discuss this outside of here. This is as far as it goes. This will not be discussed” … 
That was a very traumatic event because the baby had been alive, all day, and now 
it had deteriorated to the point where it wasn’t born alive. 
It was clear from the physician’s behaviour and messaging that this event would not be 
disclosed if the physician controlled the outcome. However, silencing was not reported as 
an issue when the description of an event involved reporting across disciplines (for 
example, when nurses were reporting events believed to originate with a physician or the 
laboratory or the pharmacy). Although staff held the belief that physicians were being 
protected by each other and the organization through silencing, the physicians themselves 
did not feel protected.  
 There are a number of ways that participants invoked the concept of being 
silenced, in a way that revealed that being silenced was also choosing not to speak – 
describing both being oppressed and effectively resisting the oppression.  Staff 
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consistently described behaviour indicative of a lack of willingness to openly report in the 
CSRS system. They also described a lack of willingness to share their concerns about 
patient safety issues with their superiors both verbally and in the context of the staff 
culture survey. The reluctance to report in CSRS or share concerns involving adverse 
events did not seem to depend on whether an adverse event had already occurred or 
whether an incident would be considered a ‘close call’ or ‘near miss.’ As Morrison and 
Rothman (2009) detailed in their analysis of the power-silence relationship, power is 
believed to be the most important variable in silence. Staff were consciously withholding 
information or concerns from organizational leaders who might otherwise have been able 
to address the issues; this behaviour, which was on one hand the result of fear of being 
punished by speaking out (and hence, feeling silenced and unable to speak out), was one 
form of resistance to power (that is, staff were choosing not to speak out and choosing to 
opt out of the reporting protocol as a means of self-protection).  
 Employees who are in a subordinate position to another person experience a 
power gradient in the other person’s favour referred to as a “power imbalance” (Morrison 
& Rothman, 2009, p. 112). This power imbalance is reported as the most important factor 
that makes employees exercise silence as a common phenomenon (Morrison & Rothman, 
2009). The employees in this study were in a position of relatively low power and the 
managers were in a position of relatively higher power. While neither type of participant 
explicitly described their experience or their behaviours in relation to their position of 
power, both staff and management contributed to the silencing process consciously as a 
display of, and resistance to, power. Power works best when it is nonconscious and 
hidden from view (Bourdieu, 1977) – in this case the use of power, and resistance to 
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power, is even more complicated because people understand their role or status in 
relation to power and choose not to talk about it, choosing instead to underemphasize the 
role of power. Intentionally the employees do not speak about power: they specifically 
cannot speak about it because doing so is dangerous. Power works in subtle ways – 
neither the managers nor the staff articulated to me how power works (the orthodoxy of 
power, in the words of Bourdieu (1977);  yet the use of power (including resistance to 
power as a result of feeling powerless) was made explicit over and over again in 
participants’ stories.  
 There are two key judgements described in the literature as being at the root of 
employee silence: speaking up is futile and speaking up is dangerous. Both of these key 
judgements were evident in the descriptions of staff in this study: 
Nothing gets done about it anyway. … So why should I waste my time filling that 
out; nothing gets done.  
We didn't report and I know that was the culture: don't. You know, “We'll take 
care of it internally. Don't be reporting anything.” We didn't feel safe. … It was 
dangerous because you or your colleagues could get in trouble. People lost their 
jobs. 
 Ashford et al. (2009) described that employees are reluctant to share information 
with people above them in the organization who might be threatening. An important 
dynamic about the CSRS system in Eastern Health is that any reporting within the system 
is automatically reported or shared with people above the person reporting, in the 
structure of the organization, by virtue of its functionality. As noted earlier, the report 
may be shared as far up the organizational reporting structure as the CEO. Staff who have 
been orientated to the use of the system would have received information about the way 
the reports are distributed within the electronic system and may weigh that knowledge in 
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their decision to report or remain silent. As one director reported, when staff were asked 
“Do you feel safe reporting an error,” most people would say, “No.” 
 Ashford et al. (2009) also described how leaders influence the use of voice by 
virtue of their leadership style. Several participants reported that their manager’s or 
director’s style of management was a direct determinant in their decision to remain silent 
in relation to an adverse event or the potentially inappropriate actions of a colleague in 
relation to patient safety. On the other hand, but having the same result, Tangirala and 
Ramanujam (2009) described that loyal employees may remain silent as a means to 
protect the organization. Participants in this study did describe in a number of scenarios 
remaining silent to protect their colleagues or themselves, but protecting the organization 
was never specifically named as a reason for silence. However, it is reasonable to expect 
that when staff were given direction to remain silent or not report an incident by their 
superiors, a part of the motivation may have been to protect the organization.  
Despite the global move toward transparency and accountability in reporting 
adverse events and errors in health care, Jackson et al. (2010) reported that participants 
in their Australian study of nurses “felt that systems and organizations that they worked 
within conspired to create and enforce a culture of silence” (p. 2197). The experience of 
my study participants similarly suggests that in some cases staff feel that adverse events 
are not acknowledged as such, and that this may be related to a culture of fear that has 
developed as a result of past organizational responses to adverse events. Staff reported 
their perception that punitive actions as a result of adverse events are common within the 
organization, and that in some cases employees have been demoted or terminated from 
their positions.  
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An important concept to consider in the discussion of silence and powerlessness is 
the notion of moral distress, a term first introduced by Jameton (1984). For him, moral 
distress “arises when one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it 
nearly impossible to pursue the right course of action” (p. 6). Subsequently other 
scholars, including Hamric (2012) and Lutzén and Ewalds Kvist (2012), have explored 
Jameton’s core concepts. Hamric concluded that moral distress is powerful and 
destructive to the moral agency and integrity of health care providers. It is clear within 
the narratives of the study that participants are experiencing distress of varying types, 
including moral distress. The types of organizational constraints that have been described 
in this study include: limiting the involvement of front-line staff in the review of 
incidents, failing to inform staff when an event has been discovered that involves their 
work, failing to communicate organizational activities in relation to an event, and failing 
to keep staff informed as an event is being investigated in terms of outcomes or decisions. 
All of these types of constraints keep the staff at arm’s length from the event as they 
experience the distress of not knowing what is happening.  
 Participants’ descriptions of an organizational behaviour of keeping the most 
involved staff from being involved in the event investigation are similar to the 
experiences described by nurses in the Grange Inquiry, when nurses reported not having 
been given a place as rightful knowers (Buckley Day, 1987, p. 31). In essence, the staff of 
Eastern Health who are deeply involved in an event feel that they are often not given a 
place within the investigation as rightful knowers. This type of marginalizing of staff 
translates into more distress on top of the distress of the original event -- the distress of 
not knowing what is happening. Many of the participants in the study described the 
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feeling of “wondering what would happen to them” and the feeling of “anticipating being 
blamed.” 
7.4 Summary 
 This chapter examined three key features identified as shaping the experience of 
adverse events: support, blame and powerlessness. Support, or the absence of support, 
was a key feature shaping the experience of second victims in adverse events in this 
study. It is clear that the ways that staff worked to receive support tended to define the 
adverse event experience. It is evident that staff repeatedly asked for support from 
various levels of the organizational leadership and finally described support primarily 
from family and close, carefully selected colleagues. There were numerous examples of 
disappointment from front-line staff and organizational leaders when the support sought 
was not forthcoming. Next, blame as a feature in the experience of adverse events was 
examined through the concepts of language, harming and fear of blame. Blame was 
experienced in a variety of ways including direct blame, indirect blame and absentee 
blaming toward an individual or a program. Health care providers described experiences 
of blame as creating generalized anxiety that extended beyond the actual event. Blame 
was not only felt to inflict harm, but also to magnify the harm that may have already 
occurred to second victims of the original event. And finally, the features of 
powerlessness and resistance in the adverse event experience were examined. Many of 
the experiences recounted were perceived as unjust and participants described a feeling of 
powerlessness. Powerlessness was attributed to having been silenced during adverse 
event management. While silencing reportedly occurred from superiors at all levels of the 
organization the silencing of staff was reported as most often originating from colleagues. 
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Resistance to powerlessness occurred by silencing, a move that inadvertently served to 
reinforce the very relations of power that were being resisted.  
Again, although many participants personify Eastern Health as a villain, the 
“truth” of individual experiences described by participants may or may not be shared by 
others. What is important for this study is that the staff who reported their experiences 
felt they were true and in keeping with their recollection. The intention of this study is not 
to inadvertently or intentionally perpetuate the personification of the organization as a 
villain, but rather to examine the accounts of those who do so, to provide opportunity for 
the organizational leadership to examine the experiences of second victims and the 
practices which have contributed to them, attempt to understand the perspective of staff 
and commit to change for the sake of improving the future experiences of staff.  
In the next and final chapter, I present a summary of the key findings and 
contributions of this study, discuss the limitations and provide recommendations in the 
areas of: education, practice, recommended future research and policy possibilities.   
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CHAPTER 8 
Reframing the Experience of the Second Victim 
   
The experience of being involved in an adverse event may leave the health care 
provider traumatized as a second victim. This study examined the second victim 
experience of health care providers from front-line staff to organizational leaders. The 
result is a comprehensive understanding of what it means to be a second victim. In 
addition, the study gives concrete direction about how a health care organization can 
better support health care providers to reduce the impact of adverse events on second 
victims and patients, and to reform adverse event management.  
This concluding chapter provides a description of the major findings related to the 
experiences of staff, describes how power factors into the experiences of heath care 
providers and outlines the contributions this study brings to an understanding of the 
concept of second victim. The chapter then provides some key recommendations that 
apply the knowledge and experience of second victims in education, practice, research 
and policy.   
8.1 Who are the Second Victims  
The focus of this study was the experiences of second victims of adverse events.  
Participants in this study were those who feel traumatized (that is, those who are “second 
victims”). The accounts of health care providers (HCPs) who have been involved in 
adverse events demonstrate that HCPs are being harmed by the experience. As a result 
267 
 
they have great difficulty participating in quality assurance processes (such as reporting) 
or trusting the organizational leadership to treat them in a fair manner.  
Health care providers become second victims as a result of their involvement in 
adverse events and many health care providers are left with long-lasting and painful 
memories of the experience. The experiences of second victims in this study are both 
shaped by and in turn reshape Eastern Health, the organization within which the second 
victim experience unfolds and meaning is constructed in relation to power. That is, 
Eastern Health as an entity does not just shape the experiences of health care providers 
experiencing adverse events; “Eastern Health” is (re)imagined and (re)constructed 
through the second victim experience. In this study, the experiences of health care 
providers were examined for the express purpose of discovering how organizational 
culture shapes the experiences and to identify how organizational strategies and supports 
figure in to the experience. As my analysis of victim accounts unfolded, the dialectical 
process of how Eastern Health is also “remade” through individual and collective 
experiences of victimization became clear. Blaming, as described in this study, is always 
relative to someone else, with the result that Eastern Health in several descriptions gets 
personified by participants as a monolithic entity that harms.  
At the outset of the study, I believed that there would be distinct experiences that 
staff would report, depending upon their location in relation to an adverse event. As a 
result of that belief I began from the premise that I would explore with staff their 
experiences of being involved in adverse events directly, indirectly or by association. In 
reality, it was very difficult to separate those levels of involvement in the descriptions of 
staff. One exception was the case of ER/PR; in that event, it was possible to distinguish 
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direct involvement from association. In ER/PR, there was a clear delineation for staff 
about whether they were directly involved (that is, described as working in the 
Immunohistochemistry Laboratory) or associated (described as working elsewhere in the 
Laboratory). Interestingly, beyond the laboratory program, staff in the wider organization 
across all disciplines also reported feeling associated with and traumatized by the event of 
ER/PR, simply on the basis of their employment with Eastern Health.  
In contrast to ER/PR, from my discussions with participants about all other 
adverse events, it was clear that staff were unable to separate their experiences by the 
descriptors of direct, indirect and by association due to the variety of experiences they 
had each had. No person described or recalled only one incident; there were always 
multiple examples with varying levels of involvement, and the intensity of the experience 
seemed to be unrelated to the level of involvement. The intensity of experience appeared 
to depend not on their personal responsibility or decision-making role within the event, 
but rather on the outcome for the patient and on the support the health care provider in 
question either received or provided. The compassion that health care providers exhibited 
towards their colleagues and how strongly they identified with the event in terms of their 
own vulnerability tended to be a determining factor in the experience rather than how 
directly they were involved. Many of the most intense responses expressed were as a 
result of a close relationship with the other health care providers involved or a negative 
outcome for the patient. 
Similarly, when considering the outcome for staff following an adverse event, it 
was reasonable to expect that the farther in the past the incident had occurred, the more 
resolved the staff member’s feelings would appear. In reality, the length of time since the 
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incident had no correlation with the emotions that were expressed and exhibited by 
participants. Many of the participants cried openly when recalling incidents that had 
happened years prior.  
One of the criticisms that some participants had been exposed to following 
specific adverse events was that health care providers in Eastern Health “didn’t care 
about their patients”, reported as having been said by political leaders and in social media 
by patients and families. Every participant gave voice to the depth with which they do 
care about their patients and their emotional responses seemed to be indicative of the pain 
caused by accusations to the contrary.  
8.2 Findings 
There are three key findings contributed by this study to the broader knowledge of 
the experiences of second victims and adverse event management. First, health care 
providers involved in adverse events need to be given the opportunity to talk about their 
experience. Second, the best way to provide support is to recognize that support is needed 
quickly. Third, in order for an organization to appropriately support the second victims of 
adverse events and their subsequent patients, a systems approach -- with attention to 
organizational culture in its relation to power -- is required. Doing so will enable a just 
culture, in which organizational management and leadership are consistent and 
transparent in their approach to adverse event management so that staff perceive an 
environment that is fair and just. Here, I expand upon each of these three key findings. 
 
1. Health care providers involved in adverse events, from those directly 
involved to those involved by association, need to be given the 
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opportunity to talk about the adverse event experience in a safe and 
supportive environment. 
This study demonstrated the value of being given the opportunity to talk about the 
experience of an adverse event in a safe and supportive environment. Participants in the 
study described the relief they experienced when they were able to debrief or discuss the 
event with someone whom they considered supportive and understanding. The 
opportunity to discuss the event needs to be extended beyond those directly and 
obviously involved in an adverse event to those people tangentially involved. Managers 
and organizational leadership need to be intentional in communicating with staff about 
their experiences and give staff an opportunity to talk, since staff interpret silence in the 
context of adverse event investigation as punitive. 
Most participants in this study identified their perception of the importance of 
having the opportunity to discuss their feelings in a timely manner following an adverse 
event, although some described that they themselves did not have that opportunity until 
they shared their feelings in the context of this study. Health care providers who had long 
delays in having opportunity to discuss their feelings described significant difficulty 
approaching the subject or finding “the right words.” When health care providers are 
given the opportunity to share their experiences and talk about the circumstances 
surrounding an adverse event, some health care providers continue to struggle to 
communicate or explain their perspective, in particular when they have had little 
opportunity in the past. The challenge to express their feelings and the frustration of 
trying to resolve those feelings was often described by the use of metaphors.  
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 Four metaphors used by participants were particularly representative of the 
sentiments that seemed to define the experience of being a second victim: “sticking like 
glue,” “dog with a bone that won’t stay buried,” “we’re all being tarred with the same 
brush”, and “left holding the bag.”  
Sticking Like Glue 
 Just as glue is a very sticky substance and makes it difficult to separate two items 
once they are glued together, many people described, in a variety of ways, the difficulty 
of trying to make the traumatic memory no longer be part of their everyday lived 
experience. Participants described the difficulty in moving past the experience into a new 
reality that did not include visiting and revisiting the traumatic event in their thoughts. 
“Sticking like glue” was used to refer to the efforts that had been made, sometimes over 
several years, to try and separate oneself from the memory or recall of an event, only to 
find that it was stuck to them with no way to leave it behind. Sticking like glue was 
described as a frustrating reality for some participants.  
Dog with a Bone That Won’t Stay Buried 
 This metaphor is particularly powerful in capturing the sentiments of participants 
who were repeatedly reminded of an adverse event by the actions of the organization or 
the media. In particular, this experience was associated with high profile events that were 
revisited by the media, for example on the anniversary of the event or when another 
related event happened. One participant described how no matter how much she tried to 
bury the event by finding ways to distract herself or by taking up new activities or 
changing jobs, the hurtful experience would not go away but rather kept coming to the 
surface. Another participant recalled being reminded by a former colleague, in a grocery 
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store, that “today is the 10th Anniversary of ER/PR” as if that were cause for celebration. 
The media coverage usually happened without warning for the individuals involved, 
despite the organization’s knowledge, and staff would be faced time and time again with 
the event in print and news reports. The media coverage was often followed up by other 
staff reminiscing about the event, with no conceptualization of how harmful these 
reminders were to the affected staff.  
We’re All Being Tarred with the Same Brush 
 At the time of ER/PR, as laboratory colleagues tried to cope with the public’s 
impression that all laboratory staff were involved in the testing discrepancies, they 
expressed the feeling of frustration of all being identified as one entity. Similar 
sentiments were expressed by other participants when they described the experience of 
being blamed or held responsible by association with events in which they had no role or 
involvement. There was an overtone of blame within this metaphor, as if the staff 
responsible for an adverse event were causing harm to innocent staff.  
Left Holding the Bag 
 The concept of being “left holding the bag” is a metaphor that describes being left 
to take all the responsibility for something that should be jointly shared. This metaphor 
also embodied the feeling of being abandoned, sometimes by colleagues and sometimes 
by the organization. In some instances, a person was identified as responsible for an event 
when in fact there were many people who were involved and responsible. Often this 
feeling of being “left holding the bag” occurred when an event took many months to be 
resolved and, by the time a resolution was reached, some people were no longer involved 
in a program or service or no longer involved in the follow-up of the event.  
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These four metaphors each speak about the meaning of being a second victim for 
health care providers who had never been provided the opportunity to talk about their 
feelings in a structured, open and safe environment.  The metaphors point to the need to 
provide supports for health care providers in the wake of an adverse event. The value of 
having the opportunity to examine an adverse event from a personal perspective by 
talking about the feelings associated with the event at the time of the event needs to be 
examined for its potential to reduce the ongoing visiting and revisiting of an unresolved 
event by second victims.  
The stories of second victims, particularly as expressed through these metaphors, 
also strikingly revealed the extent to which victimization may be experienced and require 
support by health care providers who were not at all proximate to the adverse event.  
There are second victims who are often only self-identified, who because of their distance 
from involvement in the adverse event would likely not be recognized by organizational 
leaders as in need of support. This group would benefit from the opportunity to talk about 
their feelings at the time of the event. Health care providers who are not directly involved 
struggle to find opportunities to talk about their feelings, both because the usual 
mechanisms for identifying impacted heath care providers do not extend to them and 
because they perceive themselves as less entitled to have feelings to express. Staff at all 
levels of the organization from front-line workers to organizational leaders need to have 
an avenue to discuss their experiences in the context of adverse events. 
 
2. The best way to provide support is to recognize that support is needed 
quickly. That support should be organized by people who are not involved 
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in the event, event management or event investigation, so that the support 
can be provided in a timely manner. 
Support is very important in the context of the adverse event experience, and in 
order to be effective must be prompt, respectful, voluntary and provided by someone who 
is not limited by conflicts of interest. Formalized and planned support mechanisms for 
staff provided within the structure of quality case review and investigation processes are 
key to ensuring that support is available to staff. It is important that staff report receiving 
effective support, receiving support that met their needs and receiving support at a time 
that made a positive difference. Organizational consistency in the manner that support is 
offered is key to ensuring that all who require support receive it. All people involved in 
an event require support from the closest to the most distant to an event. 
The role of support was a central theme in participants’ accounts of the second 
victim experience. Support and non-support were critical factors in how staff experienced 
and managed being second victims. The presence or absence of support was a key 
variable in determining whether the health care provider described the event as resolved 
or whether they continued to struggle to try and reach some closure. Support was 
sometimes sought out by the health care provider and sometimes offered by a colleague 
or superior. Non-support was described primarily in terms of criticism or ostracism from 
colleagues. Some of the most emotional and detailed recollections came from health care 
providers who had not received support at the time of the adverse event or felt criticized 
and ostracized by colleagues as a result of the event. The support provided through 
formal organizational structures depended in large part on the coordination of activities 
by managers and program leaders. The ability of a manager to provide support depended 
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on the manager’s role in the event investigation and on whether or not the program 
leadership, director and clinical chief had identified the need for support as a priority.  
Support can be provided by anyone irrespective of the nature of their relationship 
with the person or their knowledge of the event, if the person seeking the support feels 
supported. This study was not unique in its identification of a lack of planned and 
effective support within the health care environment. As described in Chapter 2, support 
for staff following an adverse event is understood as important and yet, in general, health 
care organizations have not communicated or implemented effective support mechanisms 
(Berlinger, 2011; Smetzer, 2012; Waterman et al., 2007), with Eastern Health being no 
exception. This study echoes the findings of  Waterman et al. (2007) that physicians do 
not feel supported by the organization. The physicians interviewed in this study also 
reported that they do not trust the organization enough to seek support, so that even if 
support were offered it would unlikely be sought. Also, similarly to Denham’s (2007) 
findings that health care leaders identify a need to support second victims, Eastern Health 
leadership also reported the need to support their staff following an adverse event, but did 
not have a plan to ensure support was provided. 
Health care providers describe a number of ways that effective support could be 
provided at the time of an adverse event. A key finding was that it is not a specific type of 
support or specific personnel who provide the support that is perceived as essential; 
rather, it is the perception of being supported that actually counts. Support is considered 
effective when it is provided by someone whom the individual identifies as being 
genuine, non-judgemental, compassionate and knowledgeable either about the specific 
event or about the type of event in general. Support is most appreciated by the recipient 
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when it is received during the initial period of distress and again when the individual is 
processing the feelings associated with the experience. It is important for support to be 
offered at multiple junctures within the adverse event experience. That support should be 
provided by a person or within a process (for example a quality case review meeting or a 
collaborative incident analysis meeting) that the individual perceives as a supportive 
entity.  
 
3. In order for an organization to achieve a just culture, a systems approach 
is required with organizational management and leadership being 
consistent and transparent in their approach to adverse event 
management so that staff perceive an environment that is fair and just. 
Organizational policy regarding reporting and management of adverse events 
should be driven by quality and safety and a view to a just culture. It is important that the 
mission, vision and values of the organization accurately portray the concepts that the 
organizational leadership are prepared to embed in policy and put into practice. If an 
organizational policy states that the organization strives to take a systems approach71 and 
to be a just culture72, then the experience of staff should be consistent with these mission, 
vision and values statements. The experience of being treated differently, in the context 
                                                 
71 In the systems thinking approach, the focus is placed on the conditions where the 
individual works i.e., the system, rather than on individual responsibility or blame 
(Queens University, 2016). 
72 Just Culture was first used by D. Marx (2001), a just culture recognizes that individual 
practitioners should not be held accountable for system failings over which they have no 
control. 
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of an adverse event, from the way organizational policy states a situation will be managed 
is very problematic for organizational culture.  
One of the most significant problems, and one that results in experiences of 
disillusionment by health care providers involved in adverse events, occurs when an 
adverse event is described as a systemic or system problem and yet the organizational 
decisions include individual punitive consequences for staff. The accounts of participants 
in this study illuminated that when a staff member is blamed and disciplined for what is 
perceived to be a failure of the system rather than individual maliciousness, that 
information becomes very powerful and is retained within the organizational memory. 
Occasionally the need for punitive action related to staff activity is required when actions 
within an event are deemed to have been of malicious intent. In those cases, it is 
important that the action is consistent across programs and disciplines and that it 
contributes in some way to quality improvement and prevention of future incidents. In 
other words, if the purpose of the punitive action is primarily to achieve a perception that 
some action has been taken, the punitive action should be avoided.  
The principal reason that staff give for being cautious about participating in a 
reporting process is fear of disciplinary actions, either toward themselves or toward their 
colleagues. One of the primary reasons why staff dissuade someone from reporting, they 
say, is to avoid punitive outcomes. The motivation to avoid punitive outcomes is so 
strong that staff are reportedly even willing for patients to undergo unnecessary 
procedures to avoid negative outcomes for staff.  
It is important that an organization that plans to take a systems approach is 
consistent and transparent across the organization when adverse events happen. 
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Organizational leaders need to commit to the understanding that adverse events most 
often occur not because of individual maliciousness but because of system failure. The 
way that work is organized, polices are written and staff understand their responsibilities 
creates opportunity for system failure. When system failure is identified by the 
investigative process, the system should be reviewed and altered, and application of 
human fault should be avoided. A key ingredient to an effective system approach is being 
consistent within the organization, across all programs and disciplines, so that staff can 
predict the experience and respond with trust and confidence. A just culture requires a 
process of response that is predictable, so that staff feel safe within the organizational 
culture and know what to expect. 
When events happen within an organization, the organization can use the event to 
inform practice and policy and learn from the event. Post-event examination of the 
systemic factors that may have contributed to the event is key to ensuring that change is 
targeted at the system. This opportunity for system learning also creates organizational 
memory about the event that identifies the event as a systems problem (rather than an 
individual failure), that is being addressed by leaders at a broad level (rather than 
targeting individuals for discipline), which can in turn enhance staff morale.     
Avoidance of blaming and absentee blaming in the context of adverse events is 
also a key component of creating a just culture. Blaming can be a powerful mechanism 
within an organization, and absentee blaming is even more powerful than direct or 
indirect blaming because the individual or group of individuals (e.g., program) blamed 
does not have the opportunity to address and resolve the accusation. Power works most 
effectively when it is hidden in the norms and assumptions of everyday life. In order to 
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effect change, then, it is at the culture of the workplace, rather than at specific 
individuals, that reform must be targeted. When organizational leaders model a non-
blaming culture the staff in the organization have less need to be self-protective and 
thereby the use of the mechanism of blame is reduced at all levels.  
Involving staff in adverse event management supports two factors that contribute 
to the perception by staff that the organization has priorities that include staff. The first 
factor is the perception of timely communication to staff during and after an adverse 
event investigation, which would result in staff having their questions answered and 
feeling certain about their status within the organization. The organization can avoid staff 
misunderstandings of organizational decisions by prompt communication. In this study, a 
poignant example of the importance of direct and immediate communication was 
revealed in staff stories about their reaction to the Graces Memorial statue.73 The second 
factor is the perception of tangible, organized and timely support that avoids assumptions 
of blame in a climate of silence. The organization can avoid staff interpreting the silence 
in the context of an adverse event investigation as punitive, when staff are made aware of 
the internal and external demands that an investigation creates. In programs where staff 
are an integral part of the investigation process, they do not feel disenfranchised and they 
feel safer to contribute to quality assurance processes.  
                                                 
73 Staff who believed that the Graces Memorial statue was placed at the entrance to the 
Health Science Centre to punish them were not aware of the activities and negotiations of 
the class action lawsuit that resulted in agreements to settle the claim against the 
organization, decisions that in all likelihood had nothing to do with the organization’s 
attitude toward the employees involved in ER/PR.  
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The Seat of Power 
Eastern Health was identified and described as the seat of power, personified and 
portrayed as the adversary by the participants in this study. There is of course no one 
powerful person/adversary that is “Eastern Health”; and it is equally not the case that 
“Eastern Health” is a third victim. Some managers and directors have themselves been 
second victims, and some of these are among the key informants who were interviewed 
for this study. Importantly, this study revealed how those in relatively powerful positions 
within the organization are among the second victims of adverse events even in cases 
where, as leaders, they were distantly removed from the actual adverse event occurrence 
and were responsible for implementing the processes of investigating and managing the 
event and disciplining individual staff.   
 There are many instances of hidden power that have been described in this study. 
Absentee blaming, support and the absence of support, and criticism are examples of 
hidden power within the organization that were recognized and revealed to help define 
the second victim experience. When you consider blame as a form of power, it was 
evident in the ER/PR and Cameron Inquiry periods that there was overt blame and that 
this blame was powerful. Blaming in the post-Cameron organization is less overt; it 
happens when the person or program being blamed is not in the room, through email or 
other forms of indirect communication, again, a form of hidden power that is even more 
powerful because it is difficult to confront.  
The authority of the manager coordinated by the adverse event management 
policy is also a form of power, exercised in the role of investigator. The power of the 
investigator required health care providers to answer questions and provide clarification, 
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with little information provided in return. The exercise of that power also included 
keeping silent, not communicating with staff, and having staff depending on informal 
pathways of communication, such as rumours, to elicit information. Staff described 
“immense distress” because the organization did not communicate back to staff in a 
timely manner or include them in any conversations.  
The power of the media was paramount in the experience of several health care 
providers. Every participant assigned power to the media in the experience of a 
significant adverse event. In the case of the Cameron Inquiry, the fact that the Inquiry 
played out in the public arena meant that staff of the health authority were reportedly 
traumatized when information was misunderstood, poorly interpreted or poorly reported 
by the media. In addition, staff expressed powerlessness in not being able to respond to 
public sentiment following an event when staff felt it was poorly represented by the 
media.  
Theorists such as Foucault (1982) and Bourdieu (1977) have shown how power is 
most effective when it is disguised, hidden in the norms and assumptions of everyday 
practice. The accounts of participants in this study, from front line staff to ‘powerful’ 
leaders within the organization, reveal how the system itself perpetuates assumptions 
about who can be told what, and how blame should be attributed, without any individual 
specifically being malicious and responsible (that is, neither the staff involved in creating 
an adverse event nor the managers who are disciplining individual staff). Rather, the seat 
of power is shown in this study to be systemic and structural. Staff feel powerless to 
speak up; and by resisting the oppression that they fear will result if they were to speak 
out, they perpetuate the relations of power by reaffirming a culture of silencing. Within 
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the organization, blame and responsibility are referred elsewhere (to “that” department or 
“that” type of staff), with resulting investigations and protocols for follow-up that both 
create, and are reinforced by, the culture of blame. Staff feel silenced and powerless and 
so they blame a constructed monolithic “Eastern Health” for the oppression, a story of 
responsibility and blame that is reinforced by the public via the media and then made all 
the more real for those who are the second victims of adverse events.  
Power is hidden and implicit in the system so no one can dismantle it because it is 
structural, embedded in the everyday work of the organization. In this study, each 
informant believed that someone other than themselves held the power and would 
therefore be protected, but in reality no one was protected. In this web of searching for 
the evil person/s the real seat of power was missed – the system.  
Having outlined the findings of the study, the contributions, limitations and 
recommendations of the study will now be described.  
8.3 Contributions 
1. The second victim trauma reaches all people regardless of how proximate 
they are to the event and irrespective of the nature of their involvement in 
the event -- people at all levels of power within the organization can be 
traumatized and hurt. 
Health care providers who are directly involved or indirectly involved in an 
adverse event experience describe trauma, stress and feelings of physical illness, and 
report that they have difficulty providing safe and effective care or completing tasks in an 
effective manner following the event. Many health care providers express guilt at not 
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having done enough to protect a patient who had experienced harm and indicate that they 
exhibit protective behaviours toward subsequent patients. 
The second victim trauma is described by health care providers who are at the 
front-line making the decisions about care to a patient, and equally by health care 
providers who are responsible for policy and practice decisions but not providing direct 
patient care. The second victim trauma reaches all providers of health care in a health 
care organization by virtue of contributing to the health care environment where adverse 
events happen. No level of involvement in health care is immune from the trauma of an 
adverse event if the person identifies themselves as holding some responsibility with 
health care delivery. 
The trauma of the second victim is very real to the person involved and obvious to 
co-workers; it can be long-lasting and, as described in the moral distress literature, can be 
cumulative. The trauma of being involved in an adverse event is not easily resolved and 
can go on to define the person’s work for many years. It contributes to an erosion of 
confidence and pride in the person’s work, in their profession and in the organization. 
The trauma of being involved in an adverse event can reach those even very distantly 
removed from the event, if they identify with the harm.  
2. The culture of the health care system creates the opportunity for harm to 
the health care provider – in order to reduce the harm to second victims, 
system changes are imperative; these changes include increased attention 
to and understanding of second victims and of how organizational 
cultural features contribute to harm. 
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An important consideration when examining a particular health care 
organizational culture is the narratives that get told about the organization and its 
staff, and how those narratives shape or reshape how staff understand and 
experience their work and their beliefs about themselves and the organization. The 
health care culture of Eastern Health has a number of narratives, past and present, 
some of which have had very discernible roles to play in the experience and 
management of adverse events. Examples include: a narrative about how staff 
were treated in ER/PR and the Cameron Inquiry; a narrative about the intentions 
of the organization in the context of the Graces Memorial statue; a narrative about 
how staff are supported following adverse events; and a narrative about the 
actions of organizational leadership compared to the policy statements about just 
culture. The interpretation of those narratives shape the culture of the 
organization, and vice versa.  
Narrative works as a mechanism of power through the messages that are 
heard and interpreted. When the narrative is inaccurate, for example the 
interpretation of the staff about the reason that the Graces Memorial statue was 
created, the outcome is a cultural shift irrespective of the accuracy or inaccuracy 
of the interpretation. Staff in the laboratory medicine program interpreted the 
intentions of Eastern Health as punitive. The cultural shift toward distrust of 
organizational leadership that occurred through the narratives of laboratory staff 
members about the Cameron Memorial statue was as a result of a perception that 
was inaccurate. The inaccuracy of the staff’s understanding is irrelevant, because 
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in the absence of communication from organizational leadership, the monument 
was enforcing a top down, victimization model.  
Equally important to the way that narratives were shaping culture for 
participants in this study was the use of silence. Silence was understood to be a 
mechanism of power employed to manage adverse events. For example, when 
staff refuse to report incidents, or program leaders do not include staff in 
investigations about adverse events, these are instances of implementing and/or 
resisting power. While narrative or use of language is relatively more overt as a 
form of power or resistance to power, silence can be even more effective as a 
mechanism for the exercise of power (Bourdieu, 1977).  
The transformation of a culture and in particular the creation of a just 
culture is not a simple task. The source of power needs to be understood; 
narratives (and silences) need to be attended to in order to identify what 
specifically is being understood, resisted, ignored or subverted. In this study, with 
the particular case of Eastern Health, it is my position that the “symbolic capital”  
that has been accumulated through the construction of a monolithic and villainized 
“Eastern Health” needs to be revealed as a cultural construction, identified as an 
ideological apparatus of power, and dismantled in order for both front line staff 
and upper level leaders to engage in effective change of the system itself.       
8.4 Limitations of the Study 
My position was a unique one in relation to this study, as discussed in Section 
3.4.1, which had advantages and disadvantages in terms of my ability to capture meaning 
in relation to power with respect to the experiences of second victims of adverse events.  
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As the principal investigator I had the benefit of being an objective listener to the 
experiences of ER/PR and the Cameron Inquiry (since I was not present in the 
organization or the province at the actual time of the events). However, even though I 
came from a place of relative objectivity in a sense, I was also both disadvantaged and 
privileged due to my position as an insider to the organization, because my pre-existing 
values and beliefs were shaped in part by my past and (then) present working roles within 
the organization. I felt a sense of identity with those who suffered because of the QRM 
role; as well I identified simultaneously and sometimes contradictorily with upper level 
management who were being blamed by front line staff as not responsive enough to their 
concerns. 
A second potential limitation of the study was the breadth of participants who 
informed the findings. On one hand, I was able to recruit participants from all levels of 
the organization, from front-line staff to organizational leadership, and the findings 
reported here are based on interviews at all levels of the organizational structure 
including the voices of upper level management (Program Directors and Clinical Chiefs). 
On the other hand, several features of the study necessarily limited the range of voices 
included. These include: (i) the study design itself, which purposefully excluded certain 
voices; (ii) my position as insider and manager within the organization, which may have 
made some reluctant to come forward; and (iii) the context of our small population which 
may have led some to be reluctant to come forward out of fear of being recognized.  
(i) Study design. This study does not capture the voices of those who were not 
traumatized by second victim experiences. The focus of the study was the experiences of 
second victims of adverse events; the recruitment process necessarily excluded those who 
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did not feel trauma as a result of their experience (just as it excludes some of those who 
remain so extremely traumatized that they declined to talk about the experience for fear 
of re-living their experiences). Participants in this study are those who felt traumatized 
(that is, those who are “second victims”).   
(ii) My position. My position in management and as a Quality and Clinical Safety 
Leader in the QRM program (at least, at the beginning of recruitment, as I had assumed a 
new position elsewhere in the organization at the time of recruitment) also no doubt 
played a role in who participated. My position may have defined for some potential 
participants their own safety in participating in this study. It is difficult to know how 
many potential participants were dissuaded from participating by their perception of my 
role within the organization; however, those participants who came forward expressed 
feeling safe and reported no concerns given my position as an insider in a position of 
relative power within the organization.  
(iii) Population size. Although Eastern Health as a health authority is described as 
large by participants, the individual health care sites are small enough that there are 
informal knowledge pathways that contribute to a fear of being identifiable. As a 
province, Newfoundland and Labrador is small from a population perspective, and the 
linkages in a small population between individuals as employees and partners of 
employees provide unique knowledge about specific events. This created limitations for 
the study, both in terms of recruitment (some would no doubt be reluctant to participate 
out of fear of being identified) and in terms of the transparency of participant accounts 
due to the vulnerability of being identified. Therefore, although the sample used was 
highly informative of the experiences of second victims of adverse events within Eastern 
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Health, it is possible that some potential informants did not respond for fear of being 
identifiable or fear of negative repercussions. For example, I was contacted by a young 
woman who described herself as very interested in participating in the study. I was 
contacted a further three times by this same young woman who expressed anxiety about 
participating because of a fear of being inadvertently identified and losing her job. She 
eventually withdrew as a potential participant.   
A third limitation of this study is that it is not a report on the extent to which the 
adverse event experience is felt and managed by health care providers. Such a study 
would require quantitative measures and large scale sampling. That was not the intent of 
this study. This was qualitative research in search of meaning, not a scientific approach in 
search of laws or ‘truths’. In fact, it is reasonable to expect that persons reviewing the 
findings will have experiences or interpretations that are different from those the 
participants described; but those alternative experiences or interpretations do not negate 
the experiences of the participants who contributed to this study. This study does provide 
a longitudinal account of the experience of ongoing trauma by second victims of adverse 
events, and how specific organizational features shape that experience. 
8.5 Recommendations 
Recommendations are presented in four areas for consideration: education, 
practice, recommended future research and policy possibilities. Leaders within the 
organization are aware of this study (indeed, it was funded by Eastern Health through a 
Quality Healthcare scholarship and was approved by its Research Proposals Approval 
Committee) and will receive these recommendations in the form of a report, enabling the 
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organization to move forward with knowledge translation. All recommendations are 
consistent with system change.  
8.5.1 Education 
Education is usually one of the prime considerations when change is identified as 
a necessary outcome in a study. It is important to consider the need for education with a 
cautionary approach, since the experience of staff had little to do with the need for more 
information; however, it is possible that education could help to improve processes that 
may have contributed to negative experiences for staff. First and foremost is the need for 
knowledge about how the policies and practices in Eastern Health prescribe the processes 
of adverse event management. If staff were more aware of the way that the processes 
were prescribed there may be less hurt when staff misunderstand the intentions of 
organizational leaders. The key to increased knowledge about adverse event processes is 
communication.  
One of the greatest challenges of creating an environment for staff where the harm 
caused by adverse events is minimized is finding a way to educate without inadvertently 
causing further harm. The necessity for knowledge translation is well known and 
particularly important in quality initiatives and patient safety culture, but it is important to 
take examples from other organizations or make the examples used in educational 
endeavours that are not identifiable to prevent ongoing harm to staff.  
Another consideration for education is the need to inform staff about the 
importance of respecting colleagues within the occurrence reporting system, to prevent 
the experience of blame, absentee blaming and staff feeling criticized. Managers need to 
receive educational support to manage the dynamic of blame and criticism that staff are 
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exposed to through CSRS, across programs and from patients and families. In addition, 
there is a need to educate managers about strategies of how to rescue staff in a timely 
manner, while balancing the expectations of adverse event management. Upper level 
managers, directors and executives need to receive additional education about system and 
human factors, so that these factors can be taken into account in the mitigation of adverse 
events. Directors who are expected to identify the need for support and provide support 
may have had no experience or been mentored to meet this demand. Education and 
mentorship about effective support is critical to enabling program and organizational 
leaders to assist effectively in the adverse event experience. 
8.5.2 Practice 
Removing the manager from the investigative process, allowing the 
manager to focus on supporting front-line staff in the Quality Case Review 
process eliminates the moral dilemma that managers face trying to investigate an 
occurrence while feeling responsible to support staff. Reassigning the roles of 
managers and program leaders within the investigative process will be critical; in 
particular freeing the manager up to be able to fulfil a support role and assigning 
the program leaders the investigative role. Additionally, it is very beneficial to 
involve staff in the investigative process. This reassignment of roles will allow 
staff to participate in the investigation while being supported. Involving staff in 
the investigative process will avoid unnecessary anxiety and harness the energy of 
staff in understanding the systems in which they work, to make system change a 
collaborative effort.  
It is important for health care organizations to examine the role of human 
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resources departments in the management of adverse events. When a health care 
organization begins examining the circumstances of an adverse event and health care 
providers’ care decisions and actions within the event, it may happen that health care 
providers’ professional judgement and competency are also questioned. The human 
resources department has expertise in determining professional qualifications for 
particular positions, but they do not have expertise to determine the professional 
judgement or competency within the actions of a HCP in an adverse event. The role of 
the human resources department should be kept distinctly separate from the review of 
HCP actions within an adverse event. In keeping with this role separation, any 
repercussions to staff after the examination of the event would seem to be better 
managed by the program leadership rather than by human resources. Human resources 
can have a role in employee wellness, assisting staff to deal with situations that influence 
their wellness. The separation of human resources and management as described here is 
for the purpose of allowing human resources to participate in the support of staff without 
participating in an investigative or punitive role.  
8.5.2.1 Collaborative Incident Analysis  
I propose the use of a method I have entitled Collaborative Incident Analysis that 
brings together front-line staff, managers and program leaders to review and examine the 
details of a critical incident as soon after the incident as possible. This method provides a 
facilitated conversation to allow all involved parties to come to a thorough understanding 
of the events surrounding and contributing to an incident thereby increasing the potential 
for accurate interpretations. Based on the results of this research, I believe that having the 
first discussion of the event happen as quickly as possible can increase the confidence of 
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staff and prevent external forces of blame and criticism from taking hold within the staff 
group. During the collaborative incident analysis review, assigning or accepting blame 
would be actively discouraged by the facilitator in order to allow all participants a 
perception of equality in the process of review.  
Collaborative incident analysis depends on the most-involved staff to 
inform the review, and as a consequence confidence is increased when staff know 
the details of the review and are informed of the plan regarding disclosure and 
next steps. This method reduces the perception of blame and powerlessness by 
involving front-line staff at the outset of the adverse event management process. 
Collaborative incident analysis would be led by someone who is not a leader 
within the program itself and is viewed as a neutral party who is knowledgeable 
about the policies and practices of the work unit. The person who leads or chairs 
the collaborative incident analysis would have expertise in group facilitation and 
critical incident debriefing and would be knowledgeable about a systems approach 
to incident analysis.  
8.5.2.2 Staff Support Mechanisms 
Receiving support and support-seeking behaviours presented many challenges for 
health care providers who participated in this study. The organizational leaders 
interviewed recognized that harm results from exposure to adverse events and described 
the need for support, and are looking for improved ways to ensure that support reaches 
staff in a timely and effective manner.  
I recommend four types of support mechanisms. First, there is a need for a direct 
form of support in which the staff person involved is automatically matched with a 
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support process, either an individual support person or a program, of their choosing. This 
support would not have to be sought by the staff member but would be offered 
automatically with no requirement for management or the staff member to identify the 
need. The type of support offered here may vary according to the needs of the staff 
member but would not be determined by the severity of the event and would not require 
management approval or involvement. The importance of this approach is to ensure that 
all events trigger a support process and all staff will be offered support. The availability 
of this type of support infers that both content expert and objective non-involved support 
persons need to be pre-identified. Individuals who are non-involved with the program 
could act across several programs, whereas context experts would be required to be 
identified within the program. Support may be individual or group in nature depending on 
the needs of those individuals involved in the event, but participation in any form of 
support should remain the decision of the individual. 
Second, I recommend paid leave be offered (in particular in the context of serious 
and severe incidents), twinned with the support program intervention described above, 
while the incident is being investigated. It is important in this type of support that the 
staff member is in agreement and would define this as a positive supportive intervention 
and not as discipline. In addition, colleagues who remain in the workplace should be 
briefed about this supportive intervention to reduce the chance that they may have moral 
distress related to an employee being on an employer-suggested leave. 
Third, a staff help line would provide an opportunity for staff to reach out to a 
neutral third party for support. A staff help line would be focused on the individual rather 
than on a group as is the focus of a group debriefing or critical incident debriefing. The 
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service would be available to individuals immediately at any time of day or night, to 
enable frank discussion of personal feelings without having to make formal arrangements 
or involve other people. Staff who are involved in adverse events, from the closest to the 
event to the bystander, could equally access this support, and accessing the support would 
not involve program leaders or colleagues. This form of intervention does not depend on 
a manager recognizing the need for support or having the time to respond to staff needs.   
Finally, in the context of adverse event management processes it is commonplace 
for a report to be provided to Senior Management and the Board, which outlines the 
“harm” to the patient and to the organization, especially in relation to adverse events that 
result in severe harm or death or result in significant media attention. I recommend 
including an update to Senior Management and the Board on how staff members involved 
in adverse events are being supported during and after the incident, along with any other 
relevant information regarding the well-being of the staff members. This strategy will 
bring this responsibility to the forefront for organizational leadership and demonstrate the 
commitment of the organization to the well-being of staff in the context of adverse 
events. Enacting this recommendation would represent a cultural shift in values and 
beliefs and would translate into processes to support all involved in an incident and have 
the organization learn and grow. The cultural shift has to come from the top (The CEO 
and The Board) and this needs to be made part of the regular agenda of the organization’s 
executive meetings and processes. Attempts to enact a cultural shift will only be effective 
if it includes all levels of the organization and begins with the executive. If the staff are 
aware that the CEO and executive are talking about the well-being of staff at every 
meeting, staff will begin to believe that their well-being is important to the organization. 
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8.5.3 Recommended Future Research 
There are a number of important findings in this study that beg further 
consideration in terms of research attention. From the participants and throughout the 
literature the message is clear that support is required following an adverse event. There 
is a paucity of research that examines support. This study goes a long way to identifying 
that support is needed. Now, research is needed that considers the timing and type of 
intervention that will make the most positive and effective outcome for health care 
providers. In addition, an examination of organizations that are doing well with 
recognizing and supporting the second victims of adverse events would be useful. 
Second, research is needed which examines the understanding by organizational and 
program leadership of the application of a system issues approach and how staff 
discipline factors into such an approach. Third, the question of how a respectful and 
collegial intervention such as Collaborative Incident Analysis could be implemented and 
how precisely it could change the experiences of staff and program leadership during 
adverse events requires further research.  
8.5.4 Policy Possibilities  
There are several policy options that are available to support staff in the process 
of adverse event investigation to create a supportive culture of managing adverse 
events. It seems counterintuitive to state that culture can be mandated by policy; 
however, the concepts of a reporting culture and a just culture are dependent on 
policies and practices that support them and in some ways allow them to exist. A 
cultural shift begins with policy and depends on the most senior people in the 
organization to champion for policy change.   
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Policies need to take a non-punitive approach to adverse event management. 
Policy for disclosure and adverse event management should frame all roles and 
responsibilities in a positive and clearly outlined manner. Disclosure policy should also 
outline the supports available to all people (including the patient, family and the health 
care provider) involved in the disclosure, during the disclosure process and after the 
disclosure is complete. This type of specific attention to the need for support in the 
context of disclosure acknowledges the stress associated with not only the event itself 
but also the disclosure, as families will often be distraught or angry or both. Similarly, 
in adverse event management, it is important in the policy to acknowledge the staff who 
are involved in the adverse event, to reduce the harm of the adverse event on second 
victims. There should be specific policy statements that plan for intervention for staff, 
which may take the form of counselling or talking to a colleague in a planned way. 
In a reporting culture when an adverse event is reported, the role of program 
leadership is to investigate in order to understand as much as possible what happened and 
how it happened, but also to look beyond the event to the system and ask questions about 
how the system created the opportunity for the failure or event to happen. This type of 
approach, that examines the system, reduces the likelihood that the person who is 
informing about the occurrence will be blamed. When an adverse event is reported 
through a patient safety reporting system, there can be a process known as critical 
incident analysis (Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI)) that examines the event from 
a systems perspective. The findings of this study indicate that in order for an organization 
to respond to an adverse event in a just manner, the investigation must focus on the 
system not on individual behaviour.  
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One of the recommendations of the Cameron Inquiry was the development of 
enhanced processes to manage adverse events and continued expansion of the QRM 
department for the purpose of adverse event management. As a result of that direction, 
adverse event management has become increasingly centred within the QRM program, 
creating separation between the event and the people involved, including the manager. It 
is important that program staff and program leadership are involved in adverse event 
management in a tangible way to avoid the perception that an event, once reported, is no 
longer within the purview of the program.  
Communication policy is required to address the need for involved staff to be kept 
informed of the adverse event management process throughout the review period. In 
addition, the involvement of the media and the support of staff should be intentionally 
addressed within communication policy, to ensure that staff are informed when media 
become involved in an adverse event. In the case of high profile adverse events, when 
media outlets make requests from the organization for information or interviews, those 
staff most directly involved should be informed about the organizational messages that 
will be shared with the media.  
The recommendations outlined in this chapter are intended to acknowledge that 
health care organizations are complex social organizations that require support to 
accomplish the goal of positive change.  
8.6 Summary 
The experience of being involved in an adverse event leaves the health care 
provider traumatized as a second victim. While the pressure to be more open and 
transparent with patients and their families brought about significant change, the 
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concomitant discipline of staff responsible in adverse events never kept pace with the 
changes (disclosure, support) initiated for patients and their families. This critical 
ethnography examined the second victim experiences of health care providers from front-
line staff to organizational leaders, emphasing organizational culture in its relation to 
power. An important context shaping the experiences of second victims in this study was 
the legacy of ER/PR. That large scale adverse event, which was experienced and defined 
publicly as a “cover-up,” was in all likelihood more a case of trying to manage an event 
that was too big and too overwhelming for the mechanisms that were in place, for the 
people who were assigned the task, in an organization that had not previously 
experienced an adverse event of such magnitude. The establishment of the Cameron 
Inquiry and the initiation of the Task Force on Adverse Events were undertaken to 
address the issues of ER/PR, and specific changes were instituted in various programs 
throughout the organization. But the legacy of ER/PR remains, not just with the patients 
and their families but also with the staff who continue to be second victims of the 
tragedy.  
For the health care providers who informed this study, the term second victim is a 
powerful and appropriate descriptor of their experiences. As is evident in the voices of 
those health care providers, the experience of being involved in an adverse event – no 
matter how tangentially – can leave one traumatized as a second victim. The 
contributions and recommendations of the study include: being deliberate about 
providing opportunities for staff to talk; recognizing that all people involved in an event 
require support; ensuring organizational consistency so the environment is perceived as 
fair and just; and introducing a collaborative incident analysis method that increases 
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accurate interpretations of events and encourages confidence while discouraging 
applications of blame.  
The specific organizational features that shaped the experiences of health care 
providers in this study are not unique to the organization which was the site of the study, 
but may be easily and appropriately applied to any adverse event and in any health care 
organization. The experiences described within the chapters of this study are an integral 
part of the fabric of any health care organization, and my hope is that by bringing these 
experiences to light, health care organizations and governments can understand how harm 
can happen and how patient care and patient safety can be impacted by the staff 
experience of being a second victim.  
This study illustrates the magnitude of the trauma and the expanse of the possible 
experiences. It helps us to understand more fully the second victim perspective and to 
understand how a health care organization can mitigate the trauma to second victims.  By 
focusing on power, particularly on the implicit or hidden ways in which power is both 
enacted and resisted through a culture of silencing and blame, the research highlights the 
need for a systemic approach to recognizing and supporting the second victims of adverse 
events. In doing so, it offers concrete direction about how a health care organization can 
better support health care providers to reduce the impact of adverse events on second 
victims and patients in the long term.  
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Appendix C: Presentation Script for the Recruitment of Professionals 
 
Have you ever seen a medical mistake happen and felt helpless to do anything about 
it? Have you been there when we failed to rescue a patient from an adverse event?  
 I suspect that as a health care professional you have been increasingly aware of 
patient safety messages.  
 My name is Sheila Marchant-Short, I am a PhD student in the Faculty of 
Medicine, Community Health and Humanities department and an employee of Eastern 
Health in the Quality and Risk Management Department. I am taking a brief opportunity 
to talk to you about my research study, which endeavours to examine the experience of 
the health care provider following an adverse event. An adverse event being an event that 
results in unintended harm to the patient, and is related to the care and/or services 
provided to the patient rather than to the patient’s underlying medical condition. Adverse 
events are a common and frequent event in health care. 
 The health care system has become concerned for the unnecessary suffering of 
patients and families, following an adverse event, often referred to as 'the first victims'. 
Far less has been done toward respect and compassion for health care providers who have 
been involved in or have witnessed a traumatic event, often referred to as 'the second 
victims'. This study seeks to examine the impact on health care providers.  
 My interest in adverse event research comes from my work with Quality and Risk 
Management within Eastern Health, although, this research study is not part of my role as 
an employee of Eastern Health. I became aware of the frequency and potential impact of 
adverse events on health care providers, and had some health care providers report 
feeling alone in trying to cope with their experience and feelings following an adverse 
event. Through my work, I have realized that we need to know more about how adverse 
events impact health care providers in order to create a responsive and supportive health 
care environment.  
Do you want to share your experiences - things you've seen happening around you, 
or that you've been involved in - that are hard to talk about? 
319 
 
 Participating in this research will involve a semi-structured interview which will 
take about 1 hour of your time, at a time and place of your choosing. You will be asked to 
describe your experience of being involved in, observing or being aware of an adverse 
event in your health care setting. You will also be asked to describe the type of support 
you received and whether you found the support helpful.  
 I have brought with me some information sheets and posters to describe what 
participation in my study would entail, with the intention of inviting you to consider 
participation.  
 I will maintain your confidentiality to the upmost of my ability. 
 If you feel you may be interested and would like further information, please feel 
free to contact me. My dissertation supervisor, Dr. Fern Brunger, will also be happy to 
provide any information that you would find helpful toward your decision about 
participation. 
THANK YOU 
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Appendix D: Presentation Script for the Recruitment of Medical Students 
 
Have you ever seen a medical mistake happen and felt helpless to do anything about 
it? Have you been there when we failed to rescue a patient from an adverse event?  
 I suspect that as a medical student you have been increasingly aware of patient 
safety messages.  
 My name is Sheila Marchant-Short, I am a PhD student in the Faculty of 
Medicine, Community Health and Humanities department and an employee of Eastern 
Health in the Quality and Risk Management Department. I am taking a brief opportunity 
to talk to you about my research study, which endeavours to examine the experience of 
the health care provider following an adverse event. An adverse event being an event that 
results in unintended harm to the patient, and is related to the care and/or services 
provided to the patient rather than to the patient’s underlying medical condition. Adverse 
events are a common and frequent event in health care. 
 The health care system has become concerned for the unnecessary suffering of 
patients and families, following an adverse event, often referred to as 'the first victims'. 
Far less has been done toward respect and compassion for health care providers who have 
been involved in or have witnessed a traumatic event, often referred to as 'the second 
victims'. This study seeks to examine the impact on health care providers.  
 My interest in adverse event research comes from my work with Quality and Risk 
Management within Eastern Health, although, this research study is not part of my role as 
an employee of Eastern Health. I became aware of the frequency and potential impact of 
adverse events on health care providers, and had some health care providers report 
feeling alone in trying to cope with their experience and feelings following an adverse 
event. Through my work, I have realized that we need to know more about how adverse 
events impact health care providers in order to create a responsive and supportive health 
care environment.  
Do you want to share your experiences - things you've seen happening around you, 
or that you've been involved in - that are hard to talk about? 
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 Participating in this research will involve a semi-structured interview which will 
take about 1 hour of your time, at a time and place of your choosing. You will be asked to 
describe your experience of being involved in, observing or being aware of an adverse 
event in your health care setting. You will also be asked to describe the type of support 
you received and whether you found the support helpful.  
 I have brought with me some information sheets and posters to describe what 
participation in my study would entail, with the intention of inviting you to consider 
participation.  
 I will maintain your confidentiality to the upmost of my ability. 
 If you feel you may be interested and would like further information, please feel 
free to contact me. My dissertation supervisor, Dr. Fern Brunger, will also be happy to 
provide any information that you would find helpful toward your decision about 
participation. 
THANK YOU 
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Appendix H: Interview Scripts 
Interview script (Direct involvement in Adverse Event) 
1. Can you tell me about a time when you were involved in a medication event/medical 
event that you were concerned about? 
2. Can you tell me how you felt about the event? 
3. Can you describe how you felt physically at the time of the event and in the days 
following the event?  
4. Can you describe how you felt emotionally at the time of the event and in the days 
following the event?  
5. Can you tell me if your colleagues were aware of the event? 
6. If your colleagues were aware, can you tell me how your colleagues felt about the 
event? 
7. Can you tell me about how your colleagues responded to the event? and How you 
interacted with each other following the event? 
8. Can you tell me about your interaction with the patient?  
9. Can you tell me whether the event was disclosed/discussed with the patient? 
10. Can you tell me about the patient's response to the event, if it was disclosed? 
11. Can you tell me how you felt about the patient's response? 
12. Can you describe how you felt about continuing to do this activity (event-causing) 
after the event? 
13. What was your experience of your work environment after the event? Colleagues? 
Supervisor? Other patients? 
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14. What was your experience of how the organization responded? 
15. Did you feel the need to be supported following the event? Did you seek support? Did 
you receive support? Who did you seek support from?  
16. When you think back about the event now, how do you feel?  
17. If you have been aware of events that your colleagues have been involved in, do you 
think your own experience impacted how you viewed those events? Did your experience 
impact how you responded to your colleague?  
18. Can you tell me about the experience of talking about the event with me today? 
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Interview script (Indirect involvement in Adverse Event) 
1. Can you tell me about a time when you were aware of a medication event/medical 
event that you were concerned about? 
2. Can you tell me how you felt about the event? 
3. Can you describe how you felt at the time of the event and in the days following the 
event?  
4. Can you tell me if your colleagues were aware of the event? 
5. If your colleagues were aware, can you tell me how your colleagues felt about the 
event? 
6. Can you tell me about how your colleagues responded to the event? and How you 
interacted with each other following the event? 
7. What was your experience of how the organization responded? 
8. Did you feel the need to be supported following the event? Did you seek support? Did 
you receive support? Who did you seek support from?  
9. When you think back about the event now, how do you feel?  
10. Can you tell me about the experience of talking about the event with me today? 
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Interview script (Involvement by Association in Adverse Event) 
1. Can you tell me about a medication event/medical event that you were concerned about 
but were not involved in? 
2. Can you tell me how you became aware of the event? 
3. Can you tell me how you felt about the event? 
4. Can you describe how you feel this event impacted you? 
5. Do you think that this event had an impact on your colleagues who were also not 
involved? 
6. Can you tell me about how your colleagues responded to the event? and How you 
interacted with each other following the event? 
7. Can you describe how you felt about the activity (event-causing) after the event? 
8. What was your experience of your work environment after the event? Colleagues? 
Supervisor?  
9. What was your experience of how the organization responded? 
10. Did you feel the need to be supported following the event? Did you seek support? Did 
you receive support? Who did you seek support from?  
11. When you think back about the event now, how do you feel?  
12. Can you tell me about the experience of talking about the event with me today? 
 
 
 
 
 
